A PRIMER OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

BY THE
REV. HENRY KEANE, S.J., M.A.

OXFORD
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BY

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CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTORY.

PART I.

ETHICS.

CHAPTER I. Human Happiness - - - - 11
CHAPTER II. Human Acts - - - - - 25
CHAPTER III. Human Acts and the Good for Man 31
CHAPTER IV. The Moral Criteria - - - - 46
CHAPTER V. Utilitarianism - - - - - 55
CHAPTER VI. Moral Virtue - - - - - 66

PART II.

MORAL OBLIGATION AND NATURAL LAW.

CHAPTER I. Duty - - - - - - 77
CHAPTER II. The Eternal and the Natural Law - 87
CHAPTER III. The Primary Moral Judgements - 101
CHAPTER IV. The Sanction of the Natural Law, Punishment - - - - - 110

PART III.

THE APPLICATIONS OF THE NATURAL LAW, MAN'S DUTIES AND RIGHTS.

CHAPTER I. Duties to God—Religion - - 119
CHAPTER II. Man's Duties to Himself - - 128
CHAPTER III. Man's Duties to his Neighbour - 136
CHAPTER IV. Rights - - - - - - 147
CHAPTER V. The Right of Private Property - 150
CHAPTER VI. Socialism - - - - - - 161

PART IV.

THE NATURAL LAW AND MAN'S SOCIAL LIFE.

CHAPTER I. Domestic Society—The Family - 183
CHAPTER II. Civil Society—The State - - 190

PREFACE.

The Oxford Dictionary defines a primer as "a small introductory book on any subject." This book is a primer, a short text-book for those who are just beginning Moral Philosophy. For them a clear-cut outline, showing whence the subject starts and where it goes to, is the first essential. Anyone, as Aristotle cheerily says, may fill in the details. The outline may appear here and there to be too firm and clear-cut, like those railway maps which show the route from London to Aberdeen as almost a straight line. But the fault, it is hoped, is more venial than its opposite, that of confusing the beginner with a mass of conflicting detail and delicately balanced opinion. This, however gratifying to the lecturer or writer, serves only to perplex the student on the threshold of a difficult enquiry. The book aims at an accurate statement of the principles of Moral Philosophy, as expounded in the Catholic schools. On the whole it avoids controversy, since it is not about principles but about their application to practice that differences of opinion as a rule develop. It has been compiled primarily for Study Clubs of the Catholic Social Guild. Should others find it useful, none will be better pleased than the author.

CAMPION HALL,
OXFORD.

29 June, 1926.

INTRODUCTORY.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. What is Moral Philosophy ?

Philosophy is an attempt to explain things by their causes or first principles. By Moral Philosophy we understand such an attempt as applied to man's moral life. By ' man's moral life ' we mean the life he leads, or the acts he performs, when he acts characteristically as man, that is, when he acts as a free, rational agent. For these two ideas, ' free ' and ' rational,' sum up the character (*mores*) of man as man. Hence Moral Philosophy goes very deep and very far. It goes right down to the roots of human nature in its simplest but essential manifestations, and it is conterminous with life. All that a man does as man, i.e. as a free, rational agent, falls within its scope.

But not all human operations come under this definition. Growth, digestion, all actions performed in sleep or unconsciousness, fall outside the scope of Moral Philosophy, because they are not acts performed by man as man. They are what are called ' acts of man ' inasmuch as they originate with him, but they are not human acts.

The field of enquiry, then, which Moral Philosophy covers, its subject-matter, is human acts, or acts performed by a human agent acting with the use of reason and freedom.

2. Divisions of Moral Philosophy.

As the scope of Moral Philosophy is so wide, it might seem that any division of its subject-matter must be purely arbitrary. Yet the subject can be rationally divided. One obvious division is that into (1) GENERAL PRINCIPLES, (2) SPECIAL APPLICATIONS. This is a sound division and one which every treatment of the subject must in reality adopt. But for our purposes it will be easier to make our divisions somewhat smaller and to treat the matter under the headings of (*a*) Ethics, (*b*) Moral Obligation and Natural Law, (*c*) The Applications of the Natural Law, with special reference to (*d*) Man's Social Life as a member of the human family and (*e*) His Life as a Citizen or as a member of the State.

3. The Method of Moral Philosophy.

By 'method' is here meant the line, or kind, of investigation pursued in regard to moral problems. How does the moral philosopher arrive at his conclusions? Does he infer from a few fixed principles? Or does he in the first place consider facts and frame conclusions from and in accordance with them? If he does the former, his science will be purely deductive, and deduction has a bad name nowadays. If the latter, must not his conclusions be merely provisional and liable to continual revision on the emergence of fresh facts?

In practice he does a little of both. He is at once deductive and inductive. He does not formulate his principles merely from his

own inner consciousness, nor are they a revelation from on high. The subject-matter of his enquiry is man and man's acts. The fact from which he starts is the broad fact of human nature. He takes it in its most general and characteristic manifestations throughout human history. Two such manifestations stand out above all others. Man at every period of his history and in every stage of civilization reveals himself as one who plans, schemes, forecasts, adapts means to ends. This shows him to be a rational or reasoning being. Further, throughout his history he displays himself as a bundle of instincts, wants, desires, lower or higher, some of which he suppresses in favour of others. And this means that he can act freely, or that he enjoys freedom of will. It is no part of the moral philosopher's business to interpret these phenomena for himself. He relies on the conclusions of the psychologist. Thus supported, he takes it that man is a being of reason and free will. And these activities are the highest of which man is capable. Until you come to them, his life runs parallel with that of the brute: here he definitely parts company with the animal world. These are the activities which distinguish him. They are his characteristic and highest activities.†

A further point in regard to method is this: the moralist deals with men and acts, under

† Moral Philosophy assumes the treatise on Natural Theology. It thus takes for granted, as already established, the existence of an Absolute Reality, a First Cause uncaused, from which all other realities originate in the only way possible in a non-pantheistic conception of God, viz. by creation.

normal conditions, and his conclusions are true of normal men so acting. But life is not always normal. Hence in a particular case his general conclusions may need some modification. What he says will, however, be true for the most part, though his assertion may not quite cover the particular case. But this is a limitation imposed by the nature of the subject-matter with which he deals.

Lastly, it must be noted that Moral Philosophy is primarily a science and not an art. The difference is briefly this: an art envisages in the first place practice. The art of skating is chiefly concerned with showing you how to skate and enabling you to do so skilfully and gracefully. It has no regard to the mechanics of the matter or to the laws of equilibrium. It presupposes them. A science on the other hand is an organised body of truth. Its main concern is not with practice but with principles. It does not tell you in the first instance how to do things, but why things are done in this way rather than in that. Incidentally you may in the process of your investigation learn certain practical truths. But it is no part of the science of Physics as such to teach carpentry or plumbing. So with Moral Philosophy: it is primarily the science of right human action, not the art of human conduct or good behaviour. The moralist may or may not be a good-living man, but at least he ought to know what is right and wrong and why, even though he does not put his knowledge into practice. Yet, inasmuch as it is concerned with action, not speculation, Moral Philosophy is rightly termed a practical science.

Questions for Revision.

1. What is Moral Philosophy, and why is it so called? What is its subject matter?
2. What is the starting-point of Moral Philosophy? Is its method deductive or inductive? What are its assumptions?
3. Is Moral Philosophy a Science or an Art? Explain the difference and give reasons for your answer.

PART I.

ETHICS.

PART I—ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

HUMAN HAPPINESS.

1. What is Ethics ?

The word 'Ethics' is generally used as synonymous with 'Moral Philosophy.' Strictly speaking, 'Moral Philosophy' is a wider term than 'Ethics.' In the strict sense of the word Ethics is a department of Moral Philosophy. It is that part of the subject which deals with the good-for-man. In its Greek form the word is a plural adjective meaning 'things-relating-to-character.' As a science, Ethics enquires into the meaning of 'goodness of character,' and into the question 'What is the good-for-man'? It discusses what human acts lead to and away from that good.

Aristotle† begins his treatise on Ethics with

† Aristotle, probably greatest of Greek philosophers, born c. 384 B.C., died 322 B.C. Why appeal to Aristotle? (*a*) Because he was the first to write a systematic treatise on Ethics in which he anticipated many modern problems; (*b*) Because his philosophy, christianized by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, has formed the basis of a good deal of Christian philosophy ever since. In any philosophical question it is always useful to know the opinion of Aristotle.

the well-known words : " Every art and every scientific enquiry, as well as every action and deliberate choice is held to aim at a good," where by ' good ' he means an object of value, something worth getting. It makes very little difference whether we speak of a ' good ' or an ' end ' or an ' object.' All three words cover more or less the same idea in this connexion.

From this it is not difficult to understand what Ethics is about. It asks the question : What is the good-for-man? We may now put this question into a more familiar shape and enquire : What is the object of human existence? or : What is the end of human life? or : What is man's life about? What does it mean, if it has a meaning? What is the ' something worth getting ' to which human life tends?

Many answers may be returned to these questions. In fact the answers will be almost as many as the persons who make them. But if we can discover a common element in them all, we shall have something on which to work. They vary from the purely selfish ideal of the ' good time ' type to noble ambitions of devoted service. But the common element which runs through all of them is that of well-being or happiness. Each man pursues his particular ideal of life, because he thinks that in its realization, or even in its pursuit, he will find happiness or well-being. Whatever form his ambition may take, in last analysis it is a desire for happiness : nor is there any contra-

diction in his finding happiness, at no matter what cost of personal sacrifice, in the service of others.†

Ethics must therefore discuss the question of human happiness. And here it will ask two questions: (1) What is meant by human happiness as an element in the life of its possessor? (2) What is the thing, if there is one, which produces this state? Remember that this 'happiness' is the one thing which all men alike pursue, that it is what they are really striving for by very different methods and avenues of approach. This is only another way of saying that happiness is their ultimate or *final* goal or 'end' or 'good.' But as it is something which does not exist outside the man himself, it is called his *subjective* final end (as being inside the *subject* or person who experiences it). The thing which produces this state, which makes him happy, is called his *objective* final end. The beginner should note the distinction carefully.‡

† Aristotle is no 'eudemonist'— εὐδαιμονία is the Greek for happiness. He is not setting up 'happiness' as the end, as opposed to some other theory of the end. By 'happiness' he means whatever people set before themselves as their end in life.

‡ All that has been said assumes that human nature is in its *essential characteristics* a fixed quantity, that in these things it never varies. It is this invariability which gives a reliable starting-point for all subsequent reasoning. Without it there can be only speculation, not science. Every science has to assume that its starting-point is fixed. This in no sense rules out subsequent discovery, or even the correction of previous views by later and more accurate knowledge. It is only another way of saying that the "natures" of things do not change, and that they are to be presupposed as fixed in any enquiry into the things themselves.

2. What is ' Happiness ' ?

The first obvious thing about the condition of being which we call happiness is that it does not lie in having something done to us. It is not a passive process of any kind. Similarly, it does not consist in the mere possession of certain qualities, for these may be dormant. Happiness is something which is active and which energizes. It is the perfection of human nature, and perfection is found not in being able to act but in acting. Mere capacity is not enough. Hence happiness must be an active not a passive state.

But acts are of two kinds. There is one common kind of activity which passes to an object outside the agent and perfects that object. The craftsman skilfully carving a piece of oak into delicate tracery is an example of this kind of action. His act perfects the oak : if it also perfects the artist, it does so only incidentally. Quite different from this is the act of thinking or willing. These acts perfect (or deteriorate) the agent : for a man is, as we say, what he thinks. Our habitual thoughts determine our character and conduct and can even leave their marks on our faces. Such acts as these are said to be immanent (i.e. remaining) in the agent himself. As an act, happiness will be of this kind.

But it must be more than a single act, for a single act does not form character. Nor can a single moment of happiness in a life-time be enough for us to call a man happy. Happiness must then be a state rather than a single act. Nor can this state be one of movement and change, for the restless man is not happy.

In our ordinary experience change is always regarded as necessary to happiness, a conclusion due in the main perhaps to organic fatigue. Could such fatigue be eliminated and our faculties remain at their first level of activity, the desire for change is at once seen to be lessened. Change, connoting as it does imperfection†, can form no true part of that highest perfection of man which is his happiness. If it did, God in whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration could not be happy at all.

The next idea we must grasp in this connexion is one which lies at the root of all Greek philosophy, that namely of *capacity and act*. This principle is most important. It contains within itself the whole philosophy of development, or evolution, or self-realization. Every ' thing ' is conceived of as containing within itself certain capabilities. Its perfection lies in the putting forth or realization of these. The eye is capable of seeing, but its perfection lies not in its capability, as when it is closed, but in the act of vision. Its ' work ' or ' function ' is just the exercise of this capability. It is perfect in the act of exercising it. Hence all perfection lies in act, not in mere capability.

Now, as every ' thing ' has a work or function, it is only reasonable to suppose that human nature has its work also. And its *characteristic* work will not be one which it shares with any lower form of life, such as

† All change must be either for the better, which implies that the changing subject was previously imperfect: or for the worse, in which case the subject loses some of its former perfection.

growth or feeling, common alike to men and animals, but one of which it alone is capable. Experience shows that the function which distinguishes man's life from all other forms is that of reasoning and willing. Hence his *characteristic* and highest activity will be that of reasoning and willing. This will be his 'work,' and in the discharge of this activity his perfection will be found. But happiness is the supreme perfection or well-being of man. He is happy by doing what he alone of all living things in the world can do. Somewhere therefore in the exercise of reason and will is happiness to be sought.

But a man's will-power may display itself in various ways. It may operate in the direction of self-control, curbing lower desires in the pursuit of a higher good, as when he willingly endures privation and hardship to scale a Mount Everest. Acting habitually thus, it will engender in its possessor the habits of the moral virtues, such as temperance, fortitude, and the rest. Or it may influence the mind to the production of some external effect, as when a man is moved to think out a business proposition and to devise means to its execution. Or it may direct the understanding to ruminate, and ponder, and consider, with no other object than just the activity itself, or the further investigation and fuller understanding of truth.

Of these three modes of activity of reason and will the first two are clearly directed to something beyond themselves. Hence they cannot be the activities in which happiness essentially lies, since it is a final activity, directed to nothing beyond itself but pursued

for its own sake. It would seem therefore that it must reside in the third. Happiness will then lie in an act of the mind contemplating for contemplation's sake. This conclusion may sound rather startling, until we remind ourselves of how much of contemplation there is in our ordinary lives and how keen the pleasure it affords. The dramatist, the novelist, the artist, and even the film-producer all appeal in varying degrees to the fact that the human mind naturally tends to contemplation. They aid its gratification by sights and sounds which appeal to the senses, or by dramatically conceived scenes which appeal to the imagination. Yet the average listener or reader ' wants to know.' Vaguely or consciously, according to his mental development, he strives to get at the ' meaning ' of the poem or symphony and is not content that it should be to him mere sense titillation. The same is true of our appreciation of all art and of natural beauty, no less than of scientific investigation or of mathematical truth. Further, if this act of contemplation is to give the sense of well-being, it must not be performed with difficulty and pain, but with ease and pleasure. Nor can it be thus performed unless it rests on a habit of intellectual strength or virtue. Hence it will be ' an activity according to virtue.' Moreover it will demand easy surroundings and the absence of pain and discomfort, and it must endure. A good that will not last cannot be man's final good : for the impermanent is imperfect, but man's final good must be perfect. " Such a life," Aristotle writes, " will be too good for man : for not as he is man will he so live, but

inasmuch as there is a divine element in his composition. As much as this element excels the compound into which it enters, so much does the act of the said element excel any act in any other line of virtue." (*Eth.* X, vii, 8. Fr. J. Rickaby's translation in *Moral Philosophy*, p. 9.)

'A life too good for man' may seem a strange result of the activity proper to man. And if Ethics stood alone, unaided by any other human science, the conclusion might well be rejected as unsatisfactory. Fortunately Psychology and Natural Theology are able to throw light here. They will assure us that the reasoning part of man is a spiritual thing, that there are no grounds for thinking that it will ever perish, since, having no parts, it can never experience dissolution: that if any such continuous activity of contemplation exists, it can only be in a state of being different from that of which we have at present experience. Aristotle is of course speaking of ideal and perfect happiness, which postulates much more than life as we ordinarily know it affords. A certain measure of happiness is however attainable in the ordinary conditions of everyday life. Yet even here the determining factor would seem to be content of mind rather than material conditions of wealth or even of bodily health. No matter how perfect his health or abundant his wealth, a man is not happy if, for whatever cause, his mind is restless, anxious, or disappointed. On the other hand a noble ambition, devotion to a cause or to persons whom he loves, to say nothing of the higher motives of religion, can sustain a man and

make him at least contented in circumstances of privation or great bodily hardship. In the lives of most men there is perhaps a larger element of this ' content ' than they advert to or are willing to admit to themselves.

Yet the conclusion is in some sense disappointing. We look for an ' end ' of human existence, as we know it here and now, and we do not find that our conclusion is fully realizable in everyday life. Our disappointment may perhaps be explained by the natural tendency to regard human nature as self-contained and autonomous. But in any logical consideration of the matter it is difficult to see how man can be perfectly autonomous without being self-caused. Ethics thus throws us back on to Natural Theology and has its roots very deep in the ' nature of things.'

Aristotle sums up his account of human happiness in the following definition: " Human good (or the good for man) is an activity of the soul according to the best and most complete virtue in a perfect life." (*Eth.* I. vii, 15, 16). It remains to add that in the ' perfect life ' will be included the social element, for man is by nature a social being. He is not destined to find his happiness in isolation. Only ' a beast or a god ' can do that. A book and a half of the *Ethics* (VIII, IX) is devoted to the discussion of friendship as an element in human happiness. Perfect happiness involves the recognition of the good in those around us and whom we love.

3. Is Happiness Attainable by Man ?

To answer this all-important question we

have to start from a fact and from a principle. The fact is that MAN DESIRES PERFECT HAPPINESS, the principle that NATURE DOES NOTHING IN VAIN. As to the fact, no man desires that it may be *imperfectly* well with him and his. If he has any desire at all in the matter, as he certainly has, it is that it may be perfectly well with him and this is a desire for perfect happiness. And this desire is not artificial or accidental. It is as natural as the desire for food or for communication with others by speech. It is part of a man's original constitution, of his nature. "To desire happiness," says St. Thomas,† "is nothing else than to desire that the will be satisfied, and this every man desires" (I. 2. a. 5. q. 8).

As to the principle that Nature does nothing in vain, it does not mean that everything in nature attains its final end, or that there is no prodigality and no waste in nature. But it means that if nature implants a capacity or an 'appetite' for a certain end, that end must be a genuine possibility, not an illusion, and realizable under the proper conditions. If the acorn has the capacity for development into an oak, somewhere in nature there will exist oaks: and, given the proper conditions of environment, nutrition and the rest, any particular acorn may so develop.

If then the desire for happiness is a natural desire in man, it would seem that this capacity is realizable, given the proper conditions. But in life as we know it these conditions (perfect intellectual virtue, the complete ab-

† St. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of the scholastic philosophers and theologians (1225—1274). The references in this book are to his *Summa Theologica.*

sence of pain and discomfort, length of days, and the rest) are never realized in combination. Hence the natural final end of man, though attainable, is never attained in the present phase of our existence. But if not here, it must be attained elsewhere. The imperishable spirit of man must realize its end in some state of existence other than the present. This seems to be as far as the purely ethical argument will take us, and the limitation has furnished ground for much criticism of the Aristotelian ethic. It seems to omit so much and to lead to no very palpable conclusion. Hence philosophers, notably the Hedonists, have tried to find a theory of morals which should fill the gaps and furnish an end more practicable than that which we have outlined. We are not at present concerned with such attempts. The reader interested in the subject will find a good account of the *Ethics* and some stimulating criticism in Mr. Field's *Moral Theory* (Methuen), cc. 6—9.

4. What is the Object which makes Man Finally Happy?

Ethics, we said (p. 13), asks two questions: (1) What is meant by human happiness? (2) What is the thing, if there is one, which produces this state? We have now to deal with this second question, and enquire, What is the objective final good for man? or, What is the object which makes man finally happy?

We may first note with Aristotle that the final good must be what he calls 'self-sufficing,' and this he explains to mean that " of itself alone it must make life worth having and in want of nothing " (*Eth.* I. 7, 7).

Clearly then it must include all that the will can desire. It must " entirely satisfy the will " (I. 2. q. 2. a. 8). What sort of good is this? First, what is it *not*?

Quite obviously it is not to be found in certain external things, such as wealth, honour, reputation, influence or power. For all these are only partial goods, i.e. they do not satisfy the whole man. Also, they are too transitory and depend too much on others to give or take away. As Aristotle says, they are too ' superficial ' to be that for which we are seeking.

Neither can Pleasure be man's final good. Of this we shall have more to say later (see p. 61). Here we need only note that pleasure is the repose of the will in the attainment of its good. It is not that good itself. From a slightly different standpoint Aristotle calls it ' the efflorescence of activity,' inseparably bound up with, yet not the activity itself. Moreover, a natural desire impels in the first place to its natural object, not to the pleasure which its possession affords. A starving man primarily desires food, not the pleasure of eating. In the same way the will primarily desires its ' object,' not the pleasure which comes of its possession. Pleasure however *accompanies* the possession of the final good and is the satisfaction experienced by the will in that good.

Some philosophers have proposed ' self-realization ' as the final good. By this they mean the fullest development of our spiritual capacities and of those of our character.†

† " Spiritual " is here used chiefly of the natural capacities of the soul, not at all in the sense of ' supernatural.'

This is an attractive theory: yet it is difficult to see how the *objective* final end, i.e. the object the possession of which causes happiness, can be the soul itself or any state of its development. Self-realization is but another term for the complete development of the soul's capacities. But these are capacities for the enjoyment of something external to it, which in last analysis is its final good. Self-realization thus lacks that note of finality which must characterise the good we are seeking. The attainment of the final good of course involves self-realization, but such self-realization is not the end itself.

For similar reasons the final end cannot be any other good of the soul itself, such as knowledge, culture, virtue, etc. What then is it?

The final end of a thing is the realization of its capacities through the attainment of their natural objects. In the case of plants and animals we can see a regular cycle of beginning, growth, maturity, decline. And were man just as the plant or animal, it might be maintained that his final end too was such self-realization. But he is different from them. He has mind and will, and these things cannot be material. They must be what are called 'spiritual.' And as the capacity of the mind is not exhausted by any particular truth: so the capacity of the rational will is not satisfied by this or that particular good but only by the good-in-general. 'The good' in the widest sense is its object. Short of such good it will never be satisfied. It will never know that entire rest of which the moralists speak. Its final good therefore must be illimitable, infinite. No finite, conditioned, relative good

but will always leave something more to be desired, and will thus fail to give that complete rest and satisfaction which the will must necessarily ultimately seek. An infinite good alone can afford such satisfaction: and there is and can be only one infinite good, the Absolute Good, which is God. Hence God Himself is the final objective end of reason and will, the final goal of human life. In knowing and loving the infinite truth and beauty which is God the soul of man is to find the highest exercise of its natural powers, its natural 'end,' and its supreme happiness and well-being. But such unfettered and uninterrupted knowledge and love is impossible in the present phase of its existence. Hence, unless man alone has a final end which is utterly unattainable and therefore none, it must be attainable and attained in some other condition of existence than the present. Supernatural revelation has here a fuller message, but beyond this conclusion human argument is silent†

Questions for Revision.

1. Distinguish between Ethics and Moral Philosophy. What is the question with which Ethics deals?

2. What do you understand by Happiness? What questions does Ethics ask in regard to it?

† For a fuller explanation of the kind of knowledge here implied the reader may consult Fr. J. Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy*, c. II, sect. 4.

3. In what sort of activity will human Happiness consist? How would you show that Happiness is attainable by man?

4. What is the *subjective*, and what the *objective* end of human life? Explain the difference.

5. How far is it true to say that the theory of Happiness as the end of human life is (*a*) selfish, (*b*) inadequate?

CHAPTER II.

HUMAN ACTS.

Ethics is the science of the good for man, and that good is attainable only through human acts. Hence the necessity of clear ideas as to what a human act is, what circumstances make it less human, what acts lead in the direction of the good for man and what away from it. These questions will form the divisions of this next part of the subject.

1. What is a Human Act ?

A human act is an act done under the control of reason and free will. It is therefore conscious, i.e. you know what you are doing, and it is free. "Those acts are called human of which a man is master, and he is master of his actions in virtue of his reason and his will." So St. Thomas (I. 2. q. 1, a. 1.). Knowledge, voluntariness, freedom, then, characterize the

human act. If one of these be absent, the act is not fully human. And the greatest of them is voluntariness, which really includes the other two. A Voluntary act is defined as *An act proceeding from an intrinsic principle* (i.e. from the will) *with and by reason of a knowledge of the end or object of the action.* Whatever therefore diminishes knowledge or lessens the share which the will has in the action, takes away to that extent from its full voluntary character. Such mitigations of the voluntary are common enough in everyday conduct. They spring from *Ignorance* (which diminishes knowledge), from *Passionate Desire* and *Fear*, either of which may lessen the share which the will has in the act. Hence these three things, ignorance, passionate desire, and fear, are said to be the *Impediments of the Voluntary.*

Note also that an action may be absolutely voluntary, yet to some extent involuntary. If you go to have a painful tooth filled, you go of your own free will and no-one could say that your action was not voluntary. At the same time you would much rather not go to the dentist : it is only pressure of circumstances which forces you into his chair. So while this act is simply voluntary, it is in some degree also involuntary. It is *simply* voluntary because it is done with full knowledge and consent : it is to some extent, or *conditionally*, involuntary because it would not have been done except under certain conditions, here of pain. The distinction is of much practical importance.

Further, the decision to go to the dentist may involve the breaking of an engagement

which you were most anxious to keep. You feel however that you must secure relief from pain at the earliest possible moment. You see that this will involve the breaking of the other engagement and you have no desire whatever to break it, yet cannot be in two places at the same time. In these circumstances your going to the dentist is said to be *directly* voluntary: the breaking of the other engagement is also voluntary, but only *indirectly*, because you do not will the thing in itself, but something else which involves it as a consequence. This also is an important distinction and one to which we shall have to return a good deal.

2. What makes an Act less Voluntary?

We have said above that whatever diminishes either knowledge or the share which the will has in an act, makes it less 'human.' We have now to consider these obstacles in detail. The first of them is

IGNORANCE. Ignorance may be related to an action in three ways:

(1) I may act *through* ignorance, as Benjamin did when he carried off in his sack his brother's silver cup, not having the least idea that it had been packed among his things. His act of carrying it off was purely involuntary from defect of knowledge. Had he known, he would never have done any such thing. This sort of ignorance precedes the action, and is therefore called *Antecedent* Ignorance. It entirely destroys the voluntariness of that part of an action which it affects.

Hence the doer is not responsible for that part of his action. It is not a human act.

(2) Or I may act not through ignorance but *in* ignorance. An unscrupulous dealer may thus buy stolen goods at a very low price, not certain that they have been stolen but ready to buy at the price whether they have been honestly come by or not. Such a man acts *in* ignorance. Actually he does not know the provenance of the goods he purchases: but even if he did he would buy them all the same. This case differs from the previous one (acting through ignorance) because of the different will-attitudes of the two doers. In the former instance the act would never have been done save for the ignorance of the doer. In the latter, knowledge would have had no effect whatever on the determination to act. But the fact remains that in the second instance the receiver did act in ignorance: hence his act was involuntary in so far as it was due to ignorance alone. This kind of ignorance, as it accompanies the action, is called *Concomitant* Ignorance. It too destroys the voluntariness of that part of the act which it affects.

(3) There is yet a third kind of ignorance which is caused by the will itself. It is a consequence of the will's own action, and is therefore called *Consequent* Ignorance and it is of two kinds:

(*a*) I may *directly* will to be ignorant, deliberately avoiding the taking of any means to dispel my ignorance, keeping out of the way of any information which could bring my obligation home to me. Such ignorance is deliberately striven for, and the Latin term for it is *ignorantia affectata*, *affectare* meaning to

strive after. In English it is termed *affected* ignorance.†

Or (*b*) without deliberately refusing to inform myself, I may be merely careless and neglect to acquire information when I easily might. In an important matter, where I am under an obligation to learn the truth, such ignorance is called *crass*. A lawyer or a doctor, who ruins his client or his patient's health through want of knowledge, which he has neglected to acquire and ought to have acquired, is said to be in a state of crass ignorance.

Neither of these kinds of ignorance can wholly destroy the voluntariness of an action. Yet, inasmuch as whether through affected or crass ignorance the agent is ignorant at the moment of action, his conduct is less voluntary than it would have been, had he acted with full knowledge.

PASSIONATE DESIRE. Passion, as such, does not belong to the rational will but to the feelings. Hence in itself it is non-moral. It enters into the moral life only in so far as it is acquiesced in, or controlled, or heightened by the will. It is a strong impulse of the sensitive or emotional element in us urging to some pleasure of the senses. Such desires can arise unbidden. Passion is then said to be *antecedent*, because it precedes the action of the will. If the will evoke, acquiesce in, or heighten the desire by its deliberate act, the passion is said to be *consequent* upon the action of the will.

† An *affected* man is one who deliberately gives himself airs or strives after effect.

An act done under the influence of Passionate Desire is a voluntary act, since it proceeds from the will—unless the passion is so intense as of itself for the time being altogether to suspend the action of reason. Then clearly the act is no longer human. Such passion is however exceptional. Normally, *antecedent* passionate desire by its influence on the will increases the voluntariness of the act but diminishes its freedom and hence its accountability. *Consequent* passion, deliberately fostered, intensifies the will's consent, and increases at once the voluntariness of the act and our responsibility for it. And even though such passion ousts reason for the moment, yet inasmuch it has been accepted and intensified by the will, the action will be voluntary, in cause at least, and hence imputable to the agent.

Fear. The passion of Fear clearly lessens the voluntary character of an act: for what a man does from fear, he does reluctantly, i.e. as it were struggling not to do it. Yet his action still proceeds from his will and so is a voluntary act—unless of course the fear is so violent as for the time being to oust reason. Normally, however, fear diminishes the voluntariness of an act without wholly destroying it. Such acts are an instance of the distinction already given (p. 26) between the 'simply voluntary' and the 'conditionally involuntary.' In law, actions performed under the influence of fear are often held to be void of effect.†

† What has been said above may be applied to any other form of motion, such as anger, passionate grief, etc.

Questions for Revision.

1. What are the elements of a Human Act, and how does it differ from an ' Act of man '?
2. Explain the Voluntary and its distinctions. How can it be impeded?
3. Explain the different kinds of Ignorance and show how they affect the voluntariness of an act.
4. What kinds of Passionate Desire may be distinguished? In what way do they affect the voluntary character of an act?
5. If a man acts through fear and against his will, is he responsible for his act? Give reasons for your answer.

CHAPTER III.

HUMAN ACTS AND THE GOOD FOR MAN.

We have seen what a human act is and that its characteristic is voluntariness (p. 25). We then considered the things which may diminish the voluntary nature of an act and so its human quality. The next question is What human acts lead to the good for man, what lead away from it? This is only another way of asking What human acts are good, and what evil? Before we answer this question it will be just as well to enquire what definite meaning, if any, we attach to the words

'good' and 'bad,' and what makes an act 'good' or 'bad.'

1. What is the Meaning of 'Good' and 'Bad' or 'Evil.'

The words 'good' and 'bad' are so familiar to us—we rarely use the word 'evil' as an adjective—that we never dream of stopping them to ask what they are about. And yet they are Jacks-of-all-trades, covering quite a variety of meanings. If you ask yourself how often you use the expression 'a good man' in the moral sense of an 'upright' man, you will probably find that you hardly ever use it so. If you wished to convey that meaning, you would be more likely to say that Jones was 'a very decent fellow' or that he was 'a white man.' If you said he was a 'good man,' you would probably mean something else altogether. You might use the expression if you were recommending him as a full back, or a violinist for a scratch orchestra, or even as a doctor or lawyer. Somewhat similarly you would talk of a 'good train' or a 'good dinner': or again, you may call a thing 'good,' such as a warm fire when you are cold or a cold bath when you are hot. When you begin to thaw before the blaze or to tingle with delight in the cool plunge, you are apt to say 'That's fine' or 'ripping' or 'good.' Then you may ask, 'What's the 'good' of Ethics anyhow?'—and you are using 'good' in yet another sense. And in an hour's conversation you might easily find that you had used the word 'good' in all these different meanings. Leaving aside for the moment the moral meaning of 'good,' I think you will find if

you examine the other three uses of the word that there is a sort of common basis of meaning in all three. Perhaps ' efficiently serving a purpose ' or ' effectively furthering an end ' or the one word ' efficient ' might express the mere adjectival meaning of the ' good ' man or the ' good ' train, while ' satisfying a want ' (a meaning closely akin to to the former) might convey what we mean when we pronounce the fire or the cold bath ' good.'

Next, what connection has all this with moral ' good,' and in particular with the 'good' act? Just this: from what has already been said it is clear that man's life has a ' purpose ' or an ' end ' and that he has an ultimate 'want' or desire. In regard to human life as a whole that conduct will be ' good ' which ' efficiently serves ' that purpose or establishes effective connection with that end. The ' good ' man will be he whose human acts habitually subserve this purpose and are at least not inconsistent with the attainment of this end. This is a very rough and general account of the matter, but it may serve as a sort of first statement of what the idea of moral ' good ' connotes.

If we follow the analogy of satisfaction of desire, we get a somewhat similar result. The good for man is emphatically that which satisfies desire, but the desire will not be any casual whim, but the most comprehensive and essential desire or ' appetite ' of human nature, which is the rational will. Hence the morally ' good ' act will lie along the line of the complete satisfaction of the highest tendency of human nature. If there is a good-for-man

(and we have seen that there must be), the morally good act will be one which leads in that direction : the morally evil or ' bad ' act one which leads away from such satisfaction. More briefly, the good act will be one which leads in the direction of man's final good, the bad act one which leads in the opposite direction.

One further point : in discussing a man's capabilities for a particular work, such as music or athletics; we often say with sweeping generality, " So and so's no good." By this we do not for a moment mean to deny him the possession of many amiable qualities, but only that he is of no particular service for the work in question. If we are pressed to give reasons for our opinion, we content ourselves with pointing out some defect in capacity. It does not matter much what the defect is; if its presence is undeniable, we have no hesitation in saying that he is no use for the work in hand, our assumption being that for it is required a ' good ' man. In such conclusions we are perhaps more of philosophers than we know : for we are acting on the axiom that ' Good demands fulness of being,' while ' Badness or evil, is predicated of any defect.' One capital defect in regard to a particular work justifies us, we feel, in pronouncing the person or thing to be ' bad ' or ' no good ' for that work. And we call a thing good for its function, only when all the essential qualities requisite for the work are present in reasonable fulness.

And in regard to the human act, in much the same way as in our ordinary estimate of men or things, we shall call that act ' good '

which possesses fulness of being, that evil or 'bad' in which we can point to defect. This leads us to ask a second important question: What constitutes fulness of being in the human act? What constitutes the morality or immorality of an action? What things tend to increase or diminish its goodness or badness? In other words:—

2. What are the Determinants of Morality?

By the Determinants of Morality are meant the things that constitute the goodness or badness of an action taken as a whole, or that make it less good or more evil. These Determinants are three:—(1) The *end* which the agent has in view. (2) The *means* he takes to secure his end. (3) The *circumstances* in which he acts. For a good action all these three must be good, for they are the parts or constituents of the action and 'Good demands fulness of being.' If any one of them is evil, the act will be bad, since 'Evil is predicated of any defect.' A word on each of them.

(a) The End of the Agent, or Doer, of the action.

If a man has met his death at the hands of another, generally the first question (supposing the facts not to be in dispute) which a legal enquiry has to decide is whether the case is one of wilful murder, or of manslaughter, or of legitimate self-defence. Usually the whole enquiry will centre on one point—With what motive can the accused be shown to have acted? What did he chiefly desire and will in his act of violence? If it can be proved

that he cherished a grudge against the deceased, or had some other strong motive for wishing to remove him, the hands of the prosecution are enormously strengthened. There will then be a *prima facie* case for a verdict of Wilful Murder. Why is this? It is because the presence of such a motive indicates that the main thing the accused intended by his action was the death of the other. Note that the external act remains the same in all three cases. If it is a shooting affair, the shooting may have been an accident, in which case the verdict may be one of Manslaughter; or it may have been an act of legitimate self-defence and the coroner's verdict be Death by Misadventure. Or there may prove to have been malice prepense, and the verdict may be Wilful Murder. Hence it is not the external action but the internal motive which differentiates acts. If then I would know whether an act is good or bad, the first question I must ask is: What was the end proposed, or motive, or 'object' of the action? For it is this on which the will first concentrates, to this that it devises means, and this which it ultimately attains: which is only another way of saying that *The First and most Important Determinant of Morality* is the *End of the Agent*. This 'end' is the final cause of the whole action, and it is more willed than any other element in the act. Hence if the end or object of the action be evil, the act as a whole is evil. The means taken may be excellent, the circumstances perfectly satisfactory, yet the action be irremediably bad and immoral because of the bad end. On the other hand, if the end is good, it does not follow that the whole act is

good : for goodness springs only from fulness of being, evil from any defect. Hence before we can pronounce the act as a whole good, we must examine the other two elements in it, viz. the means taken and the circumstances in which it was done.

(b) The Means taken.

The means taken are generally the only part of the act which appears to the eyes of others. The motive which moves me, or the end I have in view, are often secrets of my own heart. What men see is the means I take to secure my end. The motive of murder may be revenge or robbery or the removal of a rival. One has to guess at that. But the murderous act is palpable to all. Hence the means are often called the ' object,' a somewhat confusing terminology in English where ' object ' can also mean ' end.' For English readers it is therefore clearer to speak of the first two determinants of morality as the *end* and *means*, rather than as the end and object. But realise that by ' means ' is generally understood the external act itself. This act is the first step taken by the will to the attainment of its end. In one sense it is a more immediate object of the will than the end itself. Hence its large share in determining the morality of the action as a whole. If the means chosen is evil, then no nobility of the end will ever make the act other than evil : for good comes only of fulness of being. There is no proposition more subversive of morality than that which states that a good end can justify the use of an evil means, that you may rob, or lie, or blacken another's character, provided that

your motive is good. And no plea in self-justification is more common. Yet the statement that the end justifies the means contains this much of truth: that where the means are in themselves indifferent, such as walking, or reading, or eating, etc., their moral character will be derived from the end for which they are used. Thus the murderer's walk to lie in wait for his victim is an evil act, the doctor's to visit his patient a good act, its goodness being derived from the end for which it is done. The field covered by this class of acts is fairly large. In this sense and in this sense alone can the end be said to justify the means.

(c) The Circumstances.

By 'Circumstances' is here meant all the conditions of time, place, persons concerned, manner of acting, etc., which go to make up the individual act in the concrete. It is obvious that such conditions add to or detract from the moral quality of an act in a marked degree. Our judgement of an act falls on the concrete act as done here and now in these conditions, by this person or that. Such conditions have their weight in determining our moral estimate of the act. In a murder trial the main effort of the defence is often directed to reducing the charge from murder to manslaughter: and the line pursued is to show that, while the facts are not disputed, and while, in the abstract, to take the life of an innocent person is murder, yet in this case there are what are called 'extenuating circumstances.' This means that the act was performed under such conditions, e.g. of

provocation, as to make it less culpable, an act of manslaughter rather than of murder. The Circumstances of an act can readily be determined by asking the questions Who? What? Where? How? When? etc.

We may mention two kinds of circumstances. Some merely *aggravate* (or, it may be, *extenuate*) the evil of the act. If it is evil to steal £10, it is worse to steal £100. The Circumstance " What?" i.e. here the amount, has aggravated, i.e. made heavier, the evil of the act. Others not merely aggravate but *change the species* of the act. Robbery is evil, but to rob a shrine is not merely an act of theft, it is an act of sacrilege. The change is due to the circumstance " From Whom?" and by the change the act passes into a different category or species.

In one and the same act there may be a number of specifying circumstances, each of which contributes to multiply its evil. Thus, if a man robs his father because he wants money to prosecute an illicit amour, he is guilty not only of theft, but of an offence against piety or family affection as well as of the evil of his immoral design.

Two important notes may be added here :
(*a*) No Act is in the Concrete Indifferent. We spoke about (p. 38) of means in themselves *indifferent*, that is, neither good nor bad, such as walking, eating, and a host of others. In the abstract such things are neither good nor bad. We say of them that " it all depends." In the concrete, i.e. in practice, they are always done for a particular end, often very vaguely defined in the doer's consciousness but none the less real. The end may be

recreation or the mere passing of the time. Or they may find their place as parts of or incidents in another action, as when one walks about thinking out a problem. All such acts share in the good or evil of the end for which they are done. In practice there is no such thing as an act which is neither good nor bad. (*b*) THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACT AS AFFECTING ITS MORALITY. The question here is, How far do the effects or consequences of an act enter into its morality? Briefly it may be said that they enter just in so far as they were chosen as a means or willed as an end. The man who attacks another intending but failing to kill him is morally guilty of murder, because he willed that end. His failure to attain it is a mere accidental circumstance which does not affect the moral quality of what he has done but which will be to his advantage in a court of law, which can deal only with overt acts and not with secret intentions except in so far as such acts reveal them.

But it often happens that an action good in itself has some evil effect, foreseen but not in any way willed by the agent. A dentist may in the course of his treatment of a patient have to inflict acute pain. This is in no sense willed by him or intended, but it is an inevitable consequence of the remedial treatment which he has to employ. Wantonly to inflict acute pain on an innocent person is an act of cruelty, an immoral act. But here the infliction is not wanton, though it may be clearly foreseen. In this type of action a twofold question arises: (1) Am I responsible for an evil consequence which I foresee is bound to, or probably will, result from a good act of

mine? (2) Am I bound in view of such evil effect to refrain from the act in question?

The answer to (1) is sufficiently obvious. I am responsible. There is a causal relation between my act and its consequence. As I am responsible for the act, I am also for that which directly follows from it. It is true that I do not directly will the evil effect, but I will it indirectly. It is a case of the Indirect Voluntary (p. 27).

The second question is more complicated. First, I may never *directly* will evil, nor do I in the case supposed. What I will is good, but a good to which a certain evil is annexed by way of consequence. In a difficult case, where a great good is at stake which can be secured only in one way involving an evil consequence, my action may be justified under certain conditions which must all be verified at the same time. These conditions should be carefully noted. They are the following: (*a*) The act itself (or means taken) must be good. (*b*) The evil effect must be a consequence of the good act, only *indirectly* willed, not an immediate object of the will. (*c*) There must be a proportion between the evil effect and the good to be attained, i.e. there must be a sufficiently grave cause for permitting the evil effect, which there cannot be in the case where a man is bound by his duty or position to avoid this particular evil effect.

This principle is known as the PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT and is of great practical importance. But it should be remembered that it gives a ruling for difficult cases. It is not a general principle of action, a point implied in its third condition as stated above.

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We began this chapter with the question What acts lead to the good for man? (p. 31) So far we have not answered the question. We have however cleared the ground. We have given a cursory analysis of the ideas of 'good' and 'evil' and we have examined the factors which go to make an act good or bad. In the former enquiry we saw that the morally good act must be one which at least lies along the road to the satisfaction of man's appetite or desire as man, viz. his rational will. This gives a clue to the answer to our question. The acts which lead to the good for man will be acts which are in accord with his rational nature. This clue we must now follow up. We shall appreciate its significance better if we can answer yet a further question: IS THERE A NATURAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL?

In this question the whole emphasis lies on the word NATURAL. It means: Is there a difference, founded on nature itself, between a good act and a bad act, so much so that some acts are always in themselves good, others always in themselves evil? And is this difference unchanging, independent alike of changes in ourselves, our moods and whims, and of the changing conditions of civilization and environment?

Let us recall what we have seen of the idea of good. We said that it was the object or end of appetite or desire (p. 33). If there were no desires, there would be no good and therefore no evil. In man there are lower and higher desires. It is his higher desires which make him different from the animals and make him man. His good lies in that which satis-

fies his higher desires, not his lower. And in a conflict of these, what satisfies the wider and higher desire should prevail. The appetite for whisky should yield to the wider and higher appetite for health.

Now in philosophical language ' appetite ' or ' desire ' means tendency to an end or object, which tendency may be conscious or unconscious, vital or non-vital. An animal consciously desires food. A plant unconsciously tends to growth. The stomach has a vital appetite to digest food. A lump of lead has a non-vital (because it is not alive) tendency to act according to the laws of Physics and Chemistry. When such a tendency or appetite springs from the nature of a thing, from the fact that it is what it is; when it is not accidental, the result of some special condition of environment or degree of civilization, it is said to be a NATURAL Appetite. Thus, a man's tendency to take food is a natural appetite : the desire to go to the Pictures or to smoke is an artificial appetite.

But besides these physical appetites there are also appetites or desires of the soul, psychical appetites, as they are called. These will depend on knowledge, either of the senses or of the mind. We have next to ask whether any of these psychical appetites are ' natural ' Obviously some are not. The desire for alcohol or cocaine certainly depends on knowledge. You do not desire either of these until you have had some experience, either in your own case or that of others, of their effects. No-one would say that the appetite for champagne was a natural appetite. It is artificial or ' acquired.' So not all psychical

appetites are natural. Some however would seem to be. Just as there are bodily appetites for food, drink, comfort, etc., so there are appetites of the soul. It is idle to enquire why a man wants food or drink, the only possible answer being that he is made like that: and the same is true of certain appetites of the soul.

"All men naturally desire to know," says Aristotle in the opening words of his *Metaphysics*. And this is only another way of saying that the desire for knowledge is a natural appetite. It springs from the very constitution of human nature. Wherever human nature is found, in whatever stage of development or culture, that tendency is found also. Curiosity is no product of modern progress. The same thing is true of the tendency to society, to happiness, to communication with others by speech.

Now desire follows knowledge. Where there is no knowledge of a thing, there can be no desire of it. And just as the object of the human mind is the true-in-general, so the object of the human will, man's greatest appetite, is the good-in-general. And this appetite is natural to man in that it is part of his human nature, something given to him in his original constitution, not something which is the result of education, experience, or environment. It is in the fullest sense a 'natural' appetite. And since good is the satisfaction of appetite, evil that which thwarts it, it will follow that, as there is in man a natural appetite for the good-in-general, that will be naturally good which furthers or tends to satisfy that appetite, and that will be naturally evil which thwarts its

attainment. But between that which promotes the attainment of the object of an appetite and that which tends in the opposite direction, there is a real and obvious distinction, independent alike of circumstances, caprice, and environment. Hence the distinction between good and evil is one founded on man's nature itself, not one which he himself has invented. It is an eternal distinction, as permanent as that between light and darkness or straight and curved.

Our answer then to the question, What acts lead to the good for man? can now be given. It will be that those acts lead to the good for man which are in accordance with his highest appetite operating in regard to its natural object. Or, more simply, they will be such acts as are at least not out of harmony with the natural desire of his rational will for its object, the good-in-general, i.e. the Infinite Good. A man acts well when he acts in a manner that befits his human nature. He acts ill when his conduct falls short of that standard. What this answer means in practice will appear more clearly as we go on, more especially perhaps from the next question we are going to discuss, which is that of the *Moral Criteria.*

Questions for Revision.

1. Analyse the meaning of the term ' good.' From your analysis show what is meant by a ' good ' act.
2. Explain the axioms, ' Good demands fulness of being,' ' Evil is predicated of any defect.'

3. Give a short account of each of the Determinants of Morality.
4. Does the end ever justify the means?
5. Explain carefully the Principle of Double Effect.
6. How would you show that there is a natural distinction between good and evil?

CHAPTER IV.

THE MORAL CRITERIA.†

If you look up the word *κριτήριον* in a Greek dictionary, you will find that it signifies a means of judging, a standard, a test. That is just the sense in which we are using it when we speak of the Moral Criteria. In practice we need 'means of judging.' It is one thing to know that that act is good which conforms to man's rational nature, and quite another to to know whether this particular act is so conformed or not. The connexion between the action I am now contemplating and my ultimate end is often far from obvious. I may know the general direction in which I wish to travel, yet be very perplexed as to whether this road will lead me in that direction. That is how I come to need in practice some means of judging, some standard or test which I may

† For a fuller treatment of this question the student is referred to Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, Vol. I, c. 5, from which the substance of this chapter is taken.

apply to the concrete case. Such means or tests or standards are what are called the Moral Criteria.

These tests may be either a principle or a fact. If I wish to go by the shortest route to my destination, I shall reject a more interesting but circuitous road in favour of a straight one, on the principle that a straight line is shorter than a curve. Here I am using a *principle* as a criterion. Or I may use a *fact*, generally embodied in a mechanical instrument, such as a spirit-level or a gauge or the ordinary weights and measures of commerce. All these are fact-criteria. Indeed the bare fact itself may serve as a criterion. A doctor who has neither watch nor thermometer with him will take a certain temperature, rate of pulse, and appearance of the skin as a clear indication of the feverish condition of his patient. The facts are a sufficient criterion. Obviously the fact is logically prior to the mechanical instrument by which it is measured, just as in further analysis the principle is logically prior to the fact.

There are also *primary* and *secondary* criteria. A primary criterion is one which is original and fundamental and not reducible to any other. Such are the bronze yard and the pound weight which are kept in the offices of the Exchequer. They are the primary criteria of weights and measures in this country. Secondary, or derivative criteria are those which are used to represent the primary where the latter cannot be well or easily applied. Thus, all the ordinary weights and measures of commerce are secondary or derivative criteria. But note that a derivative criterion

need not necessarily be a repetition of the primary, as in the case of weights and measures. Any true *effect* of a primary criterion will serve as a derivative.

If a criterion is to be efficient, it must satisfy certain conditions. Thus the primary criterion must be true and reliable, fixed and unalterable. Were the yard-measure to be three feet long this week, and four next, and two the week after, it would be useless, unless you could discover a law in its variations and make allowance for them. It would be worse still, if it changed without our knowing it. All this has its application to the Moral Criteria. The primary moral criterion must be true and reliable, fixed and unalterable. It must also be universal, i.e. equally applicable to all men, in some sense accessible to all, and capable of being applied to human life as we have to live it here and now.

1. The Primary Moral Criterion.

To say that the Primary Moral Criterion was Human Nature would be to give an answer disappointing perhaps from its vagueness. Yet the statement contains more of truth than might at first appear. That act is evil which is contrary to man's rational nature: that act good which is in accordance with the same. But we may also departmentalize a little. Human Nature displays three main kinds of activities. It shares with plant-life the activities of growth and assimilation of food, with animal life those of the senses, and it is unique in the operations of mind and will. Clearly there is a certain order of value in these activities. The activities of sense are of a

higher order than those of growth, while the mind's operations are of a higher order still. Hence the element of proportion, so vital in any estimate of human good. Hence too the necessity of safeguarding the good of the whole against the undue intrusion of any merely partial interest. Any action which tends to subordinate the higher to the lower good, whether the good of mind to that of sense or the good of the whole to that of a part, will require at least justification before it can be passed as morally good. Thus it is at once clear that to drink so much as to deprive myself of the use of reason is *prima facie* an immoral act. By so doing I have subordinated the good of the whole to that of a part, reason to sense. Conceivably there might be circumstances which in the concrete could justify such a course : but this could only be on the ground that somehow the good of the whole man was involved, as in the case of an ordinary anaesthetic.

Similar reasoning would show that where there are fundamental needs of human nature for which nature has provided a particular activity, any use of such an activity in positive opposition to its natural purpose will be contrary to nature and hence evil. Thus if the faculty of speech has been designed by nature as a means of communicating what is in our minds, any use of this activity in opposition to such a purpose, as in the case of lying, must be evil. Similarly, as the first law of nature is self-preservation, and as all our powers of reason, sense, and development naturally conspire to that end, if I deliberately use my faculties of reason and sense to defeat that

design, as in suicide, I perform an act that is unnatural, against my human nature as a whole, and therefore evil. Note however that it is the unnatural *use* of an activity which is evil, not mere abstention from its use, unless, as in the case of food, the good of the whole man dictates *some* use at least of the activity in question.

It will be obvious that the use of this Primary Criterion is somewhat restricted. It has to do with the fundamental problems of conduct, whereas much of our moral life is concerned with questions of less depth. But for the student of Moral Philosophy these problems are as important as they are difficult and he needs constantly to remind himself of the existence and use of the Primary Moral Criterion.

2. The Secondary Moral Criteria.

We have seen (p. 47) that the Secondary Criteria are dependent on the Primary and are used when the latter cannot be conveniently applied: also that a secondary criterion need not necessarily be a repetition of the primary, any true *effect* of the primary furnishing a quite reliable secondary criterion. Of such consequence-criteria the most valuable is that which has been called (Cronin *op. cit.* p. 140) THE LAW OF GENERAL INJURY WITH GENERAL OBSERVANCE. Its opposite will be THE LAW OF GENERAL UTILITY WITH GENERAL OBSERVANCE: This means that we call an act bad if its adoption as a general law of conduct would work out badly for the community or the race. Similarly, that act will be good which if taken up generally as a rule of conduct

will benefit the community or race. Of these two criteria the Law of General Injury is the more practically important as well as the more useful, evil being easier of detection than good.

The connexion of this criterion with the primary is not difficult to trace. The primary criterion is human nature. Now nature, when working according to its own laws, never tends to its own destruction. If then we find that an act when raised to the level of general conduct does tend to destruction, is bad for the community or the race, that is a sign that it is not in accordance with nature, i.e. that it is not in accord with the primary criterion. Hence this secondary criterion is in direct line with the primary. But note that it is called the Law of *General* Observance. It is unsafe to draw conclusions from the consequences of a single act. In a particular case there may easily be accidental circumstances which will themselves account for the consequent evil. But if certain evil consequences follow at all times and in all circumstances, it is an indication that the act which produces them is bad.

This criterion needs considerable care in its application. The main point to be attended to in applying it is the *causal connexion* between the act itself and the evil result. The evil must flow from the act itself, not from any accidental circumstance connected with it. Instances will make this clearer: it might be said that if all men were to become celibates, the race would soon be extinct, and hence that that celibacy was an evil. One answer to this might be that the argument proves too much. The same objection could be raised against

engine-drivers or policemen or harpooners of whales. We should soon die of starvation were the whole race engaged in any of these honourable callings. But the melancholy result would be due not to the unnaturalness of engine-driving, but to the fact that there were in the world no butchers or bakers or candlestick-makers, that none of the trades essential to human existence was being carried on. Hence the evil is a consequence not of the act as such, but of an accidental circumstance connected with the act, the fact that no-one was doing anything else.

Again, it is a favourite argument with extremists that because a thing is open to abuse, it has therefore no legitimate use. Thus the evils which flow from intemperance in drink are great and undeniable, and were all men to consume alcohol all day long, the destruction of the race could be only a matter of time. But is the criterion rightly applied? The extinction of the race would in this case be due not to the consumption of alcohol as such, but to its excessive consumption, an act undoubtedly unnatural and therefore evil, yet an evil resulting not from the act but from too much of the act.

Another source of evil consequences attaching to an act, and to be distinguished from the act itself, is the perverse will of man. During the war the carriage of spirits by rail often led to extensive pilfering, an undoubtedly evil consequence for the community. But the consequence was due not to the act of carrying as such, but to a cause quite extrinsic to the act, the perverse will of potential thieves. Public legislation often forbids certain acts just for

this reason. There is no harm in the act, but it is forbidden lest evilly disposed persons use it as an opportunity for furthering their own ends. There is thus nothing very immoral in a beneficiary under a will being a witness to the will. Yet the law forbids it because of the abuse to which such a practice is liable. There is a clear distinction between acts prohibited because they are evil and acts evil or unlawful because they are prohibited.

These instances are intended merely to bring into clearer view the meaning of the statement that for the right application of this criterion we must make sure that the evil flows from the act as such and not from any circumstance accidentally connected with it.

A last and most important point in regard to this criterion is that it *indicates* only and does not constitute the evil of the act. If you dam a stream, you are at once made aware of the presence and force of the current, but you do not create it. In much the same way evil consequences *indicate* the presence of evil in the act. They do not put it there. From this follows a practical conclusion. It is the act itself which is unnatural and therefore evil, independently of its consequences. And the act will remain evil whether the consequences follow or not. Hence it is never permissible, not even on a single occasion. For the act is evil, *not because it has evil consequences:* rather, *it has evil consequences because it is evil.* Did its evil lie solely in the consequences, we might reasonably conclude that where these did not follow the act was good, a principle very dangerous for individual morality.

Other secondary criteria given by some moralists are the Common Convictions of Mankind, and the Moral Feelings. Such criteria may be allowed a certain weight, but the conclusions drawn from them are more open to dispute and, in the case of the Moral Feelings, more liable to be subjective than those drawn from the criteria we have already discussed. It will be sufficient therefore merely to have mentioned them.

In close connexion with the Moral Criteria it will be of advantage to consider briefly the system which at first sight presents a close resemblance to what has just been said, but which on examination is found to be fundamentally different in the rôle it assigns to the Moral Criteria, the system of Utilitarianism.

Questions for Revision.

1. What do you understand by Moral Criteria and why are they necessary? What different kinds of Criteria can you distinguish?
2. Show how the Primary Moral Criterion is a true ' means of judging.'
3. Explain what is meant by a Secondary Criterion. Mention some of the Secondary Moral Criteria and show their connexion with the Primary.
4. What is meant by saying that these Criteria *indicate* but do not *constitute* the evil of the act? What is the chief point to be attended to in their use?

CHAPTER V.

UTILITARIANISM.

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory very widespread among English moralists and one difficult to define in a form which would be acceptable to all who call themselves Utilitarians. In general however it may be said that Utilitarianism places the primary and fundamental criterion of morality in the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. That conduct is morally good which promotes this happiness, that morally evil which thwarts it. Moreover, this greatest happiness of the greatest number is the ethical goal of all human endeavour, or, the good of society is man's final end.

In these two principles is seen at once the strength and weakness of Utilitarianism. Its strength lies in its seeming unselfishness, its appeal to altruism: its weakness in placing man's ultimate end in a finite good. In spite of superficial resemblances it differs fundamentally from the Aristotelian ethic and the two systems are radically opposed. The main lines of cleavage are as follows:—

1. To the Utilitarian the happiness of the race is the final natural end of good action. To the Aristotelian the happiness of the race is *an* end of action, but not the final end. It is a secondary criterion of morality but not the primary nor sole criterion.

2. For the Utilitarian the consequences of an act *constitute* its goodness or evil. For the

Aristotelian these only *manifest* the inherent moral quality of the act. To the former the consequences are the primary and fundamental criterion of morality: to the latter they are only a secondary and derivative criterion. To the former an act is bad if it brings unhappiness to the race: the latter will say that if an act, on being raised to the level of a general rule of conduct, can be shown to be productive of evil, this is a sign of the inherent badness of the act.

Utilitarianism then is in some ways near the truth. Moreover, it makes its appeal to generous instincts, urging the individual to live not for himself but for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This is at first sight an attractive programme, but in practice Utilitarianism has its difficulties.

John Stuart Mill,† its most influential exponent, defined Utilitarianism as follows:—

> The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. (*Utilitarianism*, 15th ed., pp. 9, 10.)

He further (pp. 12 ff.) asserts a difference not only of quantity but of quality among pleasures, and insists that "the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own

† John Stuart Mill (1806–73), philosopher and political economist. Because of his upright and disinterested character he has been called 'the saint of rationalism.'

happiness, but that of all concerned " (p. 24). His proof of the principle of Utility is contained in the following well known passage :—

> The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it : and so of other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. . . . No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This however being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 52, 53.)

The main points therefore in the Utilitarianism advocated by John Stuart Mill are (1) The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the final end of human action and the sole and fundamental criterion of morality. (2) Happiness is to be identified with pleasure and the absence of pain. (3) There is a qualitative as well as a quantitative difference between pleasures. (4) The greatest happiness principle is proved from the fact that each person desires his own happiness as a good to him : hence the general happiness must be a good to the aggregate of persons.

The Aristotelian ethic also asserts that

happiness is the final subjective end of the individual, but understands by happiness not pleasure but that state which entirely satisfies desire, a pleasurable state though not pleasure as such. The difference of its view of the criterion of morality has already been mentioned. Also it would distinguish two meanings of 'desirable'; 'that which is capable of being desired' (cf. Mill's statement above), and 'that which ought to be desired.'

It will be seen at once that Utilitarianism, as Mill sets it forth, has fastened on a fundamental truth, that of the essentially social nature of man. This is also a first principle in Aristotelianism. But it has to be taken in connexion with the no less important truth that he has also an individuality of his own. Man's social nature is based on his limitless capacity for development, a capacity actualizable only through the aid of other men. Hence as the capacity is natural, the desire to associate with others for its fulfilment will also be natural. But while it is indubitably true that each man is a social unit, it is no less true that he is also an individual, a rational being capable of directing his own conduct. Though he is born into society without his being consulted on the matter, and though such an environment is in the strictest sense 'natural' to him, yet his conduct in society is regulated by his own free will. He has a 'good,' however dimly apprehended, which from his nature he must in some way desire. Society will often help him to its attainment, though on occasion it may impede him. And just as the individual is prior to society, so his good is, in

ultimate analysis, a good to be attained by him, albeit in conjunction with others, by the individual right exercise of his highest powers, those of mind and will. Society may help or hinder him : but it can never rob him of the power, any more than it can exempt him from the duty, of reaching out to that good which alone can satisfy his highest capacity. He is therefore at once a social and an individual being. To assert the one is not to deny the other. Either truth kept in rigid isolation would give an inadequate idea of human nature as a whole. Man's ethical end is the Infinite Good : his political or social end is the well-being of the community in which he lives. But the ethical end is the closer to him, as being more closely bound up with his individual nature, and in a conflict of the two it must prevail. The Utilitarian over-emphasizes the social to the neglect of the ethical end, and in so doing he over-stresses a truth until it becomes distorted into a falsehood. And this would seem to be the fundamental flaw of the system as a theory of morals.

But there remains the even more difficult question of practice. Utilitarianism proposes as a practical moral criterion a doctrine of consequences. Those acts are good which promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number, those evil which have an opposite consequence. The difficulty of this criterion lies in its application. To be validly applied it postulates a just and right estimate of consequences. But in practice human actions are complicated, and nowhere more than in their consequences. Of the same act some consequences may be good, others evil, using the terms in the

Utilitarian sense. Some may tend to the general happiness, others thwart it. Am I, for instance, morally justified on Utilitarian principles in protesting against a new and higher assessment of Income Tax? It is arguable that my protest may promote the general happiness, inasmuch as it will strengthen the hands of others who have to make a similar appeal: or that it may thwart it, as it may embarrass the Government who are presumably seeking to promote the general good. To the average man it would not be easy to decide this simple point on the doctrine of consequences. And even though we extend the theory to embrace *general* consequences by which we take account of the general tendency of certain classes of action, we are still far from a satisfactory criterion of conduct. For an effective ethical criterion should apply not merely to certain lines of conduct, but should aid me to decide what is to be done here and now. A merely general criterion is as useless as a general scale of weights and measures, difficult to apply to a particular case, would rightly be regarded in the sphere of commerce.

A further point in Mill's exposition of Utilitarianism is that he identifies the pleasant with the good. This is complicated by his other assertion that there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative difference between pleasures, that they differ not only in intensity and duration but in moral value. The older Utilitarians, such as Paley (*Moral Philosophy*, Bk. I, c. 6.), maintained that pleasures differ in quantity only, i.e. in intensity and duration. Thus, the pleasant and the good being

identical, the more pleasant the pleasure the better it will be. And, pleasantness being measured only by intensity and duration, the more intense and lasting the pleasure, the better it will be. This position is at least logically consistent, even though our moral feelings rebel against it. The only escape from it is along the line taken by Mill, that of making a qualitative difference between pleasures. But to maintain that pleasures differ by something else than their pleasantness, and are therefore to be chosen in preference to others precisely for the sake of this something else, is to overturn the Utilitarian identification of the pleasant and good.

Hedonism.

Closely connected with the Utilitarian ethic is the moral system known as Hedonism. The Greek word *Hedone* means 'pleasure.' Hence a Hedonist will be one who holds that pleasure is the final good of human life and that it determines the morality of human conduct. The Hedonist puts to himself the question: What is that for which a man does all that he does? Our answer was, Happiness (p. 12). Many have answered, Pleasure. Others who say, Happiness, understand by the word 'pleasure.' But are pleasure and happiness the same thing? May we use the words indifferently?

We have already explained what we understand by Happiness (p. 17). It is the state of well-being, or human perfection, which consists in the enjoyment of the final good, that 'activity of the soul according to excellence' with which we dealt in our first chapter.

Pleasure on the other hand is the result or concomitant of activity. The pleasure of eating comes of or accompanies eating. You may eat without pleasure, but you cannot have the pleasure of eating without food. Hence Aristotle says that pleasure gives a kind of super-added perfection to the activity, like the bloom of youth (*Eth.* X. 4. 3). The main point is that it is essentially bound up with, comes out of, or accompanies activity. Without activity there is no pleasure.

If this be a true account of the matter, it is not easy to identify happiness and pleasure, except in the sense that happiness involves pleasure, or that happiness is pleasurable. It is a common experience also that certain forms of pleasure can quite well exist with unhappiness. A man may be in general very miserable, yet derive a certain pleasure from eating and drinking.

Pleasure then arises from the possession, actual and active, of good. If this good be the perfect good, its possession is perfect human happiness: if imperfect, its enjoyment will give an imperfect, or seeming happiness. But the pleasure consequent on such possession is clearly not happiness itself, but rather a result of happiness (Cf. St. Thomas, I. 2. 2. 6).

Pleasures may be distinguished as (1) sensitive, the result of the gratification of physical appetites, such as hunger and thirst. (2) Psychical, resulting from the gratification of psychical appetites (p. 43). (3) Intellectual. In all pleasure knowledge, whether sensitive or intellectual, is an essential element. There can be no true pleasure which you know nothing about, not even in the way of pleasur-

able feeling. In the concrete these three types combine and intermingle.

There are many varieties of the Hedonist theory. We may mention two, PSYCHOLOGICAL and ETHICAL Hedonism. Psychological Hedonism holds that pleasure is the sole object of desire, the only thing we *can* desire: if we desire others, it is only because of their association with pleasure. Ethical Hedonism maintains that, while pleasure is not the only object of desire, it is the only thing worth desiring, the only thing which *ought* to be desired. Both these forms of Hedonism agree in the assertion that pleasure is man's natural end, and they identify happiness and pleasure. So Sidgwick† (*Methods of Ethics*, 4th ed., p. 120): "Egoistic Hedonism, a system that fixes as the reasonable ultimate end of each individual's action his own greatest possible Happiness: and by greatest 'Happiness,' again, we must definitely understand the greatest possible amount of pleasure." (Note that Sidgwick is here expounding a method, not necessarily giving his own view.) We have already given reasons for dissenting from this identification, and we maintain that pleasure and happiness are not the same thing. The Hedonist urges that that which all men desire, and desire for its own sake (for the only reason which can be given for desiring pleasure is that it is pleasant), must be their ultimate end, end being, as we have already said (p. 42), essentially related to desire.

To this difficulty St. Thomas replies

† Henry Sidgwick (1838—1900), Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge.

(I. 2. 34. 3. ad 2.) that the reason why pleasure is always pursued for its own sake lies in the fact that it is the repose of the will in the attained object of its desire, and the object of desire is always a good, real or apparent. But what the will or appetite first moves toward is its object, not the pleasure which comes of its possession. This is clear in the case of the physical appetites. The hungry man desires food, not primarily the pleasure of eating. Doubtless a man may reflect on his desires and by a reflex process lead himself to desire pleasure as such: but this is not the primary natural object of his appetite. The same is true of his highest appetite, his rational will. It too primarily desires its suitable end, not the pleasure which comes of its possession.

But if pleasure is not the only thing a man *can* desire, is it the only thing he *ought* to desire. Is Ethical Hedonism more justified than Psychological? It will be seen at once that Ethical Hedonism has great affinities with Utilitarianism as expounded by J. S. Mill. Sidgwick saw the difficulty of making pleasure the end of all human activity and so parted company with what he called Egoistic Hedonism. He proposes as a substitute Universalistic Hedonism, which he expounds on lines very similar to Mill's Utilitarianism (*Methods of Ethics*, 4th ed., Bk. IV, pp. 409 ff). We have already (p. 58) stated our difficulties against Utilitarianism and need not repeat them here. Many objections may be raised against the system in detail, such as the problem of constructing any practical scale of pleasures and pains such as to have universal or even wide, validity. And there is what has

been called the Hedonistic Paradox, a difficulty arising from the fact that the more intense the pursuit of pleasure, the less the pleasure. But the fundamental objection to Hedonism lies further back. It is to be found in the first principle of all Hedonist theories that Pleasure and the Good are identical, a principle the truth of which seems accounted for by the fact that the Good is necessarily pleasurable.

Questions for Revision.

1. Define Utilitarianism and show how it differs from the system of Moral Philosophy you have been studying.
2. What are the main points of J. S. Mill's exposition of Utilitarianism? On what truth is it based and to what criticisms is it exposed?
3. What do you understand by Hedonism? Distinguish between ethical and psychological Hedonism and state your main objection to either.
4. If pleasure is always pursued for its own sake, why cannot it be the final end of life?

CHAPTER VI.

MORAL VIRTUE.

Mention has been made of the element of proportion in human good (p. 49). The main object of this chapter is to furnish some idea of what this element involves. We shall not treat the Moral Virtues in detail. It will be enough for our purpose to have a general notion of what is meant by a Moral Virtue. In this connexion the first question to be discussed is

1. What is a Habit ?

The psychologists will tell us that all virtues are Habits. A Habit is an enduring quality relative to action. Its effect is to give to an agent, free to act one way or another, a tendency to act easily and readily in a particular way. It disposes to action, but it does not necessitate. It differs from a mere inclination in being permanent or enduring, whereas an inclination comes and goes. It differs also from the power to act, for it is a perfection of power, rendering action easy and ready. Two men are thrown into deep water. As soon as they rise to the surface, one at once strikes out with bold strokes for safety. The other flounders, throws his arms about, sinks and tries to rise, but cannot succeed in staying above water. The difference in their behaviour is due to a difference of habit. One has formed the habit of swimming which

disposes him to an easy and ready use of the movements of arms and legs. The other has no such habit. When he tries to act as though he had, he finds that his actions, instead of being easily and readily evoked, are done with the utmost difficulty, if they can be said to be done at all. Both have the same power in arms and legs: the difference between them is due to the presence and absence of a facility in their use.

There are physical habits, such as swimming, walking, skating and the rest; intellectual habits, such as knowledge of a particular science or language; and moral habits such as temperance or fortitude. These habits are the results of acts. Originally the acts were performed slowly and laboriously with great awkwardness and difficulty, as any beginner in swimming or skating will assure you. But once the repetition of acts has led to the formation of the habit, the actions are performed with increasing ease and readiness, until after a time (especially in the case of physical habits) they become almost automatic and habit is seen to be 'second nature.'

Habits, then, have their origin in acts. And as we are responsible for our acts, we are responsible also for our habits, bad no less than good. Some habits, indeed all to some degree, require exercise more or less constant if they are to endure. This is more true of intellectual and moral habits than of physical, and of habits which go against natural inclination than of such as are in accord with it. In a sudden emergency physical or moral the possession of the right sort of habit must necessarily make all the difference between

strength and weakness, safety and extreme peril.†

The habits with which we are chiefly concerned in this chapter are not those of the body nor those of the mind as such, but those of the will. It is these habits of will that are known as the Moral Virtues.

2. Virtue.

The literal meaning of the word is 'Manliness,' the disposition to do 'all that may become a man.' Its Greek equivalent seems to bear exactly the same sense. By the philosophers both Greek and Latin the word was used to express excellence in any department, especially the characteristic excellence of a thing. They would have said that it was the 'virtue' of fire to burn, of a horse to be swift, of the ear to hear, of the musician to tune his instrument aright. From an undue pressing of the analogy of the Arts Socrates and Plato were misled into identifying virtue and knowledge, an identification expressed in the formula 'No man errs willingly.' Such an identification forgets that I may quite clearly see the better course and choose the worse; that for good action it is not enough to see what is right, but that the will must be

† Cp. William James "There is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the time of rising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work, are subjects of express volitional deliberation. Full half the time of such a man goes to the deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought to be so ingrained in him as practically not to exist for his consciousness at all." *Principles of Psychology*, I. c. 4, p. 122.

trained to adopt it. It is this training of the will which is secured by the Moral Virtues. Hence the virtuous man will be not one who possesses intellectual virtues only, so that he sees the right course to take, but who combines with them those excellences of the will which we term Moral Virtues, by reason of which he not merely sees what is right but acts according to his knowledge. How it comes that the mind can see what is right and the will choose what is wrong is explained by Aristotle when he says (*Pol.* I. 5. 6) that while the soul rules the body with despotic power, reason rules appetite with constitutional power, the power by which free men are governed, who, as St. Thomas explains (I. 2. 58. 2), have the right of objecting and urging difficulties. We have only to consult our own experience to see that these difficulties arise in the main from pleasure and pain. If we act badly, the reason generally is that the course we adopt is more pleasurable or easier than what we know to be better. If we see the better and approve, but follow the worse, the reason ultimately is that the worse appeals to us more here and now and that our choice is influenced by this appeal. The will yields to it in spite of the clear indication of reason that it *is* the worse.

Not that all good action is painful and all evil pleasurable. There is often an element of pleasure and pain in either course. The problem of moral choice is in drawing the line, especially perhaps in pleasure. Our natural tendency, i.e. the tendency of the sensitive appetite, is to take as much pleasure as we can get, irrespective of higher consider-

ations, of our well-being as a whole, or of the good of others. Reason, and all right action is reasonable, dictates moderation. But how in this conflict are we to secure the right attitude of will? Only, Aristotle will tell us, by the formation of the right 'habit.' And if you say that this is a truism (you secure the right attitude by securing the right attitude), he will answer that this habit is formed by individual acts, painful and slow at first but gradually becoming easier as the habit strengthens. And the habit, once formed, will give facility in the very acts which gave rise to it: so that a moral habit is at once formed by difficult acts and gives a facility in these same acts.

Now the problem with which habit is called upon to deal is one of proportion. The right course is as a rule a mean between two extremes of excess and defect. In the body excess or defect of food or exercise is alike injurious to health. The right proportion of each makes for bodily well-being. So too in the soul. The man who always yields utterly to the impulse of fear develops into a coward. He who yields blindly to a sort of brute courage in which reason has no share will become rash. If I give myself up to every passing pleasure, I shall weaken my will. If I severely refrain from any kind of pleasure, I shall blunt my sensibilities. Such are the extremes. The problem is, What is the right amount? And how am I to choose it?

First note that the Greek philosopher is quite definite that there *is* a right amount. It is not an absolutely fixed quantity. It will vary with the individual and his circumstances.

But there is a true proportion for every action. It will be found in the judgement of the prudent man, ' as the prudent man would decide.' Why so? Because by the ' prudent man ' is meant the man who knows about life and conduct. He possesses the true idea of that proportion which makes it ' good.' He is the artist in life. And as the artist possesses the true idea of his art and knows the proportion to be observed in painting, statue, or musical composition, so the artist in life possesses the true idea of good action and knows its proportion. Hence the definition of goodness of character or moral virtue will be : " A habit of choice, essentially consisting in the preservation of the mean, relatively to the persons concerned, as determined by rule (or proportion), i.e. by the rule by which the prudent man would determine it " (*Eth.* II. 6. 15). It is the part of virtue to find and *choose* the mean between excess and defect in action and feeling. Virtue lies in the mean.

A not unreasonable objection might here be that the whole of this discussion rests on an analogy, and that this is a somewhat precarious basis for a theory of human conduct. To a Greek however there is more than mere analogy here : there is an exact parallel. The artist, he would say, works by law or rule. It is only a certain combination of colours which will give the effect he desires. His progress in his art will lie in his clearer realization of this law. Conceivably he might stumble on it by a happy chance. If so, the resulting product would be fortuitous rather than in the strict sense artistic. The true artist possesses the laws of his art and con-

sciously uses them to secure his effects. Life also is under law. There is a law which governs right conduct as truly as the law of perspective governs correct drawing. The 'prudent man' possesses this law, as does the true artist the laws of his art. If you would be 'good,' you must aim at doing what the prudent man does, for he is the man who knows. The notion of law is not explicitly introduced here, but it lies back of all that Aristotle has to say on the nature of moral goodness.

But 'Ten men love what I hate, hate what I admire.' Who is this prudent man that we should model our lives on his? Supposing that we do not agree with him: our opinion is surely as good as his. To such an objection a Greek would be prone to answer that, unless life is to be conceived of as quite non-rational, there must be a fixed law of conduct. There must be a right way of living, though there may be a million wrong ways. By the 'prudent man' is meant no more than the possessor of the right idea of living. And if he does possess it, it is obvious that right action must model itself on his or not be right action at all. Here there is a great gulf fixed between one who regards human nature as fluid, as in a process not merely of development but of progressive evolution which makes it differ from age to age, and one for whom the 'nature' of a thing is essentially unchangeable. As has already been said (p. 13), the latter was the Greek view.

Briefly, Moral Virtue is a habit, residing in the will and sensitive appetite, which aims at the mean (the observance of due proportion

in action and feeling), which has for its subject-matter pleasure and pain, and which is best displayed in the more difficult field of pleasure. Reason alone cannot ensure the choice of the higher alternative which it indicates as higher. Only the will can do this. That it may, it needs the training which comes of the effort to acquire moral virtue.

Questions for Revision.

1. What is a Habit? How does it differ from (*a*) a power to act, (*b*) an inclination to act?
2. How is it that a man can see what is right, yet do what is wrong? What is the defect in such conduct?
3. What is Moral Virtue and how is it formed?
4. Explain what is meant by saying that Virtue lies in the mean.
5. " As the prudent man would determine " —What is meant by the ' prudent man ' and why should one follow his example?

PART II.

MORAL OBLIGATION AND NATURAL LAW.

PART II.

MORAL OBLIGATION AND NATURAL LAW.

CHAPTER I.

DUTY.

Moral Philosophy differs from other forms of scientific enquiry in this, that it deals not only with what is but with what *ought* to be. Indeed the word 'ought' and the idea it covers form one of the chief and most important questions in its enquiry. That question we must now attempt to answer—What do we mean by 'ought'? What does the idea of *Duty* stand for?

1. The Idea of Duty.

Ordinary speech may furnish us with a useful starting-point. Take the following uses of the word 'ought' and examine their meaning: (*a*) You *ought* not to be absent without leave. (*b*) If you want a seat, you *ought* to be there early. (*c*) If he caught that train, he *ought* to be in London by now. (*d*) He has worked so hard that he *ought* to succeed. (*e*) We have half an hour, so we *ought* to be in plenty of time. (*f*) You *ought* to have heard the language he used.

Compared with Latin, English is a loose language, vague in meaning and slipshod in expression. If you had to translate the above sentences into Latin, you would have to distinguish between the different uses of 'ought.' You would then find, I think, that the meaning was almost the same in (*a*) and (*b*), that it had a different sense in (*c*), (*d*), and (*e*); while sentence (*f*) is idiomatic, 'ought' there being almost part of the verbal form. In (*a*) and (*b*) 'ought' means 'must' and expresses the notion of duty, either absolute (You *ought* not to be absent), or hypothetical (You *ought* to be there early). In (*c*), (*d*), (*e*) the notion is that of 'fitness' in the sense of 'what you would naturally expect' (He *ought* to be in London. He *ought* to succeed. We *ought* to be in time).

So we are left with two main uses of the word 'ought,' duty and fitness. And these uses are somewhat akin. There is a fitness about doing your duty. It is what is to be expected of you. But duty? What is that? It is what other people expect us, and what we expect other people to do. It is, we say, what we are *bound* to do, or, if we prefer a Latin word, what we are under an *obligation* to do. We sometimes speak of our 'bounden duty,' or say that we are 'in duty bound.' What is the underlying idea here? 'Bound,' 'bounden,' 'bond,' 'obligation,' all suggest something 'due' (duty). They connote constraint, force, necessity of some kind. Not chains or bonds in the literal sense, nor what we call 'physical necessity' such as that for food or air: yet for all that a real necessity, one which affects not bodily health or physical

freedom but conduct, a necessity laid on our will. This necessity constrains us to do certain things, such as telling the truth in difficult circumstances, and to avoid certain others, such as stealing another's money even though there seems little likelihood of our being found out. Short of this, it can constrain us to do something fitting or due in the circumstances, something which we say we 'owe' to our position, etc.

Experience tells us that rightly or wrongly we suppose ourselves to be under some such necessity by whatever name we call it. Here two questions arise: (1) Is this experience genuine or is it a delusion? Do we merely imagine that we are thus necessitated? (2) If it is a fact, how does such a necessity arise and whence?

As to the first question, the experience is so universal that a theory of delusion becomes very difficult. The burden of proof must lie on those who make such an assertion or uphold such a theory. The sense of duty may be claimed as one of the common experiences of humanity, giving rise to the general conviction that there is such a thing as Duty.

2. Origin of the Idea of Duty.

To the question of the origin of duty there have been many answers. Association of Ideas, Environment, Evolution, Heredity have all been among the explanations proposed. The problem is complicated by the fact that the idea of Duty does not stand in isolation. It is intimately bound up with any theory of morality you may hold. And according to the nature of your general theory

the idea of Duty will be either a problem or a support. If you are a materialist or an evolutionist in moral theory, the phenomenon of Duty is a problem. You must explain it on the lines of your general theory, or it will wreck the theory. But if the human soul is spiritual, if there is a law of its life to which it must conform as a condition of attaining its good, the idea of Duty is less a problem than a support. For if there is such a law, the sense of being bound by it is at least more intelligible than it can be in any theory which denies the existence of such an obligation.

The fact then to be explained is the moral necessity laid on the will in virtue of which we realize that we *ought* to do such and such a thing, even though we do not wish to do it, or that we *ought not* to do something else, however much we may feel inclined to it.

We are quite accustomed to what we call necessities in the physical order. An unsupported body must, we feel, necessarily fall. Water *must* seek its own level. Coal-gas *must* light in the air if we apply a match to it. Why are we so confident that these things *must* happen? Partly from experience: we have always found that they do so happen. Our experience has been so unfailing as to lead us to conclude to a *law*. Such laws scientifically formulated are what we know as the Laws of Physics. So that the necessity arises from a law, the law which governs the world as it appears to our senses. Nor are these physical laws mere blind urges, springing we know not how from the nature of things. It is true that they do so spring, but that is not the beginning

and end of them. As we shall see later, they are a participation of what is called the 'Eternal Law' of the Supreme Lawgiver.

In like manner the necessity laid on the will by duty will arise from law, ultimately from the Eternal Law, but proximately from something in human nature itself. For Moral Obligation is obviously connected with moral goodness, which in its turn is, as we have seen (p. 33) immediately dependent on the inner requirements of human nature. And just as the urge, by which the plant or animal is impelled to reach out to the perfection proper to it, is from nature itself, so it would seem that the necessity which is laid on man's will to strive after the perfection which is his must be in some sense from his nature itself.

Note that we are concerned here only with a necessity laid on the will. We are not speaking of physical force or of mere logical necessity, the necessity by which a triangle has the properties of a triangle. The only necessity to which the will can be subject is that arising from an end to be attained. If I wish to be in London by a certain time and can go only by train, and if there is only one train which will get me there by that time, I *must* take that train. This necessity, arising from the end in view, may carry with it a number of other necessities which will modify my conduct not only on the morning itself, but it may be for days or even weeks before, as in the case where I have to save up for my railway-fare and other expenses. But it is clearly a hypothetical necessity. It depends on the supposition that I really wish to be in London at the time in question. This

necessity is called 'final' necessity because it arises from the *finis* or end in view. And this is the sort of necessity that Moral Obligation or Duty will carry with it, a necessity imposed on the will from the fact of its desiring an end.

Most final necessity is hypothetical: it depends on an 'if.' 'If you wish to keep that appointment, you must take this train.' But the end in view here is subordinated to another, pecuniary advantage, or whatever it may be. Hence I may reject it, rejecting at the same time the further end its attainment would serve. The reason why I may reject it is that it is not ultimate. If my object was more money, I may tell myself that money is not the be-all and end-all of life and that I prefer a lower income with less personal inconvenience. But if there is an end which is absolute and ultimate, which is desired for its own sake and not because it leads on to anything else, then it would seem that the necessity arising from it would be equally absolute and not hypothetical at all. At the beginning of our discussion of Ethics (p. 12) we saw that there was such an end, a thing which all men desired and for its own sake, the natural object of the will, the happiness which comes of the possession of good. This ultimate end is not of man's choosing: he is made like that. It is fixed for him by the fact that he is what he is. There is no question of an 'if' in regard to it. Hence the necessity which it imposes will be not a hypothetical but an absolute necessity. And as in the case of hypothetical necessity a certain obligation is laid on the will to take the means which will ensure the possession of the end,

so from the natural desire of the ultimate end there arises an obligation or necessity of taking some at least of the means that lead to it and of avoiding what leads away from it. But the means which lead a man to his perfection or last end are good acts, bad acts being those which lead away from it. Hence from the ultimate end there arises an obligation of performing good acts and avoiding evil. This obligation or necessity is what we mean by Moral Obligation or Duty. It is not hypothetical but categorical. It springs from the very nature of the will itself as having for its formal object the good.

There remain however two difficulties. One may be put thus: What if I do not want to be moral, or a good man, or to reach my last end? To answer that such a desire is unreasonable is only to provoke the further question, But why should I be reasonable? Am I not free? To say to such a one that if you are not reasonable, you are a fool, may sound like mere abuse. And the retort will be, Why should I not be a fool if I wish? The question is perhaps not so much foolish as literally non-sense. It does not mean anything. It is as though one should ask Why should I be a man, why not a battleship? In other words, the question Why should I be moral? is only another form of the question Why should I be a man? a query to which there is no reasonable answer because the question itself is unmeaning. For if morality essentially consists in the attempt to gain human perfection, and if human perfection (or the final end) is not a thing the quality of which is left to me to determine but something

fixed by nature itself, then to ask why I should be moral is only to ask why my final end is fixed for me, or why should a man have senses, need food, etc. Why should a triangle be triangular or a circle circular? Such questions are mere waste of words. No less so is the question Why should a man be manly? It is only confusion of thought which can prompt to its asking. Such confusion easily arises from lack of a clear idea of freedom, which may cause us to confuse freedom in the choice of means with freedom in the choice of ends. In regard to the ultimate end the will is not free. It may sound paradoxical to say that the will is not free to desire or not desire happiness; but the paradox is explained by the variety of views as to the nature of happiness to which we referred in the beginning (p. 14). The common and most fundamental desire, however differently envisaged, of all men is that it may be well with them and theirs. It is in the choice of means to the realizing of this desire that freedom lies, not in the desire itself. And it is from this fixed and unaltering desire that the necessity which we call Duty arises within human nature. Of course it goes further back and is ultimately derived from the Eternal Law and the Eternal Lawgiver. But we are at present seeking its foundation within human nature itself.

The second difficulty is that urged by Plato, that no man does wrong willingly. If a man knows the good, he will naturally strive after it: if he does not go after it, it can only be that he does not know it. It is true that knowledge is essential to a human act (p. 26).

But knowledge can be of two kinds, knowledge in use and knowledge possessed but not in use. It would be strange were a man to choose evil for himself with knowledge of the former kind. But there is nothing strange in his so acting with the second kind of knowledge. In this case he ignores the evil element in his act and attends only to the good, real or imaginary, which he discerns in it. And as he is responsible for allowing his knowledge thus to go into abeyance, he is also responsible for the act done under such conditions. Hence a man may see the better course and approve it, yet follow the worse, fixing his attention on the good that is in the worse to the neglect of the greater good of the better. One who thus acts persuades himself that, whatever may be true in the abstract, here and now this evil thing is worth having, that it will satisfy him and give him happiness, though all his previous knowledge and past experience may cry out against the fallacy. His freedom (and so his responsibility) is exercised in the deliberate concentration on one motive or set of motives to the exclusion of others in spite of the protests of reason. A will thus set on the choice of the less good can even force reason to allege considerations in its behalf, passing over in silence all that can be urged against it, or even hearing with a certain approval the arguments in favour of the opposite course though quite determined not to yield to them.

It need hardly be pointed out that the theory of Duty just explained differs fundamentally from Kant's theory of Independent Morality or the Autonomy of Reason.† In

† Immanuel Kant (1724—1804).

Kant's view reason itself is the sole source of the Categorical Imperative : it does not reveal obligation but constitutes it without any reference to external authority. Thus each man becomes literally a law unto himself, and his morality is quite strictly 'independent.' Such a view omits all consideration of the Eternal Law and the Eternal Lawgiver.

Questions for Revision.

1. Explain the idea of Duty.
2. What does the idea of 'necessity' involve? What sort of necessity will be in question when we are speaking of Duty? Whence does this necessity *ultimately* arise?
3. What is the proximate basis in human nature itself for the idea of Duty? Is the necessity involved absolute or hypothetical? Why?
4. How is the idea of Duty to be reconciled with human freedom?
5. "No man does wrong willingly"—Who said this? Explain the difficulty to which it refers.

CHAPTER II.

THE ETERNAL AND THE NATURAL LAW.

1. The General Meaning of 'Law.'

'Law' is one of those words which we are constantly using, the exact meaning of which we might find it difficult to state. There are the Laws of England and the Laws of Physics. There is Criminal and Civil Law, International Law, Canon Law, Moral Law. We often speak of the Law of Evolution or the Law of Heredity. When a phenomenon such as an epidemic occurs periodically, scientific men set about determining 'the law of its incidence' or 'of its variations.' For the last hundred years economists have investigated the 'law' that governs industrial crises.

But in these various uses of the term there is clearly some difference of meaning. We do not mean exactly the same thing when we speak of the Laws of England and the Laws of Chemistry. We associate the Laws of England with the House of Commons and Committees of Enquiry. We are more inclined to associate the Laws of Chemistry or Physics with the name of an individual such as Faraday or Newton. In England the King, Lords, and Commons in Parliament assembled enact or pass a law. In physical science the expert discovers and formulates an already existing law. In the former case

the law did not exist until the legislative authority made it: in the latter the law existed, but its existence and force were not clearly apprehended.

But if there is a difference there must also be a common element of meaning in the two uses of the word, otherwise its use would be perplexing to the point of absurdity. What then is this common meaning? The law of the land imposes on all citizens a common method of action. To all alike it says, for instance, 'No will shall in this country be considered valid unless it be signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses mutually present to each other.' All wills must thus be made after a common fashion by all citizens. Here is a 'common method of action' imposed by law. Analogously the 'laws' of any branch of science *indicate* a constant method of action common to all the natural objects with which they deal. Hence the sameness of meaning in the two senses of the word 'law' is to be found in the idea of a 'constant method of action.' The most general notion of law is that of a rule of action, a settled principle of conduct.

But it would be straining language to say that the sea or the sun had settled principles of conduct. No unintelligent thing is capable of 'conduct.' Rational beings alone can act on principle. Hence the idea of law will be predicated primarily of such: but the idea and the term may by a metaphor be applied to other things inasmuch as they invariably act in one way. Hence the first meaning of 'law' is to be found in such expressions as the Laws of England. The 'laws' of Physics

or Electricity will be a metaphorical use of the term.

Law then is a rule or direction regulating the conduct of rational beings, or of free acts, and the element of guidance or rule is fundamental in the concept of law. Further, law will direct action not by mere caprice but with some definite object or good or end in view. To secure this good or end it imposes the adoption of certain means. All laws are the indication of certain means to certain ends. But the law is not a mere indicator or sign-post. It imposes an obligation in virtue of the authority from which it emanates. Yet in so far as it does indicate means to ends, it is an affair of reason, for reason alone can choose means to ends. Hence St. Thomas defines law as an ' arrangement ' or ' ordinance of reason ' (I. 2. 90. 4), i.e. an arrangement made by reason. The ' reason ' in question is in the first place that of the law-giver. It is he who thinks out and decides on the choice of these means for this end, and thus the law exists first in his mind. But it will also exist in, i.e. be known by, the mind of the subject that he may embody it in his conduct. This, it is true, will involve the use of his will also, but primarily law is an affair of reason.

2. The Object of Law.

The object of getting people to act in one way is the common good. You have only to watch a number of people struggling to get in at a door from which others are struggling to get out to realise the need of a regulation or of ' order ' of some kind. You feel instinc-

tively that it would be to everybody's advantage (' the common good ') if those going in kept to one side and those coming out to the other. That is just what law attempts to do, to establish ' order ' by prescribing a common method of action. It aims at directing people's conduct with a view to the common good. This is where it differs from a simple command or precept. The precept binds the individual. Law is imposed on the community. Not every law deals with the good of the whole community directly. It may deal with only a section of the community and bind them alone. Those who do not motor are not touched by the laws which regulate motor-traffic. Yet all laws aim indirectly at the common good and that is sufficient for the true notion of law to be verified in them. Law then is ' an ordinance of reason which aims at the common good.'

It is of the essence of law that it should be promulgated, or made known to those whom it is to bind. For this it is not necessary that it should have been brought to the notice of every member of the community. It is sufficient that he should have been given opportunity to acquaint himself with its provisions by public announcement, through the press, notices in public places, and the like. A certain time is always allowed to elapse before a new law after promulgation comes into force. At the end of that time it is taken for granted that the law is known, and ignorance of it is not admitted as a valid excuse. The first obligation which the law imposes is a knowledge of itself. The formula of the law will generally include what is known as its

sanction, i.e. the penalty for its violation. If the end of the law is satisfied either by its observance or by the acceptance of the penalty for its violation, it is said to be a 'merely penal law.'

3. Natural and Positive Law.

Apart from the Eternal Law, of which more later, the main division of law with which we are concerned is that of Natural and Positive law. By Natural Law is meant that law which expresses the essential moral requirements of human nature. The expression of it with which we are perhaps most familiar is what we know as the Ten Commandments, which summarize man's duties to God and his neighbour. The negative precepts of the Natural Law are said to bind 'always and for always,' i.e. it is never lawful to violate them at any time. The affirmative precepts are said to bind 'always but not for always.' Thus the precept of honour to parents is never abrogated, it binds 'always': but one need not always be actively engaged in the duty of honouring, i.e. it does not bind 'for always.'

Note that the Natural Law is not arbitrary. It does not consist of rules for human nature drawn up by a sort of divine caprice and which could just as easily have been quite different. On the contrary the Natural Law follows necessarily on the decree of creation. Granted that human nature was to be, these *must* be the laws of its moral life.

Positive Laws on the other hand are those which God or man *freely* enacts. In human legislation such laws often determine the Natural Law. The Church's law as to Sunday

Mass thus determines the general obligation of divine worship. Or they may enforce the Natural Law as does the State's prohibition of wilful murder. Or they may concern themselves with matters that are morally indifferent but which need regulation for the common good, as the registration of motor cars.

The Natural Law comes from God alone and is the expression of His *necessary* will in regard to human nature. Positive Laws may be either divine or human and are freely enacted. They may change with changing circumstances, whereas the Natural Law remains immutable. They require promulgation by external authority : the Natural Law is made known by the light of reason.

4. The Eternal Law.

Every building or engineering work originates in the mind of its architect or designer. When it comes to exist in stone or steel, it is the concrete embodiment of the idea which he had in mind. The same is true of any action on a large scale, a big commercial enterprise or a naval battle. It has to be thought out and planned beforehand, and the result is at least intended to correspond with the idea so conceived. In the same way Law embodies the ideas of the sovereign authority in regard to the government of the State.

Such instances give us a useful analogy to the Eternal Law. The universe is the concrete embodiment of the ideas of its divine architect and designer. All laws which operate in it, whether in the physical or moral spheres, are reflections of the plan of divine wisdom. Hence the Eternal Law is nothing

else than "the plan of divine wisdom as director of all acts and movements" (I. 2. 93. 1) It is the law of God as directing the *whole universe* to its end. It thus includes in its scope all natures rational and irrational, and all the laws which they obey. It is prior to every other law, natural or positive, and it is the ground and principle of all these.

It is called the *Eternal* Law, because everything in God is eternal and this law is part of the divine thought. Just as the decision to create existed from eternity in the divine mind, so too did the plan of creation and the laws which all things were to obey. The Eternal Law thus covers all creation, animate and inanimate, free and necessitated, directing them to their various ends. Rational beings are under other laws also. Irrational are under the Eternal Law only: this Law they embody in their operation and may thus by a metaphor be said to obey it, true obedience requiring intelligence.

5. The Natural Law.

Law is a measure and rule of action: hence it exists not only in the mind of the lawgiver but in that of the subject also who apprehends it and makes it the guiding principle of his conduct. The whole universe is governed by the Eternal Law, eternally existing in the divine mind. A portion of the universe consists of rational beings whose minds apprehend the Eternal Law in so far as it affects their conduct. As thus existing in the human mind it is known as *the natural law*. But as human nature is free, the law

will affect it not as a mere blind force, but as a motive impelling free will, obliging but not constraining.

The Natural Law then is a reflection of the Eternal Law, made known to rational beings in order to the directing of their conduct in accord with it. It is a law within the mind and consciousness of the intelligent being whereby he shall regulate and measure his own behaviour. It is what St. Paul calls the law written in our hearts, urging man to keep the moral order, to do good and avoid evil. It differs from the Eternal Law in that that law is in the mind of God, this in the minds of intelligent beings. The Eternal Law governs the operations of the whole universe: the Natural Law regulates only the free actions of rational agents.

It is called the Natural Law because it is found more or less perfectly expressed in all rational beings, at the very least in the most general form of its precept—Do good and avoid evil. It belongs to their specific nature. Moreover, it points to something which any rational nature must necessarily compass within itself in order to the perfection proper to it and to attain to its maturity. It is 'natural' in much the same sense as walking, speech, civilization are 'natural' to man. One who had no trace of it would be below the standard of his kind, an abnormal phenomenon. But like many natural endowments it will depend for its development on education, training, environment. In man whose impulses or appetites are under the guidance and control of reason, the natural law will find expression in the dictates of reason. It will

become the natural law of what we call ' conscience.'

6. Conscience.

Few moral ideas are more often appealed to than that of Conscience. Yet often the meaning attached to the word is of the vaguest. Take a few phrases at random and ask yourself what precise meaning you attach to them: e.g. " The rights of Conscience." " The Conscience of the nation was roused." " He has no Conscience in the matter." " A man must always obey his Conscience." " I cannot in Conscience do that." " A conscientious objector," etc. All these expressions, and they could be multiplied indefinitely, seem to point to some element in a man's make-up which urges him to a line of conduct, often in opposition to what other people are content to do or wish him to do. What then is this thing? Is it an emotion, or some quite special form of mental activity, or something coming from without altogether, a voice heard within but coming whence no-one quite knows?

Conscience is not an emotion, though it may be accompanied by emotion. It is some sort of act of the mind, affirming or denying: hence it is an act of judgement. And judgements are of two kinds, judgements of fact, as when I say ' That tree is old,' and judgements of value as in ' That statue is ugly,' where the value in question is aesthetic. If I say ' That conduct is cruel,' I pass a judgement of moral value. Conscience will be something of this kind, something therefore that belongs to

reason, but to reason operating in the field of morals.

We have seen (p. 15) that by moral goodness we mean conformity between the human act and the ultimate end imposed on us by our rational nature. Now, the last end and the law which nature imposes on us are known to us only as any other truth is known, by our minds. Hence it is by mind or intelligence that in the last resort we judge of morality as of everything else. The knowledge of a law and the direction of conduct in accord with it necessarily imply the work of intelligence. Hence the intellectual machinery by which you gain this knowledge or form this judgement will be the same as that by which you acquire any other piece of information. This means that what some writers call the Moral Faculty is intelligence.

Experience at once bears out this view. In ordinary life the determination of conduct involves the application, conscious or unconscious, of general laws to particular cases. We quote such in justification of our conduct. But it is reason which makes the application, and hence reason that determines what is right and wrong in human action. But reason is unfortunately fallible : and while it is as likely to be reliable in moral matters as anywhere else, its infallibility is not more guaranteed in the sphere of morals than it is on the stock-exchange. Yet as in other departments it is the guide of action, so in morals we may safely take it as our guide and trust in the main to its decisions. In the normal man these, if safeguarded by ordinary prudence, will as a rule be correct. But in the moral life, even more

than in the business life, there are apt to arise difficult situations and perplexing problems. In such cases expert advice is desirable. (Hence, incidentally, the rôle of the confessor in Catholic moral life.) This does not mean that in general reason is inadequate to deal with moral problems, but only that from time to time there arise cases which lie outside its previous experience or its skill in applying moral principles. Again, reason may be misled by passionate desire, or moral weakness, or self-interest, just as a man may be betrayed by ambition into an imprudent course which his friends warn him against and which he lives to regret.

As morality has to do with practical conduct, with what is to be done here and now, moral judgement or conscience will be an act not of the speculative but of the practical intellect. Its decision may be analysed as the conclusion of a practical syllogism, though in practice we are hardly conscious of the process of our reasoning. If you asked a conscientious objector why he would not join up, he might answer, ' Because war is murder.' His process of reasoning in detail would be : ' All murder is wrong. War is murder. Therefore war is wrong,' where the fallacy lies, as so often in the minor premiss. The dictate of conscience would then be, You must not engage in war because it is wrong.

Conscience can look either to the past, as when it approves or disapproves of action, its disapproval being known as ' remorse ' : or to the present, as when I know that I am acting against my conscience : or to the future, as when I deliberate about the lawfulness of an

act that I contemplate. In all these cases it is an act of judgement, an activity of the same faculty which guides me in the ordinary practical affairs of life whether in business or in recreation.

Whence then, it may be asked, arises the sanctity of conscience, if it is only an ordinary act of reasoning? Its sanctity springs from the nature of the subject-matter with which it deals. No special sanctity attaches to the truths of mathematics or physics as such nor to my choice of a place for a holiday. But inasmuch as morals have to do with man's duty to God, the highest and most important of his manifold activity, and as this duty is apprehended by that light of reason which is God's gift to enable him to thread his way through the maze of life, it may not unreasonably be claimed that when intelligence deals with such subject-matter, it is acting according to its highest function, and that there is truth in the metaphor which describes its findings as the 'voice of God.' Revelation apart, there is no other way of discovering what God wishes me to do here and now than the way of reason. Reason is therefore to me God's messenger or His 'voice,' though it would be an error to imagine that it is a direct communication of God to the mind as in the case of inspiration.

In every department of its activity reason needs and is the better for training and education. It is liable to error, and never more than when personal considerations enter into its calculations. 'No man is a judge in his own case' is a piece of universal experience which has its application in the field of morals also. Hence the advantage of consultation

and of taking advice, particularly of disinterested persons, even in matters of conscience. When it is said that a man must always follow his conscience, it is not for a moment implied that he should be guided simply by the inner light. " When Jones follows the inner light, he mostly follows Jones " is Mr. Chesterton's way of expressing the danger to which those are liable who are inclined to make too much of their conscience and its rights. Yet when a man has done all he can by consultation and deliberate weighing of pros. and cons. to eliminate all possible error, he is bound to follow the judgement of his conscience, even though it be objectively in error, seeing that reason is his sole guide to truth.† In the case of an honestly erroneous conscience the agent acts in antecedent ignorance and thus is not responsible for the evil of his act (p. 27). He would act immorally if he defied his conscience.

Conscience then is the dictate of reason applying the Natural Law to the particular case. It is not concerned with general principles but with the practical thing to be done or not here and now. In regard to that its dictum is, ' It is right, or your duty, to do this action.' Or, ' It is wrong to act thus and it is your duty to refrain.' Yet the word ' Conscience ' is often used in a loose sense. So used it generally means ' moral principles.' This use of the word has often led to supposed conflicts between conscience and authority, where the real point in dispute has been a

† We abstract from revealed religion with which we are not here concerned.

difference of moral principle or the misunderstanding of a principle held by both parties alike. Strictly speaking however, conscience is not the general grasp of moral principle, but the judgement of reason as to the morality or the reverse of a particular act. We shall deal in the next chapter with the general grasp of moral principles.

Questions for Revision.

1. Distinguish the uses of the word ' law ' in the expressions ' The Laws of England ' and ' The Laws of Physics.' In which of the two uses is the original meaning of the word ' law ' to be found?
2. Explain the original meaning of the word ' law.' What is the object of law? In what sense is it an affair of reason?
3. Distinguish between Natural and Positive Law.
4. What do you understand by the Eternal Law? Why is it called Eternal, and how does it differ from the Natural Law?
5. State clearly what you mean by Conscience. How does it differ from ordinary reasoning?
6. Whence arises the sanctity of conscience? In what sense is it ' the voice of God '?
7. Is a man always bound to follow his conscience? Why? Supposing his conscience to be in error, on what ground would you excuse him from evil-doing?

CHAPTER III.

THE PRIMARY MORAL JUDGEMENTS.

Certain elementary moral principles belong naturally to the human mind. They are natural not in the sense of being innate, but because the mind comes quickly and easily to acquire them, indeed cannot help acquiring them, any more than it can prove them once they have been acquired. These principles are distinct, as has just been said, from conscience, though in everyday speech the two are often confused. Conscience is the act of judging. The Primary Moral Principles are an habitual possession of the mind once they are formed. This habitual grasp of them the mediaeval philosophers called *Synderesis,* a word the derivation of which has been much disputed but which seems to mean literally the habitual viewing together or keeping sight of certain objects, here the principles in question. These principles vary with different minds. The commonest type of them is to be seen in such elementary judgements as that good should be done, evil avoided: parents should be honoured, benefactors requited, evil-doers punished, etc.

In regard to these primary moral judgements two important questions arise: (1) What is their origin? (2) What of their development or decline?

1. Origin of the Primary Moral Judgements.

The origin with which this question deals is not the logical basis of these judgements, nor

is it concerned with primitive man. It does not ask, How do these judgements come to be the common possession of the race? But rather, By what process do such beliefs arise to-day in a child's mind? What is their point of origin? Are they wholly due to teaching and tradition? Or do they come to the child through the unaided working of its own intelligence?

Few perhaps would to-day maintain the extreme view that such beliefs are due *solely* to teaching and tradition. That they owe something to teaching may readily be granted. Tradition plays a great part in all our intellectual beliefs. But tradition does not go the whole way. The child may begin with tradition, but by the time that reason has at all asserted itself, say by the age of ten or twelve, he holds some of these beliefs not merely on the testimony of parents but because he sees them to be true. The boy of twelve believes that two and two make four not merely because the printed book or his teacher tells him that it is so, but because of an inner conviction of its truth. And he would stoutly refuse to believe you if, with no matter how great an apparatus of learning, you tried to prove to him that two and two made six. Similarly he has been taught that it is wrong to tell a lie or to take what does not belong to him, that it is his duty to obey his parents, that he has certain rights against other people and ought to respect theirs against him. This means that he has some idea of what is right and wrong, of what is fair and unfair, an idea, it may be, which owes much to teaching and experience, but which is now held and believed

not solely on these grounds but because it is seen to be true. And hence on quite simple and elementary principles of morality the child's judgement is perfectly trustworthy

The part played by teaching and training is to aid the mind to form such judgements more readily and quickly—precisely the same part as education plays in any other field of knowledge. Left entirely to itself the mind can attain to some truth and knowledge. If in no other way it at least learns in the school of experience. But the whole process is speeded up and made more scientific and reliable by considered instruction. Such ideas then, as all others, originate in the first instance from without: but the assent which the mind gives to them even in childhood is real. No less real is the recognition of a *duty* to avoid certain types of conduct and to aim at certain others. And while mere association may explain the occasion of the evoking of certain emotions, e.g. of attraction or repulsion, it fails utterly to account for the child's inner conviction that it is *right* to be so attracted or repelled.

2. The Development and Decline of the Primary Moral Judgements.

The primary moral judgements are capable of indefinite development, their field of operation being as wide as human life. Thus the elementary principle of justice covers the whole of a man's moral and social life. There is no condition of things however modern and up-to-date in which it does not play its part, sometimes in the subtlest and most intricate fashion. A study of the daily

legal actions in the civil courts will furnish many a lesson in the intricacy of a simple moral principle and the scrupulous fairness of the judicial enquiry. Of the possibility then of the development of simple moral principles, in the sense of the fuller understanding of their meaning and far-reaching application, there can be no reasonable doubt.

But they can also decline in their force in the life of the individual. They never wholly disappear but their efficacy may be considerably weakened. Apart from the failure of the reasoning powers owing to sickness or old age, there are two main causes of a relaxed grasp of moral principles. The first is action in direct opposition to them. The psychological process here is curious but unmistakable. A man can accustom himself very easily to act against his better judgement (which in morality is his conscience). After some time this judgement hardly asserts itself at all, till he can end by taking true for false and false for true. This is what Plato called the lie in the soul and justly regarded as one of the greatest calamities that can befall a man. In the first chapter of *Romans* St. Paul describes the same process under the metaphor of debasing the coinage. It stands for a lowering of moral standard and can be seen in actual practice in the victim of any form of vice. By habitual self-indulgence against the dictate of conscience that dictate is rendered fainter and fainter until its warnings are hardly heard and grip of moral principle becomes relaxed to feebleness.

The second and most potent agent of decay is the influence of the emotions, especially of emotional desire, the ' charm that steals the

wits even of the wise.' In practice these two causes operate together. The resultant state is that of a 'seared conscience.' Yet there is a limit to the decay. No sane man ever thinks murder, as such, a moral act, though he he may very easily think that he has a right to kill, though not (he will explain) to murder, a certain person or persons. Nor will he hold that for another to rob him of his lawful possessions is in accord with approved moral principles.

3. The Immutability of the Primary Moral Judgements.

We have already stated what the Primary Moral Judgements are, viz. the most general expressions of the Natural Law, such as honour to parents, requital of benefits, the avoidance of evil and the doing of good. The question here is: Are these principles immutable, or can they and do they vary from age to age, so that what is forbidden *by the Natural Law* in one set of circumstances or in one state of society may be permitted by this same law in another? It will be obvious that this is practically the same question as that of the immutability of the Natural Law itself.

Many difficulties in this difficult matter find their solution in the fact that while the primary moral judgements are natural in the sense that they form part of the ordinary man's normal mental equipment, their application is a matter of individual training and development. Thus, while all men believe that they ought to do good and avoid evil, their views as to what is good and what evil may display considerable variety. This difference will

depend in the main on circumstances of environment, popular tradition, social development and the like. Its presence proves nothing against the immutability of moral principles: it merely stresses differences in their application. So too of the Natural Law. It is often urged that what one age considers a form of religion, another will detest as an abomination: hence that ideas of right and wrong vary from age to age. It would seem a sounder conclusion to say that the application of the ideas varies, the ideas themselves remaining the same.

But the question of the immutability of the Natural Law is too complex to admit of a simple Yes or No. It is necessary to distinguish first between its elementary and less elementary precepts (which are called primary and secondary), next between the law itself and man's apprehension of it. A priori it would seem clear that the Natural Law *ought* to be unchanging, since this law expresses the fundamental and essential requirements of human nature if it is to attain to its perfection. And since human nature is in essentials unchanged and unchangeable throughout its history, its essential requirements will always be the same. It can never be a good thing for human nature to take injustice or unrestrained self-indulgence as a first principle of conduct. These things are evil not because they are forbidden, but are forbidden because they are evil, leading man not to his perfection but to his undoing. Hence the laws regulating them in general will be as unchanging as man himself. 'In general,' because in detailed application of these laws differences may

well arise with varying conditions of civilization, lack of education, development and the rest. That is what is meant by saying that the primary precepts of the moral law are unchangeable, where by ' primary precepts ' is meant the most general expression of the moral law such as ' Do good and avoid evil,' ' Honour where honour is due ' and their quite obvious and immediate applications.

But when we come to the secondary precepts, which are conclusions from the primary, more complex and more restricted in their field, the case is different. Perhaps the most noteworthy difference occurs where the human nature with which we have to deal is below the normal level whether through lack of development or relapse into moral degradation. Here the secondary precepts of the natural law, first, may not be apprehended as such, or secondly, may be dispensed with, as in the case of polygamy in the Old Testament. " With regard to the secondary precepts," writes St. Thomas, " the natural law is not changed in such a way that that is not as a rule always right which it commands. It may however be changed in a particular case and in rare instances owing to special causes which hinder the keeping of such precepts " (I. 2. 94. 5). Hence in the secondary precepts only, and then only in special circumstances, is there room for change in the natural law. To say this however is not to deny that in the *applications* of the natural law diversities may and do occur. All men recognize that good should be done, evil avoided. Their notions of what is good and evil may however differ considerably. All may be agreed that honour

should be paid to parents. Yet one tribe may honour its parents by preserving them in life as long as is humanly possible, another by speeding their passage to the next world once they have become useless in this. But these are subjective variations. The moral principle is recognized by both alike, but interpreted differently in practice.

This leads to the question of the apprehension of the moral law. Its most elementary and general principles express fundamental requirements of our nature of which the race cannot long be ignorant any more than it can of its need for food and drink. Hence there is very little room for variation in the apprehension of these simple principles, though there may be differences in their application. All this is true of normal human nature. But when we pass either to abnormality in environment, or to the conclusions drawn from these elementary principles assertion cannot be so confident. A child brought up in a thieves' kitchen may grow up with strange ideas as to the principle of justice, particularly in regard to the world outside its own immediate surroundings. Yet even here the tradition of honour among thieves might be sufficient to satisfy a very imperfect apprehension of the principle of justice. On the other hand it is well to remember that Moral Philosophy deals with the normal man acting normally (cf. p. 5) : it is of him that its conclusions are primarily true. It may learn much from abnormal cases, though it does not base its conclusions upon them. So too the psychologist may find the study of the feeble-minded or insane of advantage in his science, though

he would be the first to maintain that psychology dealt with the normal human mind.

As for the variation due to deeper grasp of moral principles, it is indefinite. It will depend for the most part on education and environment: in fact it is conditioned by the same circumstances as the rest of our mental growth. It is however worth noting that a man's moral development is often below his intellectual, a fact once more due very largely to lack of proper training, defective upbringing, the force of example, etc. Thus you may find a man whose business capacity is undeniable yet whose moral life outside the demands made by his business is that of a child in its weakness of will and failure to appreciate moral considerations. Such instances of one-sided development are common enough where life is concentrated on a single object, such as the making of money, and where the religious instinct has been almost atrophied from neglect.

To the question, then, Is the Natural Law immutable? we may now reply, "In regard to its primary precepts, Yes: in regard to its secondary precepts, No." Is the apprehension of the moral law a matter of evolution and growth? In regard to the most general principles of morals, No. In regard to a deeper knowledge of them and skill in their application, Yes.

Questions for Revision.

1. What is meant by The Primary Moral Judgements? How do these differ from Conscience?

2. How do such Judgements come to be present in the child's mind? What reason is there for thinking that they are not wholly due to teaching? What truth is there in the statement that your ideas of right and wrong all depend on how you have been brought up?
3. What are the chief causes which produce feebleness of grasp of elementary moral principles? How is it that feebleness can exist side by side with intellectual ability in other directions?
4. Give as full an answer as you can to the question Is the Natural Law immutable? In what sense can one admit 'evolution' in Morals?

CHAPTER IV.

THE SANCTION OF THE NATURAL LAW—PUNISHMENT.

By the Sanction of a law is meant the penalty for violating it. The natural punishment for persistent violation of the Natural Law is the loss of that to which its observance leads, the final end or perfection of man. Hence the persistent lawbreaker frustrates his possibility of reaching his final good. And as happiness is the final good of human nature, if existence be prolonged in such frustration, it can only be a state of misery. But behind the Natural Law stands God, the Lawgiver.

Hence the evil result of its violation is not merely a natural consequence, it is also a divine punishment. In the event such punishment must be final. For, however many stages of probation are supposed, there must in the end come a stage when the alternatives lie between annihilation and the unending continuance of the punishment or state of misery. Experience can tell us nothing of annihilation. Philosophy can only argue the matter, and the reasons against such a termination of existence must be held, in the absence of any evidence, to outweigh those in its favour. But if annihilation is improbable, final and unending misery gains in probability.

This opens up the wider question of Punishment in general. Punishment is pain inflicted for wrong done. It is of two kinds, *prospective* and *retrospective*, according as it looks forward to the amendment of the criminal and the deterring of others or back on the criminal act and vindicates violated order or justice. Prospective punishment is therefore divided into *remedial* or medicinal, as seeking the improvement of the criminal, and *deterrent* inasmuch as it tries to deter others from imitating his conduct. On the question of prospective punishment there is practical agreement among philosophers. Retrospective, also called *retributive*, punishment was generally admitted as an ethically sound notion until about the end of the eighteenth century. But with the beginnings of Utilitarianism in the writings of Jeremy Bentham† the

† Jeremy Bentham (1748—1832).

question began to be raised whether such an idea was ethically defensible. English ethical opinion, deeply imbued with Utilitarian principles, is now largely opposed to retributive punishment. On the other hand common conviction supports the ethical soundness of such punishment. Those who oppose it do so for the most part on humanitarian grounds and base their case in the main on human punishments. The movement against it was part of the reasonable reaction against the savage penalties of the older English criminal law. And if we confine our attention merely to existing human legislation, it is certainly easier to make out a case against retributive punishment, legal penalties being more remedial and deterrent than retributive (II. 2. 66. 6). Yet they are retributive also, a fact which is the main justification of capital punishment regarded purely as a legal penalty.

The fundamental idea of retributive punishment is that of satisfaction for order violated. If I steal a bicycle and after some time restore it together with money compensation for wear and tear and for any inconvenience I may have caused the owner, public opinion will agree that so far I have acted rightly in my attempt to redress the wrong, but that I ought never to have committed the theft at all and deserve to be punished for so doing. It is still more emphatic in the case of bodily injury. If I assault a man and inflict bodily harm on him, even though I afterwards apologize and make money compensation for the injury, all is not finished. It is felt that I ought to be punished for my act of violence and breach of the King's peace. What public opinion is here de-

manding is *satisfaction for order violated.* Such satisfaction has been described as the reaction of the organism against the criminal. Crime is an act of violence against the social organism, and the criminal provokes the reaction against himself. Every public act of wrongdoing has a triple formality. As against the individual it is a wrong. As against the law of the land it is a crime, an offence against society. As against the law of God it is a sin. This is the ultimate ground of retributive punishment. The criminal has rebelled against the order of reason, against the social order, and against the moral order. Hence he incurs a threefold reaction, from his reason in remorse, from the law in the form of legal punishment, and from the moral law in the frustration of his ultimate end if he perseveres in his evil will (cf. St. Thomas, I. 2. 87. 1). The moral order is an immaterial thing. It is the direction of many wills to a certain end by the principle or controller of the order. One rebellious will can pervert and break down this order. It produces disorder first by its actual rebellion, then by the bad example it gives, and also by the sense of insecurity which it engenders. This is seen perhaps best in wide-spread disorder under which society becomes, as we say, demoralized. But wide-spread disorder differs in degree not in kind from the disorder induced by the individual when he violates the law.

Wrong against the individual is atoned for by compensation or restitution. Crime is punished by the State, a punishment which looks to the good of the criminal, to the deterring of others from similar courses, and to the

satisfaction of justice. Divine punishment however is retributive. The analogy of human punishment is here frequently misleading. It is always extrinsic not intrinsic to the criminal act. There is no intrinsic connection between forgery and penal servitude. In a true sense it is a purely arbitrary punishment, fixed by the free choice of the legislative authority. But between choosing evil and having evil there is an intrinsic connexion. The one is a logical consequence of the other. Divine punishment is of this kind, as much a consequence as a punishment. From the point of view of law the matter may be stated thus: the physical laws act blindly and automatically. Disregard of them produces immediate reaction (punishment), even though the disregard be purely unintentional. There can be no violation of the moral law which is not intentional, since it is violated only by the deliberate withdrawal of the will from obedience to its precepts. Such violation if persevered in carries with it its own punishment in the failure to attain the happiness without which human life is frustrate. Such failure is suffering and punishment. "The defect of doing is made up by suffering, inasmuch as they suffer what the Eternal Law prescribes for them to the extent to which they fail to do what accords with the Eternal Law" (I. 2. 93. 6). Universal in its scope, the Eternal Law binds according to the nature of its subjects. Irrational things are bound by its necessity, rational by its obligation. They may withdraw their wills from carrying out its ordinances. They cannot withdraw from its operation. It operates by securing either its

own fulfilment or the required compensation in the form of punishment for those who deliberately refuse submission to it.

It need hardly be added that it is coming to be increasingly recognized nowadays how great is the need for seeking to render criminal punishment remedial as well as deterrent.† The need is the greater owing to the complicated social system under which we live and to the decline in religious and moral training for which non-religious education is in part responsible. Such efforts however, humane and praiseworthy though they be, do not alter the fact that punishment is retributive, a fact attested by the common human conviction that the wrong-doer should be punished because he is a wrong-doer and not merely for his own amendment or to deter others.

It remains to add that punishment is a duty of public authority. The victim of wrong-doing must seek redress through the law and not by private vengeance, no matter how great the provocation. Neither does it belong to any body of private citizens to inflict such punishment unless by delegated authority of the sovereign power. The attempt to usurp such authority is what is known as ' lynch-law.'

Questions for Revision.

1. What is meant by the sanction of a law? What is the sanction of the Natural Law?

† A first-hand account of the present Prison system in the matter will be found in the C.S.G. Year Book, 1926.

2. Distinguish the different kinds of Punishment. Explain clearly what is meant by *retributive* punishment.
3. What kind of sanction is attached to continued violation of the Natural Law? Why is the analogy of human punishment misleading here? In what sense can the sanction of the Natural Law be described as 'a consequence just as much as a punishment'?
4. Why is private vengeance wrong?

PART III.

THE APPLICATIONS OF THE NATURAL LAW— MAN'S DUTIES AND RIGHTS.

PART III.

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CHAPTER I.

DUTIES TO GOD—RELIGION.

In its widest sense the word ' religion ' denotes at once man's beliefs as to the existence and nature of God and his duties towards Him. If these beliefs are based on revelation, they are said to belong to *revealed* religion. If they are the outcome merely of reason and reflection, they form part of *natural* religion. It is with natural religion only that Moral Philosophy deals. By natural religion, then, we mean both the acts of worship of God which reason dictates and the body of truths about Him to which reason can attain. Thus the *object* of religion is God, the *motive* of religion is our sense of dependence on Him, the *act* of religion is worship.

1. Belief in God.

It is obvious that religion cannot exist without belief in God's existence. It is not the

part of Moral Philosophy but of Natural Theology to show the reasonableness and even necessity of such belief. We may however note something of the process by which belief normally arises in the mind of the ordinary man. It has two chief sources, tradition and reflection. None of us can escape the influence of environment. Everywhere in the world to-day some part of the normal man's environment tells him of a belief on the part of other people in the existence of God. The number of positive atheists is comparatively small. In England there is abundant evidence of belief in the existence of God, not only in the professions of the different religious sects, but in literature, art, and the usages of social life. Whether such belief is acted upon or has much bearing on conduct, is another question; but it is at least traditional.

Reflection also leads man to enquire into and to wish to know the whence and the whither of human life. Horace's *Non omnis moriar* (I shall not wholly die) expresses a deep human conviction. The universe itself is ever presenting the problem of its origin and its destiny. It reveals evidence of ordered design. Chance seems too flimsy an explanation of its ordered sequences. Though the problem is beset with difficulties, the average man feels that the existence of a Supreme Author of the universe is, to say the least, highly probable. Conscience too plays its part, bidding him do certain things and refrain from others. Vaguely he recognizes in the voice of conscience the edict of some higher law which imposes itself on him, whether he

will or no. Then there is life itself with its mysterious dispensations of joy and sorrow and the inequalities which it presents.

" And hearts say ' God be pitiful '
Which ne'er said ' God be praised '."

With all this there goes the deep conviction that what we see is not all. Somehow man cannot believe that death, dark and mysterious as it is, is the end. So gradually along many converging lines the mind is borne on to the conviction that what the great majority of the human race believes, and has always believed, must be true : that there must exist a Supreme Ruler who is the origin, cause, and governor of all that is, and hence *its* origin and ruler. From this springs the sense of duty in regard to God, the duty of acknowledging His supreme dominion, which is the first element in religious worship.

It needs but very little further reflection to convince the mind that this First Cause must Himself in some way contain the perfections which He produces in others, that He must be supremely excellent. And as we naturally tend to honour excellence of any kind, we shall be moved to give to God honour and worship of the highest kind. God is also felt to stand in very close relation to the universe which He has made and which He governs by fixed laws. Of these laws, alike in the physical and in the moral spheres, He must be the ultimate guardian.

2. The Duty of Religion.

Once the mind is convinced that God exists, is infinite in all His perfections, and is the moral governor of the universe, our duties to

Him become in general clear. Man is an intelligent part of the universe : hence he must acknowledge God's supreme dominion, must honour Him for what He is in Himself, must observe His law and obey Him as sovereign. Hence there is a special virtue of religion, the object of which is the duty of honouring and worshipping God. Nor is it enough to say, with Kant and others, that religion consists wholly in the observance of the moral law and in the discharge of duty for duty's sake. From His position in regard to the world no less than from His intrinsic excellence God has a right to special acts of worship on the part of man. Hence some religious worship forms part of man's duty under the natural law.

It is sometimes said that religion is based wholly on feeling, which the individual may or may not experience; that it is, as Matthew Arnold called it, 'morality tinged with emotion.' But it is not wholly or chiefly this. Religion may well, and often does, include feeling : but it is based on the most solid of the convictions of the human mind, no less than on the most enduring needs of the human heart.

It does not at all follow from this that every man will act on his beliefs or even that the majority will. Such beliefs are often driven underground by the pressure of life, sometimes by a shrinking from the obligations which they carry with them. It is as a rule an unsafe conclusion that because a man adheres to no religious sect and attends no public worship, he has no belief in God. Such belief is even consistent with an outward indifference

to all forms of religious worship. Belief is one thing, practice another.

3. The Acts of Religion.

The acts of religion are *internal*, such as inward reverence, or self-abasement, or repentance for wrong done, and *external* as in outward reverence and public worship. Both kinds of acts are required for the discharge of the full duty of religious worship. Body as well as soul belong to God and both should do Him reverence. Moreover they are so intimately connected that the one helps the other. To worship with the mind or soul alone is not only to deprive oneself of a powerful aid to devotion, but to run the risk of mere wool-gathering. The need for external forms of worship springs from man's complex nature, bodily and spiritual. Further, as he is a member of society his worship ought to be, and will gain by being, social. He is helped here as in other things by association with others. There is an uplift in united worship which is with difficulty obtained by the average man in private devotion. The social body is bound to the worship of God even as the individual. Thus, religious worship is an essential part of human life and of man's duty under the natural law. He may no more neglect it than any other portion of the law if he is to live as a rational being.†

THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION.

† It may be well here to add a note as to some of the theories which have been put forward by anthropologists and others to explain the origin of the religious instinct. It will be enough to mention three:—

1. ANIMISM. The term is derived from the Latin word

4. The Abuse of Religion.

The abuse of religion is Superstition, of which there are two main forms, (1) the worship of false gods, (2) the worship of the true God with foolish or unauthorised rites. To superstition belong all 'freak religions' as they are called. It may arise from defect of knowledge as with the ignorant or uninstructed. It is then subject to the rules already given (p. 27) for acts done in ignorance. Or it may be due to the decay of genuine religion. Religion being part of the natural law is in a certain sense a necessity of human

'*anima*,' meaning *soul* or *spirit*. It seeks the origin of religion in the idea of a soul or spirit in inanimate things. Men began by noticing change and movement in the things around them, the rising and setting of the sun, the phases of the moon, trees waving in the wind, clouds floating in the sky, etc. This led them to think of these things as alive, with a sort of soul like their own. They concluded that these souls must be be more powerful than theirs, since in many cases they were powerless against these phenomena of nature. Such is the theory first strongly advocated by E. B. Tylor.

To this Herbert Spencer added that of dreams. To the savage, dreams, he thought, were real. It is the dreamer himself who does the actions, visits the places, carries on the conversations of his dreams. Others also visit him during his dreams, especially the souls of his ancestors. There must be in him a *double* which goes abroad during sleep and returns at waking. A sleeper must not be too suddenly aroused, lest his spirit, still abroad, have not time to return and so the man die. For at death this second self has merely gone away. It will one day return, the savage counterpart of the Christian teaching as to the resurrection of the body. These second selves haunt the visible world in invisible shapes. Men are at their mercy. Hence they will try to defend themselves, at first by the witch-doctor, the sorcerer, and the magician. These defenders proving useless, man has recourse to intercession

nature. Where the worship of God is banned, either by human law, as under an infidel government, or owing to sheer neglect, there is a tendency for men to invent gods of their own. The nature of the deity will vary with the intellectual and moral state of the worshippers. Idolatry ranges from the worship of stocks and stones to that of the State or of Humanity or even of Posterity—all forms of superstition. The corruption of the best is the worst form of corruption. Human life is

and propitiation. Thus the souls of ancestors are not only feared but revered. Rites are instituted, some denoting fear and awe, others propitiation and veneration. Out of these come all other forms of worship. Hence belief in God grew from a recognition of souls in things and in particular from ancestor-worship.

2. Nature-Worship and Magic. We may group these two theories together, because in spite of differences they are in many ways akin. Nature-Worship bases its explanation of religion on the phenomena of nature, so much more striking in tropical regions than in our own. The savage is familiar with the terrific thunderstorms of the tropics, with the flooding of huge rivers, with sulphurous springs, volcanoes, and earthquakes. What more natural than that he should tend to personify these and see in them powers for good or evil, able to make or mar his life? So he will pray to them and fear them. Or he will try to control them. To do this he must learn the secret. There will be a mystical formula to which they will yield. Some men will know it, others will not. Those who know will be the magicians. When the force proves altogether too strong to be coerced by any magic, it will gradually come to be worshipped as a god.

All such theories have two main difficulties to face—first their own assumptions, secondly the facts. Their first assumption is that of a progressive evolution as applied to human history in general and in particular to the development of thought. Even were the hypothesis of evolution in the material order established beyond all possibility of doubt, it would still have to be *proved* that the same

never more completely out of focus than when men worship false gods.

On the borderland of superstition are what are known as superstitious practices. Such are a genuine trust in omens or charms, a belief in occult powers, whether in oneself or others, of reading the future, fortune-telling, spiritualism, and the like. A blind faith in

hypothesis was true of the order of thought. Thus it cannot be *assumed* without more ado that present-day savage customs and ideas *must* represent a higher stage of evolution than was possible four thousand years ago. There is degeneracy as well as progress among races.

As to the facts, such theories generally fasten on some truth, e.g. the common tendency to personification, and one by no means confined to savage races. Within the last ten years aeroplanes and motor-cars have acquired a quite definitely recognised sex among ourselves. Poets of all ages and forms of religious belief have personified the forces of nature, rivers, winds, storms, etc.

To the contention that all savages regard all nature as living is opposed the fact, established by linguistic research, that there are primitive races with definite lists of nouns used of inanimate objects, which could hardly be the case did they regard all nature as alive. Further, belief in the survival of souls after death is in every case bound up with belief in a Supreme Being who keeps them in existence. Wherever travellers have found traces of Animism, the fact has been shown to prove no more than the existence of a certain element of superstition, since invariably there has gone with the misbelief religious belief and practice. To say that the religious belief has evolved from the animism is merely to assert what has to be proved. The same is true of magic, which is found to flourish most where genuine religion declines.

3. Modern Psycho-Analytic Theories. Psycho-Analysis is a method rather than a philosophy. Some however of its practitioners put forth a theory on the origin of religion which states that all religious ideas are projections of the mind and hence illusory. Further, religion is the

mechanical aids to religion can also be superstitious, as also the exploiting of the religious fears of others, generally of the ignorant, such as obtains in superstitious practices like the Snowball prayer, as it is called. Certain forms of superstition are of periodic occurrence, notably at times of great public calamity, which furnish opportunities for the charlatan and the wonder-monger.

mere satisfaction of instinct, hence, *as religion*, a delusion. By ' instinct ' is understood those innate specific tendencies of the human mind which are common to all the species. Such are for instance the instincts of flight and repulsion, of pugnacity, of self-abasement and display, of curiosity, together with the parental, reproductive, gregarious, and acquisitive instincts. Religion is the product of instinct. The idea of God is thus a mere creation of our minds in response to instinct. We ' project ' Him into the objective world and worship Him in satisfaction of the instincts of submissiveness. Hence God is an illusion, and in these days an unnecessary illusion: for man, if truly natural, is self-sufficing.

That we ' project ' our idea of God is a proposition which could bear an intelligible meaning in the sense that we can project any of our ideas. But you haven't got rid of God by saying that you project Him. The problem is how to distinguish the true from the false in our projected ideas. Does the idea of God, projected or not, correspond to reality? That is the question to be answered. Nor is it true to say that all our beliefs are the outcome of instinct. Many are due to reasoning, as are all the truths with which the method of Psycho-Analysis works. Religion, it is true, does satisfy instinct: but it does not at once follow that it is an illusion, unless we are prepared to say that all that satisfies instinct is illusory, a proposition which we should be chary of admitting in the case of food or drink. Neither is the satisfaction of instinct a complete account of the matter, even though it were proved to be true as far as it goes, any more than an explanation of the mechanism of a piano is a complete account of the Beethoven sonata which you play on it.

Questions for Revision.

1. In what ways does belief in the existence of God arise in the mind of the average man?
2. What is meant by religion? Show that it is a duty under the Natural Law.
3. Why is not the duty of religion satisfied (*a*) by the observance of the moral law, (*b*) by private communing with God?
4. What is meant by superstition? Whence does it arise?

CHAPTER II.

MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF.

It sounds paradoxical to speak of a man's duties to himself. It is intelligible that he should have duties to his fellows or to God as the author of the moral law. But in what sense that is not nonsense can he be said to have duties to himself? Even if we are reminded that he did not bring himself into existence and does not unaided maintain himself therein, we feel that this points only to duties towards the Author of our being and to the guardian of the moral law.

Strictly speaking duty does regard another. The discharge of duty in the strict sense is an act of the virtue of justice, and justice is

essentially an ' other-regarding ' virtue which cannot be exercised by a man towards himself. But though he cannot be just to himself, he can and must love himself, and his fulfilment of his duties to himself is in fact an act of self-love.

Ordinarily we use the term ' self-love ' in a bad sense, implying the pushing of our own interests to the neglect of the interests and even of the rights of our fellows. But it has also a good sense. In its good sense self-love is the first law of man's being, a law based on the natural tendency or appetite for our own good of which we have already spoken (p. 12). In the limit this good is our final good. Our duties to ourselves lie along this line and consist in directing our free acts to the attainment of this end. This is only another way of saying that self-love, as we are now considering it, consists in the observance of the moral law, that law being regarded primarily as it concerns the individual. The same law will also regulate his dealings with others, but for the moment we are not considering this aspect of it. Self-love thus regarded has no element of ' selfishness ' in it. It does not prefer its own good to that of others, though it may and ought to refuse to do evil to secure the good of others. And if it be said that the good of others is a higher good than my own and that I ought to stop at nothing which may compass it, the only answer can be that I am not likely to be a moral man by doing immoral acts. Provided that I can secure the good of others within the limits of the moral law, I have every right, and may even have a duty, to secure it. But I am not selfish if I refuse to do evil or

to purchase good at the price of evil. I have a duty to others, but I am merely the victim of muddled thinking if I imagine that I can only discharge it by a violation of the moral law.

We may next give the leading lines along which man's duties to himself lie.

1. Duties to Mind and Will.

The first principle of the moral law for the individual is that he consciously direct his conduct in such wise that it be not out of harmony with his final good. It is from this that all his duties to himself in detail flow. But this end and all that concerns it are made known to him only through his intelligence. Whence he has a duty to develop and improve that faculty as far as he reasonably may. This duty will vary enormously with the individual. It does not imply that all men are to be intellectuals. It is enough that a man do what in him lies to acquire some knowledge of the moral law and its application to himself. He ought to know the essential 'duties of his state.' Deliberate failure to secure this amount of intellectual development can only result in an ignorance which is culpable. This is the minimum in the way of intellectual virtue which is involved in a man's duty to himself.

But he will not carry out what his intelligence indicates as the right thing for him to do, unless he has strengthened his will by moral virtue. Of these the most difficult and in one sense the most obligatory is the virtue of temperance, which deals with the greatest obstacles to right action, pleasure and pain

(p. 69). Hence he will be bound to a certain measure of self-restraint, and so of other moral virtues.

2. Duties to the Body.

The duties just discussed deal with goods of the soul. But there are also goods of the body and external goods. There is a strict duty to preserve life and health by the use of ordinary means. This will generally mean that a man must work for his living, and he will have a duty so to work. The chief virtue dealing with goods of the body is temperance, which is concerned with the three strongest physical instincts, those for food, drink, and sex. Eating and drinking to excess will both be against this virtue. This implies that there is an eating and drinking which is suitable, and which will therefore be legitimate and virtuous. But the mean is not absolutely fixed : it will vary with the individual (Cf. p. 70). In general such eating or drinking as impedes the use of reason or does serious bodily harm will, as such, be evil, unless some higher consideration, such as the good of the whole man, intervenes. Thus the use of anaesthetics is legitimate, since, though reason is impeded, it is so for the good of the whole man. The inhibition is therefore in the interests of reason, not against them. In the case of drunkenness reason is impeded against the interest of the whole man, not in its favour. Hence the evil of intemperance, apart from its effects on others, e.g. the drunkard's family, is to be sought not in the chemical composition of the beverage consumed, but in the irrational, and hence immoral, use of it. An

irrational use implies the existence of a rational use. Such are the general moral principles in the matter. Their application will vary with the varying circumstances of the individual and of the social conditions in which he lives. There are those for whom the only safe form of temperance in drink is total abstention from all alcoholic drinks: and there might arise social conditions in which, owing to the widespread evil of intemperance in drink and its grave social and moral consequences, the practice of total abstinence by all or by a large portion of the community might be a matter of urgent counsel.

The sex instinct and the pleasure attending its use are designed for the propagation of the race. Its legitimate use is found in the state of matrimony, the stable union of man and wife for this very purpose. Out of the state of matrimony its use is immoral and against the natural law for the reason that the due propagation of the race, which involves the care for and education and training of the offspring, is then impossible. Unnatural use of the sex instinct is the abuse of a faculty and, as such, immoral according to the primary moral criterion (p. 48).

The negative side of the duty of preserving life and health is the prohibition of *suicide*. It is often asked, Is Suicide never lawful? The questioner generally has in mind hard cases, such as that of the hopeless invalid whose life is useless to himself and a burden to others, and who can look forward only to days of ever increasing pain. But hard cases make bad law. It is better to apply the moral criteria to the act of suicide in general. Here both

primary and secondary criteria may be applied with effect. By suicide is meant the *direct* taking of one's own life, or the deliberate adoption of such means as must necessarily lead to that end, or even the deliberate neglect, as by self-imposed starvation, of the necessary means to life. It must be carefully distinguished from the mere risking of one's life for a cause proportioned to the risk, as also from the *indirect*, though unintended, sacrifice of one's life. The soldier risks his life in battle for his country's good. The martyr persists in a course which he clearly foresees may end in death, although he does not take direct means to compass death.

Of suicide as thus defined it can only be said that it is evil as judged either by the primary or secondary criterion of morality. The primary criterion we have seen (p. 48) to be in general human nature, in particular the good of the whole man. But nature never tends to its own destruction. It is natural to every being, animate and inanimate, to resist every attempt at its disruption. All its forces are gathered to maintain itself in being. This law of nature holds good of all man's powers, vegetative, sensitive, and rational. All alike tend to their own preservation as to that of the subject to which they belong. An act therefore which positively thwarts the good of the whole, due proportion being observed, is, in so far as it thus impedes, naturally evil.† But in suicide all the powers of man are concentrated on self-destruction, the destruction of

† The higher good should prevail over the lower in a conflict between them. Thus lower desires may, and often must, be thwarted that reason and its good may prevail.

human nature. Hence it is an act essentially opposed to the good of human nature, and hence essentially evil according to the primary and fundamental criterion of morality. Directly and deliberately to compass one's own death is then to violate nature and the natural law. There may, it is true, be cases in which it would seem that death were preferable to life, and a greater good for the individual. This may be granted: yet not for that can the evil of taking one's own life be evaded. Like many another thing death may be a consummation devoutly to be wished, but I am not on that account justified in taking a means intrinsically evil to such a consummation.

The application of the secondary criterion causes no difficulty. Were suicide raised to the level of a general line of action, were every man who was in difficulties to feel that he need have no reasonable scruple about taking his own life, an immense evil would result to human society. Such conduct would inevitably work destruction for the race, a sure sign of its inherent evil. And it will be evil not because it produces this result: but it produces evil because it is evil. The secondary criterion indicates but does not constitute evil in an act (p. 50).

There is the further question of the dominion of God against which the suicide sins. To take and destroy another's property against his known and reasonable will is to do him wrong. The suicide takes and destroys the concrete human nature which belongs to God and exercises his will upon it to its destruction against the known will of its

Owner whose rights are thus grievously violated. Such an act cannot but be immoral.

What is true of positive suicide is no less true of negative self-slaughter in which one deliberately neglects the necessary means to life. The man who deliberately refuses food with the express purpose of ending his life differs in no respect from one who takes any other means to the same end. His act is morally indistinguishable from that of the positive suicide.

A distinction already made above needs careful note. It is one thing to risk life for a good and proportionate end, even when the risk is very great, and quite another deliberately to compass one's death *as a means* to a desirable end. In the former case, say that of the soldier who risks his life in a forlorn hope, the elements of the act are (1) the end, the rescue of comrades or whatever it be, which is, it is presumed, wholly good : (2) the means taken, the going on this expedition attended by grave risk to life : (3) the circumstances, which may be presumed to be morally just. Hence the whole action is good, good being predicated of fulness of being and each of the three elements of the act possessing this fulness. But in the second case while the end may be excellent, relief from present misery for oneself or others, the means chosen, viz. self-slaughter, is evil. The circumstances need not be dealt with since evil is already present in the means. Since evil is predicated of any defect, the act as a whole is evil. To call it anything else would be to invoke the immoral axiom that the end justifies the means. The former is an instance of the

Principle of Double Effect (p. 41), the latter an example of the end being supposed to justify the means.

Questions for Revision.

1. In what sense can a man be said to have duties to himself?
2. What duties are prescribed by the Natural Law in regard to mind and will?
3. What are our chief duties in regard to the body?
4. What of the morality of hunger-striking?
5. Show why suicide is immoral?
6. Show the distinction between suicide and facing almost certain death to rescue a comrade.

CHAPTER III.

MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS NEIGHBOUR.

Man's duties to his neighbour are in the main duties of justice. Naturally they will cover a very wide field. It may be well therefore to preface what has to be said about them with some explanation of the virtue of justice.

1. The Virtue of Justice.

In general the virtue of justice is that habitual disposition of will which prompts us

to render every man his due. So defined, the virtue of justice will cover the whole field of moral obligation and will govern man's duties alike to God and to his fellow man. In this sense it is known as *General Justice*, prompting to the fulfilment of all the obligations of both natural and positive law. The word is often thus used in English, justice or righteousness being used as an equivalent for moral virtue in general.

Contrasted with this is what is known as *Particular Justice*, divided into *distributive* and *commutative* justice. Distributive justice is the virtue of the ruler, the statesman, or the public official, according to which he observes fairness in the distribution of public benefits and burdens, such as honours and rewards, public money, judicial decisions, taxation, etc. It is sinned against by cliquishness, favouritism or corruption in the courts or elsewhere.

The justice with which we are here concerned is *Commutative Justice*. This alone is justice in the strict sense. It is called commutative (or justice *in exchange*) because its field is that of *exchanges* or *contracts*. By it we give another an equivalent for what he gives us. It rests on *equality* in the exchange. The commonest instance of it is that of buying and selling, where the just price is held to be what is adequately sufficient to compensate the vendor for the value of the article sold and for the expenses to which he is put as a public vendor of goods. Buyer and seller are parties to a voluntary contract. But in many cases which fall under commutative justice the contract is involuntary. To understand this we

have to remember the existence of natural rights in all men, e.g. to life and liberty, to property, etc. Such rights beget the duty to observe them. Hence if I sin against my neighbour's right, I by that very act enter upon an involuntary contract with him to make good the loss I have caused. The whole transaction is involuntary, first against the will of the wronged party, then, it may well be, against my will who have to restore. It is a contract from the nature of the case. It is I who by violating his right incur the obligation of making my trespass good and of giving back what I have taken. This is the obligation of *restitution* which attaches to breaches of commutative justice. Such justice consists essentially in an equality, which is violated by my wrongful act, and I remain in a state of injustice until equality is restored by the restitution of what I have unjustly taken. Hence the obligation of restitution is not a mere penalty imposed from without, but is of the very essence of the virtue of justice.

Such in general is the virtue of justice and the nature of my duty to my neighbour under this head. I am bound to respect his rights, or, if I violate them, to make him restitution or reparation for the wrong done. Note that the virtue of justice thus differs from the other moral virtues. They reside in the mean (p. 71). Justice alone is not in a mean but in absolute equality. We have next to apply this to the chief rights of our neighbour.

2. The Duty of Respecting Life.

A man's first and chiefest natural right is that to his life. Hence I may never directly

compass the death of an innocent man, understanding ' innocent ' in its political and social sense. I may never of my own authority directly take the life of another. By ' direct ' killing is understood either the willing of another's death as an end in itself, or the deliberate choosing of it as a means to something else, e.g. robbery.

All that has been said about suicide has its application here. The direct killing of an innocent person is clearly inconsistent with primary and secondary criteria of morality. It is an invasion of God's dominion over the victim just as it is of the latter's right to his own life. It is not difficult therefore to see the essential injustice of murder in general.

The real difficulty in the matter lies in the case of *indirect* killing. Here two questions may be distinguished, first that of indirect killing in general, secondly the question of the indirect killing of the unjust aggressor against my life or property.

First, note that indirect killing is a particular instance of Indirect Voluntary (p. 27). An act is said to be indirectly voluntary when it is not willed as an end in itself but occurs as a foreseen consequence of an act which is directly willed. We saw that we are not always bound to refrain from action because evil consequences are inseparably bound up with the act in the concrete. The conditions under which action is then lawful were formulated in the Principle of Double Effect (p. 41). Indirect killing of the innocent may therefore be permissible provided that (*a*) it is indirect, not the object of the will either

as end or means: (*b*) it is the result of an act good in itself and permissible to the agent: (*c*) there is a cause or motive proportioned to the indirectly-produced evil effect.

Precisely the same principle applies in the at first sight more difficult case of the indirect killing of an unjust aggressor. The chief point in the case from the standpoint of morality is that the death of the aggressor be not *directly* willed. The case is one of trespass in a serious matter, either life or valuable property being at stake. The risk is presumed to be actual and imminent. The aggressor is unjust. He has no right whatever to attack me or my goods. I have a right to hold and defend them against one who would unlawfully deprive me of them. Intent on that defence, a quite legitimate purpose, I have to take immediate and violent action, it is supposed, to stop his trespass. I do stop it by the only means at hand, a blow which may or may not be fatal. If death results, I have not willed it, though I may have foreseen that it was likely. Hence I have acted on the Principle of Double Effect. My action of self-defence was good and permissible. The evil effect has resulted from the good, the stopping of the attack and the defence of my life, and the cause was sufficiently grave to warrant my taking the risk of evil consequences. Hence my action as a whole was justified. St. Thomas adds that I must act 'with the moderation of a blameless self-defence,' which in practice means that I should strive not to inflict greater injury than is necessary for the end in view.

3. The Duty of Respecting Reputation and Truth.

My neighbour has a right to his reputation until he has forfeited it by publicly known misconduct. His reputation may be damaged either by my revealing what is true but protected by a natural secret, to the breaking of which my auditors have no right: or by the invention of false charges against him. The first of these violations of justice is Detraction, the second Calumny. As against justice both alike carry with them the obligation to repair as far as possible the damage done, even by money compensation if need be.

This brings us to the general obligation of truth in social intercourse. The obligation is positive—to tell the truth—as well as negative—not to lie. It is generally treated under its difficult negative aspect, that of the prohibition against Lying.

The chief question that arises in this connexion is: IS A LIE INTRINSICALLY EVIL? By this is meant, Is it evil in itself apart altogether from its consequence good or bad? If it is thus evil, no nobility of motive, no importance of consequences can ever justify it. If it is not, then it must be either good in itself or indifferent, which, as we have seen (p. 39), means in the concrete good or bad according to the circumstances of the act.

The most widely accepted definition of a lie is 'speaking against one's mind.' By this is meant any speech, statement, or communication made to another person, which seriously purports to represent what one believes to be true, but which the speaker at the time of

speaking knows is not true. Note that it is a form of speech or its equivalent, e.g. writing. To act in such a way that my neighbour draws a wrong inference from my conduct is not, strictly speaking, to tell a lie, which is essentially a form of speech. Moreover speech is possible only between intelligent beings. You cannot therefore lie to your dog. And lying speech must seriously purport to represent the speaker's mind. This condition *may* be fulfilled even when the speaker is joking, as where there is no indication whatever that he does not wish to be taken seriously. In such a case, while the innocence of the end in view diminishes the evil of the lie, it does not wholly destroy it. But the 'jocose' lie is often not a lie at all. The circumstances, the very absurdity of what is said, the accompanying actions, a twinkle or gesture may give quite a new meaning to the words used, from which it will be clear that they do not seriously represent the speaker's mind.

As to the *evil of a lie*, St. Thomas puts the matter in a sentence when he writes (II. 2. 90. 3), "A lie is evil *of its own nature*, for it is an act falling on undue matter. For since language is naturally the sign of what one thinks, it is unnatural and undue to say in word what one does not think in his mind." We have already seen (p. 49) that if a faculty has a natural end, any use of it which opposes that end must be unnatural and therefore evil. But is the natural end of speech the manifestation of our thoughts, or is it given, as the French cynic said, to hide thought? We can only appeal to experience. The common sense of mankind assumes without question

that in ordinary circumstances what a man says represents what he thinks and believes to be true. This understanding once removed, social life, as we know it, becomes impossible and language meaningless. If it is to be understood by common agreement that when a man makes a statement, it bears no necessary relation whatever to what is in his mind at the time, language ceases to have any function in human intercourse. It can neither inform nor deceive. If then speech has for its natural end that it should be in relation to thought and express the mind of the speaker, the deliberate lie, which frustrates this end, is an unnatural use of speech and hence immoral and evil, not always a great evil, yet evil not good. Hence the *intention to deceive* is not essential to a lie : its essence consists in speech against one's mind.

But if a lie is intrinsically evil, the use of falsehood can never be moral or permissible. What then of difficult cases? Apart from the maxim that hard cases make bad law, there is a quite definite issue here. Either a lie is intrinsically evil, or it is intrinsically good (which no moralist of any school would seriously maintain), or it is good or bad according to circumstances. If the last, a by no means uncommon view among non-Catholic moralists, to lie or to tell the truth is a matter of expediency which each man must decide for himself in the concrete, guided by general moral principles. Those who hold such a position would be the first to say that as a general rule it was better to tell the truth than to lie : in fact that one ought to hold it as a general principle to tell the truth, but

that circumstances might arise such that telling the truth would do much more harm than an 'innocent' lie, and that in such circumstances it was permissible, and even better, to lie, such a lie being innocent.

This is dangerously near Utilitarianism (to which in our hearts we have all a secret bias), and rather avoids the practice of truth when it is difficult than faces up to it. And virtue is practised just in such difficult circumstances. Catholic moralists will never admit that there can arise circumstances in which a lie is justified. But they maintain that one is not on all occasions bound to tell all the truth that one knows: indeed that there may be circumstances in which one *ought* not to disclose all the information in one's possession.

This position has been very much criticized, and often misunderstood. It is well therefore to remember that both those who differ from us and ourselves are faced with the same set of facts, those namely of the difficult case. The practical question is what to do about it. One way out is to tell a lie and have done with it, and that is what in practice many well-meaning people advocate. But if a lie is intrinsically evil, it is only waste of time to talk about justifying it. You may revise your principle, but as long as that *is* your principle a lie can never be a good act. And the only alternative is that, in the abstract, truth or falsehood are indifferent, and like other indifferent acts take their morality from the circumstances. On the other hand it is undoubtedly true that your telling the truth may do harm, not because it is the truth but because of some accidental circumstance such as the shock it will cause or the

importance of the person involved. And however far one may extend the limits of the conventional lie,† there remain cases in which one has to choose between the truth and harm on the one side, or protection, the guarding of a secret—and a lie?—on the other.

Reduced to its simplest elements the case amounts to one of conflicting obligations. On the one side is the duty of telling the truth, or, at the least, of not telling a lie: on the other, that of charity or of guarding a secret, natural or of trust. Silence is often only tantamount to admission of the damaging truth. What is to be done? The alternatives seem to be: tell the truth and ruin your friend's reputation (in addition, it may be, to violating a natural secret), or tell a lie and excuse yourself on the ground of difficult circumstances. If the latter, the probability is that you will tell a very fair number of lies in the course of an ordinary life. In such circumstances and for such circumstances (and the qualification is to be noted) Catholic moralists have maintained the possibility of a certain economy of truth. They have said in effect: You are not here bound to tell the whole truth; and while you must not lie, you may reserve a certain part of your information within your own breast.

Such reservation is known as *Mental Reservation*. By Mental Reservation the spoken phrase is so limited as not to bear the full sense

† The conventional lie, which is not a lie at all, covers such conventional replies as "Not at home," "I'm very well, thanks," and even the language of ordinary polite compliment which is understood not to express the speaker's innermost mind.

which it might seem to bear. If the limitation of the spoken sense is in no way revealed externally, the reservation is said to be *pure*. Pure mental reservation is never permissible, since it differs in nothing from a lie. Broad mental reservation, in which some external indication (e.g. the nature of the matter in discussion) is given of the possibility of reservation, is permissible, not as a general rule of conduct, but in the difficult cases alluded to above. That this is so follows from the natural law which forbids me to divulge a secret and which equally forbids my neighbour from prying into it. Partly from the subject-matter and partly from my obvious reluctance to give him the information he desires he learns that he has no business to make his enquiries and no right to the full truth from me at least. In such cases the speaker will use words which, while not fully revealing all that is in his mind do not oppose it, and hence are no lies. If it be felt that such economy of truth is hateful, a lie or the violation of a natural secret is more hateful still. Nor is mental reservation a rule for general conduct, it is only an expedient for difficult cases.

Questions for Revision.

1. Distinguish between General and Particular Justice; Distributive and Commutative Justice.
2. How does justice differ from other moral virtues?
3. Distinguish between direct and indirect killing. Is the latter ever lawful? Under what conditions?

4. Distinguish between Calumny and Detraction. What obligation does either carry with it? What moral principle is violated by relating what is true but prejudicial to another?
5. Define a Lie and show how it is an immoral act.
6. In a conflict of the obligations to speak the truth and to protect a secret what course may be followed?
7. Can the position that an innocent lie, which does no harm and may avert some impending evil, if permissible be ethically defended? Give reasons for your answer.

CHAPTER IV.

RIGHTS.

The word ' right ' has many senses. Used without an adjective it ordinarily means a moral right. A moral right presupposes the existence of a moral law. That such a law exists we have already seen when dealing with the Natural Law (p. 93). Law, directing the community to a definite end, binds to the doing or refraining from certain actions. As it must bind the whole community, it will dictate lines of action to be pursued in regard to my neighbour. By its provisions the law

gives him a *right* and imposes on me a duty, just as it gives me a right and imposes a duty on him. Right then originates in the first instance from law. And it is obvious that right and duty are correlative. If there is a right there is a corresponding duty and *vice versa*.

Hence a right is a moral power entitling me to have or do something. It is not a physical power, though I may defend it by physical force. On the other hand I may retain it unimpaired under the greatest physical stress. It is the essence of a right that it be inviolable. This means that it may be exercised without interference on the part of others. This quality follows from the very nature of a right, the moral power to do or hold something, which necessarily carries with it the duty on the part of others not to interfere with my so doing or holding. My right may however be limited, and in practice is generally limited, by my duties in other directions. Thus in the abstract a man has the right to spend as he pleases the money he earns. In the concrete his spending power is considerably curtailed by the claims of justice, as in paying his debts or supporting his family, and charity, which demands some contribution to the relief of distress or the upkeep of charitable institutions.

While it is untrue to say that might is right, there is truth in the statement that right is might, in the sense that right carries with it the right to its defence even by the use of physical force, as in the case of the unjust aggressor (p. 140). Hence it is sometimes said

that one of the properties of right is *coercion*, which means that you may legitimately enforce your right or defend it even by physical violence in the proper circumstances.

In the books there are endless divisions of rights. We need perhaps concern ourselves only with three:—(1) *Natural and Positive*, according as they depend on natural or positive law. (2) *Connatural and Acquired*. A Connatural Right is one possessed by the very fact that one is a human person, as the right to life. An Acquired Right is one entered into by the fulfilment of some condition, as the right to inherit property. (3) *Alienable and Inalienable*. Alienable are those rights which a man may legitimately renounce, as the right to marry or to possess wealth. Inalienable rights are those which may not be renounced because they are also duties, as the right to worship God or the right to life. It should be noted that these divisions may cross one another. Thus a natural right may be and often is also positive. An inalienable right is often connatural and so on.

Questions for Revision.

1. Define a Right. Give and explain some of the more important divisions of Rights.
2. In what sense is a Right inviolable and coercive?

CHAPTER V.

THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.

By the right of Ownership or Private Property is meant the permanent and exclusive moral power of retaining, controlling, and disposing of a thing according to one's own will and good pleasure. Thus described the right contains four elements :—(1) Control. (2) Control in one's own interest. (3) Permanence. (4) Exclusiveness. Of these (1) and (2) are the essentials, the right to control in one's own interest. Of itself ownership gives unlimited right of control. In practice this right is generally limited by positive law, as well as by the claims of various virtues such as justice or charity.

Ownership is said to be *Public* or *Private*, according as it is vested in a private individual or association, or in the community or in some public body. If you control the thing itself and all its uses or fruits (e.g. capital and interest), you are said to have *perfect ownership:* if only the uses or fruits (interest), your ownership is *imperfect*. If you control the thing alone and not its uses (capital only), you are said to have *direct* ownership : if its uses only, *indirect*.

Two quite different questions arise here and have to be carefully distinguished : (1) How is it that Private Ownership exists at all? In what sense is it necessary? (2) How does the right of Private Ownership arise in this particular case? What is its *Title?* The important question is (1). Note that it deals

with Private Ownership in general. We are not here discussing the question whether private ownership of land is justifiable, or whether the State ought to own the means of production, but merely the naked principle of private ownership, an ownership stable, lasting, and extending even to accumulated wealth. To assert the existence of such a right is not to deny the right of public ownership. Nor if we say that the right of private ownership is part of the natural law, do we mean that it is by the natural law that the present distribution of goods has come about. The goods of nature are *negatively* common. They become appropriated to individuals by human intervention. If they are negatively common they are intended by nature and reason to be used to the best advantage. This is only possible in practice through private ownership. Community of goods might be feasible and of advantage in a primitive or very closely united community. But in a large community with conflicting sectional interests, such as the modern State, private ownership is a practical necessity.

The question then to be discussed is, How is it that private ownership exists, and in what sense is it necessary? Briefly the answer is, because human nature is what it is. There is an intimate connexion between the principle of private ownership and the practical needs and necessities of human life.

We may note first that private property is a constant phenomenon in human history. It exists and has always existed everywhere and among all nations taken as a whole. Here and there there may have been communism,

but of the race as a whole it is true to say that it has everywhere recognized the fact or institution of private ownership. So widespread a phenomenon points to a probable connexion between the thing in question and human nature itself. Nor has this fact been regarded as an outrage on human nature. It has been acquiesced in and recognized as a fact based on a right, the right to acquire property of one's own. This right does not refer to this piece of property or that. It is quite vague and general, a general power or right to acquire things of one's own. In practice possession of this thing or that will be determined by some particular concrete fact. What that fact is, belongs to the second of the questions to be discussed.

Perhaps the negative method of approach is the easiest for convincing ourselves of the existence of this right. Suppose the entire abolition of all private property of whatever kind and of all right to acquire such. If it is clear that such abolition would work out badly for individuals and for the race as a whole, then, according to one of the secondary criteria of morality (p. 50), this abolition will be in itself evil and immoral. Moreover, the institution of private property is, logically at least, more natural than any other system, since the individual and the family are prior to the State. The individual held certain things as his own as against other individuals, and the family as against other families, long before any state organization was possible. Thus the state of private ownership is closer to nature than any state of common property.

The interests concerned in the question of

private ownership are those of the individual, the family, and the community. It is difficult to see how any of these would benefit by the absence or abolition of the right of private property. If you take the individual, by the fact that he is a person he has at once the right and the duty of self-development. Of the motives to this the greatest is ownership. If a man has worked hard to make or get a thing, he wants to use it as his own. Under this stimulus he will put forth his best powers. Deprived of it, his work tends to fall off in quantity and quality, as daily experience proves. And possession is one of the strongest natural instincts. A man likes to feel that he has something which he can call his own, which he can use for his own service or amusement and which no-one can take from him. This is a source of very real happiness in life, just as its opposite is of real pain. Watch the pathetic fervour with which poor people in their old age will cling to their few possessions, shrinking intensely from the thought of dependence on others against which their bit of property is something of a guarantee. The instinct is closely allied to that of self-respect. It prompts us to lay by for our old age, precisely lest we have to depend then on others. To abolish any such right is to do violence to one of the deepest instincts of human nature.

It has also to be remembered that a man has by nature a property in his own person, abilities, and energies. Hence he may also claim property in the products of these. The external goods which he produces by the use of his own powers, on his own raw material,

and aided by his own tools, are his and his alone, being merely his energies transformed into external goods. This is but a further indication that the right of private ownership follows from the fact that a man is a man, and that it is therefore a natural right.

Or take the family, the first type of society and nature's only instrument for the continuance of the race. The father has at once the right and the duty of providing for his family. This means not only that he must preserve it from starvation, but that he look to its well-being according to the demands of its position in life. His children have the right not merely to such food as will keep body and soul together and to such clothing as will cover their nakedness, but they may reasonably demand to be kept in frugal comfort. Further, they must be trained and educated and given the possibility of making a start in life and even of improving their position. These demands, and they are reasonable, require wealth for their satisfaction. Hence the head of the family has the right no less than the duty of acquiring and possessing such wealth: else he cannot discharge the responsibility which nature itself has laid upon him. And as nature has fixed no limit to the number of children in a family nor to the extent of their reasonable demands, it is difficult to see that she has imposed any limit to the acquisition and even accumulation of wealth by the head of the family.

Nor are the parents themselves to be left out of the account. They have old age to face, and have a right to their independence especially at a time of life when perhaps more

than at any other dependence is felt to be most galling. Everyday experience shows how inadequate to this demand are state-provided institutions, not necessarily from any inefficiency on their part but because they fail to meet the reasonable requirements of independence.

The recognition of the right of private property is thus essential to the well-being of the family. Whether by mutual agreement any workable system of common ownership could be set up, is an entirely different question with which we are not dealing here. The point here is that private ownership is a natural right, one therefore which, if it were superseded at all, could be yielded only by mutual consent. To abolish it without more ado would be to violate the natural law.

As for the general interest, as the common weal is the result of the well-being of the individuals and families which compose the State, it is not easy to see how if these are hard hit the State as a whole is going to flourish. Depress the interests of the individual and the family, and you depress those of the whole community. What all communism loses sight of is the truth that man is an individual, an independent person, as well as a member of a community. And while it is true that there are times and seasons in which he will sink his individuality and labour solely for the common good, as in a great national crisis, he will not in normal times and in everyday life consent to forego his liberty and the fruits of his own labour. In a small closely-knit community, such as were the early Christians, such an arrangement might be found practicable for a time, but the conditions are totally different

in the loose aggregate of persons and interests which make up the modern State. That there are many evils in the present social system none but a fool would deny. But it requires great faith in human nature and in the State to believe that the remedy for them lies in the introduction of state-control into every department of life. And the only substitute for the right of private property is state control or complete anarchy.†

† It may be well here to give a brief account of St. Thomas's teaching on the right of ownership. It is contained in two passages in the *Secunda secundae*. In the first (II. 2. 57. 3.) it is introduced in illustration of the meaning of 'natural' as in e.g. 'natural law.' He says there are two senses in which 'natural' or 'natural fitness' may be used. One arises from a mere comparison in which the 'natural' fitness is at once perceived. Thus there is a natural fitness that a husband should beget children by his wife, or that a father should support his son. In other cases mere comparison will not reveal the natural fitness. You can only deduce it from some consequence of doing or not doing the thing in question. "Take for instance," he continues, "the right of ownership. Consider a field in the abstract and there is no reason why it should belong to this man rather than to that. But if you regard it from the point of view of cultivation and peaceable possession, there is a natural fitness in its belonging to one man and not to another. . . . But to consider a thing, comparing it with its consequences, is a function of reason, and hence this same thing is natural to man according to natural reason which dictates it." In such findings of reason common to all nations alike he sees what he calls "Ius gentium," not International Law in the modern sense but certain first principles recognized by all nations without any positive legislation about them, and he quotes the right of private property as an instance of what he means.

In the second passage (II. 2. 66. 2) he is enquiring whether it is lawful for a man to possess anything as his own. In his reply he distinguishes between the power of managing and dispensing external goods and their use.

The right of ownership then is a natural right. But its scope is not unlimited in practice. There are responsibilities attached to it. If the communist forgets that man is an individual, the owner may forget that he is a member of society. It is this solidarity which attaches responsibilities to ownership. There are the obligations of charity, liberality, and friendship to be discharged. Charity obliges to generosity to our poorer neighbour, especially in his greatest need, when " use should be common." If the distress is extreme, the owner is bound in justice to help to relieve it, with due regard to the necessities of himself and his family. The obligation *in justice* here is based on the fact that nothing which I own is produced entirely by myself. All ownership begins in occupancy, originally in appropriating that to which we had no claim, but which the natural law permitted us to take because it was not necessary to the community. Should this thing or part of it become necessary for the very existence of a member of the

As to the former he says that it is lawful and even necessary to human life for a man to possess things of his own, first because such possession leads to more efficient management, secondly because it makes for greater order in human affairs, thirdly because it helps to public peace. His words as to the use of external goods have often been quoted: " As to use, a man ought not to consider external things as his own but as common. I mean that in the necessity of others he should easily share them."

To sum up—though external goods are negatively common to all, the right of private property is a natural right, dictated by reason and recognized without positive enactment by all nations. The right makes for efficiency, order, and peace in human affairs. In the use of property a man should regard it as something easily to be shared where others are in need.

community the condition on which I hold it becomes operative and confers on the person in 'extreme' necessity a right in justice. Thus the food that is absolutely necessary to prevent a man perishing of starvation is his just right. In practice and to prevent abuse the law will not allow him to take it, but it will not punish him if his necessity can be shown to have been extreme.

The second question about private property was that of the *Title* to ownership. By 'title' is meant the fact or event by which an owner comes to have the right to hold this piece of property and to exclude others. A title is necessary to make the abstract right concrete. In other words you must be able to say how you came by this property and what right you have to it. A title may be *natural* or *artificial*, *fundamental* or *derivative*. The fundamental natural title to property is *Occupancy*, which means taking a thing into one's power with the intention of using it as one's own. Needless to say there are very few things which can be so acquired to-day. The question of Occupancy however, though somewhat academic, is instructive. Note that it is not the State or labour which gives this fundamental natural title. If there is no occupancy, there is no ownership either by the community or the individual. Mere labour is not enough, because labour does not produce the land or the raw material. Even if the community is to own, it must occupy. This implies an external act of appropriation, the setting up of a flag or the erection of a fence etc., by which it is notified to others that the ground or object in question has been appropriated. Obviously

the object so appropriated must be suitable for occupancy. This means that it does not already belong to someone else, that it is not necessary for the community, unless the community freely cedes its right; nor can the object appropriated be such that it cannot be exclusively possessed. No individual or nation may appropriate all the sea or all the air.

Of derived titles Labour is perhaps the most important for the ethical student. All rights rest on the fact that every man is autocentric, which means that he is the master of himself and his energies mental and physical. Every man has thus a property in his own person. As the products of his labour are his energies transformed, he has a right of ownership over the things which his labour alone has produced. Hence if he owns the raw material, the tools, and the capital which is necessary to make his labour commercially productive, he also owns entirely all the products. In practice this does not obtain. Hence labour cannot be said entirely to own the product. To arrive at a just estimate of the share owing to labour deductions would have to be made for raw material, machinery, capital, and even for organization. In modern industry the worker for the most part sells his labour rather than regards it as conferring a title to part ownership. He may legitimately do this. His energies are his own and he may lawfully dispose of them to another for a price, which must be just. If he is a whole-time worker, giving up his whole working day to his employer, he is devoting to him all his means of livelihood. Hence he has a right to demand in return for his labour such a

remuneration or wage as will keep himself and and his family 'in frugal comfort.' This will be the *Minimum Just Wage*. Note that the right to it is based on justice, not on charity, or on the conditions of the industry, or the state of the labour market, or on any other consideration than that of justice. Every whole-time worker who thus sells his labour has a right to the minimum just wage.

On the other hand the employer is not bound to buy his labour, any more than his customers are bound to buy his goods. It is here that the practical difficulties begin. The employer says in effect: "I fully agree that if you work for me, you have a right to the minimum just wage. But I have not the money to pay you, so I will not accept your offer to work for me." That is the beginning of unemployment, the deadlock of modern industrialism. Hence commissions of enquiry to examine whether what the employer says is true; and if it is true, how it can be remedied; whether it is that 'the industry cannot stand it,' i.e. cannot afford to pay the minimum wage, or whether it is the owners and shareholders who cannot stand it, or what is the cause. Often it is found to be no single cause but a variety of factors whose combination has plunged the industry into genuine difficulties. Among these a prominent place is held by foreign competition with which so far there is very little effective machinery for dealing. Anyhow there are undoubted evils and abuses. Hence the outcry against 'the system,' and the proposal to substitute other systems for it. The substitute most widely advocated to-day is some form of Socialism.

Questions for Revision.

1. Define the right of Private Property. In what sense has Nature made all things common?
2. How would you show the necessity of the existence of the right of Private Property?
3. In what sense may the right of Private Property be said to be part of the Natural Law?
4. How do you reconcile the existence of such a right with the fact of the Communism of the early Christians?
5. In what sense may a man do what he will with his own?
6. What is a Title of ownership? What is the fundamental title? In what sense does labour confer a title of ownership?
7. Define the Minimum Just Wage. On what ground would you justify it?

CHAPTER VI.

SOCIALISM.

1. What Socialism is.

The present industrial system in this country is competitive. It is based on capital and the means of production, distribution, and exchange (machinery, buildings, ships, railways, etc.) owned by private firms. Socialism proposes to abolish this system of privately owned capital and to put in its place an industrial system in which all capital and

means of production etc., shall belong to the community. That and that alone is the *essential* idea of Socialism. It would substitute *collective* for *private* ownership of capital and the means of production, distribution and exchange. It is thus essentially an affair of economics.

2. What Socialism is not.

If you keep the above definition in mind, you will see at once what Socialism is and what it is not. *In itself* it is not communism. It is not an attempt at the equal distribution of wealth, nor a doctrine of the equality of all men, nor the class war, nor a dozen other things that it is sometimes thought to be. Neither is it Christianity or any form of religion. It is a system of making and distributing wealth. *In itself* it has nothing whatever to do with these other things with which it is so often identified.

" In itself " is important, because in thinking of Socialism you have to distinguish between theory and practice, or between the idea and the movement. The idea can be stated in a very few words: the movement is complicated in the extreme. You may put the same distinction in the form of two questions: What is the thing that the Socialist is trying to do? and, Why does he want to do it and How? The answer to these questions gives at once a programme and a method. So far we have spoken only of the programme.

3. Socialism and Ethics.

If Socialism is an affair of economics, how does it come into Ethics? In this way:

economics, being concerned with the production of wealth, is a subordinate science, because there are in life higher considerations than those of money (cf. Clay, *Economics for the General Reader*, ch. xxv). As Socialism is an affair of economics, it too is subordinated to the principles of Ethics. Provided that these principles are safeguarded, Ethics has nothing to do with Socialism or any other economic system. But this is a very wide proviso. The ethical difficulties involved in reducing such a programme to practice are not a few. As the word implies, Socialism is the antithesis of individualism. Historically it is a reaction against individualist economics, and it shares the danger common to all reactions of going too far; of not merely subordinating the private to the public good but of submerging the citizen in the State, the individual and the family in the community. Such a state of things would be a violation of the rightful liberty of the individual and the family, because in practice it means the complete dependence of the individual on the State as the sole employer, sole owner of the means of production, sole vendor of all goods produced. The State is thus all, the individual nothing. Yet the family is, as Pope Leo insists, a true society, " anterior to every kind of State or nation, invested with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the civil community " (*On the Condition of the Working Classes*, p. 17. C.S.G. ed.).

Moreover, as things are at present, there is no sign of any willingness on the part of the owners of capital and the means of production, distribution, and exchange to part with their

goods at the request of the promoters of the Socialist programme. Some at least would therefore have to submit to expropriation with or without adequate compensation. If with it, the new State must from the beginning be able to command enormous financial resources. If without it, a serious violation of the right of private property is inevitable.

A third difficulty not lightly to be passed over is the good of the community as a whole. It is proposed to introduce a new method of getting rich which has never on any scale been tried in this country before. It has been tried elsewhere but with disastrous results, as quite recent history proves. Apart from the ethical responsibility which each of us in his measure shares for the well-being of the community, common sense suggests that one should be very slow in adopting a remedy for social evils which has so conspicuously failed in other cases.

In each of these three points principles of justice are involved. They are a good instance of how Ethics does come into an economic system, as undoubtedly it does, unless you are prepared to maintain that the ' dismal science ' is the supreme guide of human conduct.

4. Socialism as a Movement.

There is a great deal more in Socialism than just an economic theory. This theory remains and must always remain the core of the whole matter : but, as a movement, Socialism has roughly a hundred years of history behind it, during which the central idea has been expounded and advocated by very diverse arguments and very varied practical methods. For

a grasp of the movement as a whole the reader many consult with profit Dr. Shadwell's *The Socialist Movement 1824—1924* (Philip Allen and Co., 1925); or for the movement in England Mr. Max Beer's *History of British Socialism* (G. Bell & Sons, 1925). So wide is the field covered by the movement that it is difficult to give any one definition of it which will cover the whole. It has an extreme left wing whose charter is the Communist Manifesto published by Marx† and Engels in 1848 and whose modern representative is the Communist International. Its activities may be studied in the last eight years of Russian history. The right wing, more intellectual and in many ways more effective, is represented in England by the Fabian Society founded in 1884 and, speaking generally, by the Labour Party, though the latter organization includes many who would describe themselves as communists, as well as a considerable number who are social reformers rather than Socialists in any technical sense.

The extreme left is revolutionary in tendency and aims at the violent overthrow of the existing social order. "The revolutionary era compels the proletariat to make use of the means of battle which will concentrate its entire energies, namely mass action, with its logical resultant, direct conflict with the Governmental machinery in open combat. All other methods, such as revolutionary use of bourgeois parliamentarianism, will be only of secondary significance" (Manifesto of Third International, 1918, quoted Shadwell, *Social-*

† Karl Marx (1818—83), Founder of modern Socialism.

ist Movement, Part II, p. 60). Its gospel is Karl Marx's *Capital* and still more the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848. The concluding words of the latter give the spirit of the whole : "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends are to be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workers in all countries, unite." Such is the spirit of the movement in its extreme revolutionary form, and it bases itself on Marx. Whether the position is justified by the teaching of *Capital* is,as the Master of Balliol has recently shown (*Karl Marx's Capital*, Lindsay, Oxford University Press, 1925), very much open to question. But justified or not, it is the popular interpretation of what Marx has written. It emphasises three main ideas which it derives from Marx. (1) The Materialist Conception of History, (2) The Class War, (3) The Labour Theory of Value.

(1) *The Materialist Conception of History*. Of this the crudest statement is as follows :— "According to this conception, these institutions [the social, political, legal, cultural, and religious institutions of society], and the changes in them which make up human history, are the results of man's reaction to his economic environment. Man's ideals and aspirations, his beliefs hopes and fears are determined by the methods by which, for the time being, he gets his living" (*An Outline of Psychology*, The Plebs League, 3rd ed. p. 1).

The ' conception ' is frankly determinist and stands for a necessitated and inevitable process of evolution. Thus the writers of the *Outline* say plainly " We stated at the outset that we adopted the determinist position as a working theory. . . . We could therefore afford to dispense with the free-will hypothesis " (p. 88). So stated the ' conception ' is an obvious exaggeration of the truth that economic considerations have played a great part in human history and that some of our ideas are shaped and coloured by economic environment. (Whether this exaggeration is due to Marx or to his disciples is another question. Mr. Lindsay in his chapter on Economic Determinism (*Karl Marx's Capital*, c. 2) inclines to lay the blame on the latter.)

As for determinism, the authors seem to confuse what is sometimes called economic determinism (another name for the inexorability of economic laws) with metaphysical determinism which denies the fact of free will. If man has no free will, he is an automaton, the plaything of blind forces. To adopt such a theory is to cut the ground from under the feet of the agitator. It is useless to exhort people who have no power of action. As well urge a blind man to use his eyes. The utmost that the necessitated man can do is to sit and watch economic laws evolving socialism. He can neither help nor hinder the movement. The *Outline of Psychology* feels the force of this difficulty and devotes a couple of pages (pp. 92-94) to an attempt to evade it. But the attempt only lands the authors in a yet further confusion between intellect and will, in which " the individual's unconscious striving towards

self-expansion " take the place of the latter, while the ' consistent determinist is . . . one who endeavours, by acquiring knowledge, to bring his striving into harmony with the trend of economic events ' (p. 94). But if the striving is ' unconscious,' it is difficult to see how one is to do anything with it. Even if it were conscious, without free will one is powerless to modify it, as daily experience proves in the case of those whose wills are weak. The weak-willed always urge in their defence the blind impulse of passion. They will tell you that they can not help themselves. They see the better and approve it, but follow the worse. Knowledge is not enough without that strength of the will which we call moral virtue.

The only determinism of which there can be question here is economic determinism. The laws of economics may be as inexorable as those of physics, but they can be harnessed and made to serve man's free purposes just as science, though rigidly obeying physical laws, can be made the handmaid of man's convenience. But the only method of thus subjugating physics to human ends is that of patient study. The same holds good in the economic sphere. It is not fretful agitation but painful and patient study of conditions and their causes which is the road to amelioration. To destroy free will is to smash the only lever by which the weight may be raised. It is only fair to the authors of the *Outline* to note that they admit that " the final solution of this [the free will] problem has not yet been achieved " (p. 88). Meanwhile their endeavour is to supply and foster ideas which shall be at once

in harmony with the ' conception ' and shall act as propaganda for the class war (*Outline*, cc. 26, 27).

(2) *The Class War.* A leading idea in Hegelian philosophy is that of progress through antagonism. Evolution is the outcome of struggle. So with Marx, social evolution is the outcome of class struggle. By class he means economic class, that is the group formation in a community which is held together by the bond of common economic position and economic pressure. This bond will tend to set up a ' group-loyalty,' a kind of fellow-feeling between members of the same group which will cause them to sympathize with and to aid one another in any time of stress. Such economic groups are to be found in every nation and are a natural and healthy feature in the body politic. Between such different groups rivalries and conflicts are inevitable and are in themselves no bad thing, provided always that they ' meet in a higher unity,' as local patriotisms are fused in general love of country. Out of such clash and conflict progress often comes, as truth is hammered out from the clash of conflicting opinions. In this sense it is true to say that social development is the outcome of the class struggle, and in the same sense the class struggle is as beneficial as it is inevitable. The tendency to undesirable division is held in check by the unifying influences which are inherent in a sound body politic, patriotism, sense of duty, and the rest. The very metaphor of the ' body politic ' points to the fact of differentiation within a single whole, of parts different in fact and function, yet work-

ing harmoniously for the good of the whole. Such bodies politic are nations, in which primarily as in its immediate whole the class division is found. In them it is a natural and vertical division. But it becomes quite artificial if it is regarded as horizontal, running right across, e.g. Europe, independently of nationality. Being artificial it will require continual stimulus in the form of propaganda for its maintenance, and will be liable to fail at the critical moment as it did in the European War.

The cruder notion of the class struggle regards it not as healthy rivalry within one single whole but as 'the struggle for power between two rival sets of egos, whose outlooks, whose class consciousnesses, have been shaped by different environments. . . . The transference of power from one class to another 's known as revolution' (*Outline*, p. 132). This is the idea expressed in the Communist Manifesto. Such a perversion is on a par with the patriotism which urges to hate other nations rather than to love one's own. It does not appeal to the mind or conscience of the average man, nor can it lead to anything of permanent value for humanity. Force only provokes force. The result of such class war could only be further war and anarchy. The remedy lies not in a denial of the existence of class or of conflicting interests but in an attempt to make men care more for the common weal than for sectional advantage, combined with serious effort to curb selfishness in all classes and to diagnose and remove the causes of grievance and discontent. And here international combination may prove of real service in checking

cut-throat competition and in the diffusion of the spirit of the will-to-help rather than of the will-to-fight. This is obviously the rôle of some higher unifying force such as Christianity.†

(3) *The Labour Theory of Value.* This theory was proposed by Adam Smith,‡ formulated by Ricardo§ and adopted from him by Marx. By 'labour' Ricardo meant all the work or effort required to produce and place the commodity in the market. Later the term became narrowed to the meaning of manual labour. In this sense it is often said that "Value depends on labour," or, "It is labour that produces value." This theory, which is as old as Locke and is to be found even in

† The basis of class division is not merely economic. Personal idiosyncracy by which one man differs from another in ability, physical or intellectual, plays an important part also. The complexities of modern life with their demand for specialized education and training tend also in the direction of differentiation. Every civilized community further tends to the formation of a 'leisured' or 'gentle' class, the basis of which is partly physiological (stock), partly intellectual (education), a traditional outlook of appreciation of the best in matters of taste and conduct. This implies leisure not in the sense of idleness, but in that of freedom from the preoccupation of making a living and of the cares which attend it. Sociologists generally hold that the existence of a leisured class is a good thing for a community, though it is obvious that its responsibilities are as great as its temptations, and that a corrupt leisured class is among the worst forms of corruption which can afflict a State.

‡Adam Smith (1723—90), Scottish political economist. Author of the *Wealth of Nations.*

§ "The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its production." *Principles of Political Economy*, c. 1.

Hobbes, envisages a primitive state of society in which a man works with his own tools on his own land or raw material. It takes no account of monopoly, competition, or demand. It is a theory of natural rights, true of in ideal state of society which may never have existed and certainly does not exist anywhere in the industrial world to-day.

When Marx took over this theory, he modified it to suit his thesis on the inherent unsoundness of capital. He was not so foolish as to believe that in modern industry the intrinsic value of a thing depended on the amount of labour put into it. Such a theory omits altogether the vital question of demand and sets a premium on misdirected labour. Hence he says that the exchange value of commodities is determined not by the amount of labour but by the amount of *socially necessary* labour embodied in them. By the words italicised he intends to take account of demand, thus ruling out a *mere* labour theory of value, and of improved methods of production. If enormous labour is spent on a commodity for which there is no demand, such labour is not *socially* necessary since society will not buy its product: if much labour is expended on the production of an article for which there is a demand but which could have been produced by improved methods with half the labour, such labour is not socially *necessary*.

But he goes further in criticism of the economists of his day. These had adopted the labour theory of value in so far as it suited their purposes and were ready to use it to justify a bare subsistence wage for the worker. They argued somewhat as follows: the price

of a commodity represents the amount of wealth its maker has produced. What is given him in the market is the value he himself has created. But the industrial worker has no commodities to exchange in the market. His product is a joint-product in which many other workers share. To divide the value of the product justly between all concerned in its production would be an impossible task. But we can get at the worker's just remuneration in this way: the market price represents the cost to the community of the labour involved in the production of the commodity. What it costs to produce this labour will therefore be the just remuneration of the worker. But to produce the labour of the unskilled worker it costs the wage which will keep him alive and fit for his work. Therefore the bare subsistence wage is the just remuneration of the unskilled worker.

To this Marx replied that the worker creates more wealth than it costs to keep him, a surplus value which the capitalist puts into his own pocket. Hence his profit is exploitation. Marx is here taking the labour theory of value and using it against the individualist economists. As a debating point his answer is admirable and it is the point on which both his critics and his partisans have fastened with tenacity. The theory of Surplus Value has been as fiercely defended as it has been ruthlessly attacked. The critics point out that Marx has overstated his case, that he has omitted altogether from his consideration the organization of industry and the securing of markets: that industry cannot flourish without buying and selling, and that the skilful anticip-

ation of demand increases enormously the value of the commodity which labour has produced. And the critics have reason on their side. In his eagerness to meet the individualist economists Marx did lose sight for the moment at least of the function of the organizer and the merchant, though he elsewhere admits (*Capital*, II, p. 149) that the latter reduces the useless expenditure of energy on the part of labour, and that capital promotes the realization of value (*Ibid.* III, p. 331).

His defenders on the other hand are inclined to uphold the theory of Surplus Value just as it stands and to talk of robbery and exploitation in the spirit of the Communist Manifesto. Such talk is only mischievous. Yet at least this much may be said in Marx's defence, that he did realize and insist on the change from individual to collective labour which the factory system introduced. With the perfection and increased use of machinery really skilled labour had in certain industries become less necessary, while the field for mechanical or unskilled labour had been correspondingly widened. What the capitalist buys, Marx insists, is labour power, which the worker must sell, and to the capitalist, because he has no other market and no other means of livelihood. Once he has sold his labour power and entered the factory, he has become a 'collective labourer.' He may be one of the lucky few to whom skilled occupation falls. More likely he will join the army of the unskilled for whom the bare subsistence wage has to suffice.

The change was worth noting, since it does enter as a factor into the question of wages.

But it falls far short, as Marx stated it, of justifying the general proposition of the essential injustice of capital. First his statement is not true of all industry.† Secondly, he exaggerates the proportion between skilled and unskilled labour. Thirdly, he argues from a metaphor, treating labour as a commodity, as though it were something which when bought became the purchaser's absolute property to dispose of at his good pleasure. It would be nearer the truth to say that what the employer buys is the worker's time. What he cannot buy is just the most essential feature in industrial production, his good will. He may, and often does secure this by other methods: but money payment alone will never purchase it. It is true that the worker becomes a 'collective labourer.' He enters an organization and by the fact must be to a greater or less degree organized. But no organized method of production, competitive, socialist or communist, is ever going to alter that fact, though one or other of these may mitigate its hardships as they have been mitigated during the last sixty years through the beneficent action of the Trade Unions.

Were all that Marx has asserted true, there would still be many in this country who would shrink from the methods embodied in the Communist Manifesto. They feel that some other way must be tried, the way adopted by the great majority of those who in this country call themselves Socialists, that of Social Reform.

† Marx had no personal experience as an industrial worker. His informant was in the main Engels who worked in a mill in Manchester.

5. Social Reform.

The difference between the spirit of the Communist Manifesto and that of the advocate of Social Reform is that between a destructive and a constructive programme. Envy, hatred, distrust are never safe foundations on which to build. The ideal of Social Reform is constructive. It would first understand, and then eliminate or at the very least palliate the evils of modern industrialism. It recognises that there are evils, often of very complex origin and nature, difficult of complete, still less of immediate remedy. This is not to cry 'Peace, peace' where there is no peace: rather it is a recognition of the fact that the trouble is two-sided and that without good will on both sides it is never likely to be appeased. Unfortunately the atmosphere of good will is easier to destroy than to reconstruct after destruction. Rightly or wrongly the workers feel that they have been 'let down' by their employers. They are able to quote instances in which a laissez-faire attitude on the part of capital has resulted in what the other party to the dispute regards as failure to keep a promise given. Nor have there been wanting those who have made the fullest use of such failures in the interest of Marxian propaganda. Hence the programme of Social Reform puts in the first place the creation of trust and of an atmosphere of good will, and in this it is undeterred by the ill-considered utterances of the extremists of either party.

This being its general attitude, Social Reform uses every legitimate means in Parliament and out of it to push forward measures of amelioration. It thoroughly

believes in trade-unionism and in the right and value of free criticism, although it knows that the loudest-voiced is not necessarily the profoundest thinker. It seconds the efforts of the Labour Party to secure better housing conditions, surer employment, and a remedy for the evil of unemployment. In addition to this Christian Social Reform is the first to proclaim that no remedy is likely to be effective which is not based on Christian principles. The recognition of the Fatherhood of God and of the brotherhood of man, of the meaning of life, of the moral law binding on all men alike, of unselfishness, self-restraint, of the value of hard work and its necessity, are among the basic ideas on which its efforts rest. Aloofness, sectional cliquishness, refusal to co-operate, distrust and suspicion it regards as evil tendencies which it strives to counteract by every means in its power. It has no use for the class war of which it is a convinced opponent, and as for class consciousness, it no more desires it than any other form of self-consciousness. The social worker of this type prefers to take himself and his fellows for granted, satisfied that they are men like himself whom he is ready to help if he can whether they be dukes or dockers. For him as a social worker such distinctions simply do not enter into the problem. They are wholly irrelevant to the work in hand.

The moralist will heartily approve of any scheme of social betterment which is based on sound moral principles. If he opposes Marxian Socialism, it is not from any lack of sympathy with the suffering or the victims of injustice, but because he cannot reconcile that

kind of social reform with moral principles, can never believe that two wrongs will make a right or that the end can justify the means. Nor can he view with approval any scheme of life which sees in the possession of material goods the be-all and end-all of man's existence. Yet, while revolutionary Socialism stands condemned on its own principles, other forms of what is often called Socialism, but which is really social reform, are in the main matters of expediency. The chief question is: Will they work and will they produce the desired effect? That is a question for the expert, not for the mere politician, nor, justice safeguarded, for the moralist. Co-operation, guild socialism, profit-sharing, state-purchase, and a dozen other social schemes, are matters which call for expert and often very technical knowledge, which is not to be expected, as it is certainly not found, in the average man of other departments.

6. The Church and Socialism.

It may be well to add a brief note on the attitude of the Church to Socialism. For a fuller treatment of the matter the student is referred to Mr. H. Somerville's pamphlet *Why the Church has Condemned Socialism* (C.S.G., 2d.). Briefly it may be said that what the popes have condemned is the revolutionary socialist movement, inaugurated by the Communist Manifesto of 1848, which has allied itself with Communism, Nihilism, and anarchy. In so far as any modern form of Socialism propagates and upholds the ideas and methods for which these theories stood, it will come under the same condemnation.

The relevant documents in the matter are :

1. *Pius IX* (Encyclical " Quanta cura ", 8 December, 1864) speaks of those who " teach and profess the baleful error of Communism and Socialism ", where note that Socialism is linked with Communism. This was in view of the Communist Manifesto and all that followed from it. The Encyclical concludes with the words : " By Our apostolic authority we reprobate, proscribe and condemn " all the false teachings referred to in the course of the letter, " and We wish and order them to be rejected, proscribed, and condemned by all children of the Catholic Church." Again in the Syllabus of Errors, published at the same date as the above Encyclical, mention is made in section 4 of Communism and Socialism, and references are given to various Allocutions of the pope and to Encyclical Letters addressed to bishops. Both these documents, " Quanta cura " and the Syllabus refer to revolutionary Socialism.

2. *Leo XIII.* The documents issued by Pope Leo will be found conveniently gathered in *The Pope and The People* (C.T.S. 1912). They include the Encyclical " Quod Apostolici Muneris " (December 28, 1878) which deals with ' Socialism, Communism, and Nihilism,' groups them together as " bound intimately together in baneful alliance " for the purpose of " uprooting the foundations of civilized society at large " : and the well known Encyclical " Rerum Novarum " on the condition of the working classes. In the last named document the existence of the evils which Socialism seeks to remedy is clearly recognized, the hard-heartedness of employers,

the greed of unchecked competition, rapacious usury, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, 'so that a small number of rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself' (*The Pope and the People*, p. 179). These are strong and carefully weighed words. If the pope condemns Socialism, he is no less emphatic in his condemnation of the unjust abuses of Capitalism. But he sees no remedy in the mere setting up of injustice against injustice. As for socialist proposals, they are 'emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring State action into a sphere not within its competence, and create utter confusion in the community' (*The Pope and the People*, p. 180).

Questions for Revision.

1. What is the essential idea of Socialism? To what is it opposed?
2. How does Ethics enter into the question of Socialism?
3. Explain what is meant by Socialism as a movement.
4. Explain (*a*) The Materialistic Conception of History, (*b*) The Class War.
5. Explain carefully the original 'Labour Theory of Value.' How did Marx modify it and with what success?
6. Taking account of ethical principles outline a scheme of social reform.
7. What sort of Socialism has been condemned by the Church and why?

PART IV.

THE NATURAL LAW AND MAN'S SOCIAL LIFE.

PART IV.

THE NATURAL LAW AND MAN'S SOCIAL LIFE.

CHAPTER I.

DOMESTIC SOCIETY—THE FAMILY.

1. Of Society in General.

The two truths to be constantly borne in mind in regard to the complex thing we call man are that he is at once autocentric and heterocentric, an individual with a personality of his own, and a member of society. In a true sense he is the forger of his own fortune: but he is also absolutely dependent on others. Experience proves that it is difficult to keep both these truths focal in the mind at the same time. In the present chapter we are to discuss him from the heterocentric point of view, as a member of society. It is perhaps as well therefore to remind ourselves from the outset that he has another aspect, that of his individual personality. With this *caveat* we proceed to enquire what the idea of 'society' involves.

The idea of 'society' connotes plurality of persons united in some sort of permanence with a common aim or object. This will involve the taking of means to secure the end in view, which in its turn involves some authority prescribing the use of these means rather than those, and settling, when need arises, points in dispute. Thus the three chief features of any society are plurality of persons, common aim, authority. It is obvious that neither the individual by himself, nor any chance collection of individuals, as in a railway carriage, constitutes a society. Some sort of common object, however vaguely defined, pursued by a more or less common effort, though not necessarily by identical means, is required to bind a mere aggregation of persons into a society. And every society will have a president or governing body of some sort. Without some kind of authority it will speedily dissolve into either sections or individuals. A society is said to be 'perfect' when it contains within itself all the means necessary for its end, as does e.g. the State: it is 'imperfect' when it is incapable of realizing its aims without aid external to itself, e.g. a particular municipality which depends for its ultimate authority on the State.

That society of some sort is necessary and therefore natural to man is obvious pragmatically. No man is sufficient for himself all the time. From the complete dependence of infancy he emerges into a condition of less though still real dependence, and often back into the almost complete dependence of old age.

2. The Family.

There are two types of society which claim our attention, domestic and civil. Domestic society centres in the family. This is the first, most fundamental, natural society. Its components are father, mother, and children. It is the most natural society, because it is absolutely necessary for the propagation of the race. The mere fact of birth is not sufficient to secure this. The parents must rear the infant and educate and support the child. This of itself points to some sort of permanent association as necessary for the effective propagation and continuance of the race, an association which nature has provided in the state of marriage.

Marriage is defined as the stable union of man and woman, made under contract, involving their living together, with a view chiefly to the birth and rearing of children. Note that this definition gives only the barest essentials of marriage. Its essence is the stable union of the sexes based on contract: its end the procreation of children. It is thus opposed to promiscuity or to mere chance and impermanent unions of man and woman, and its primary natural end is the propagation of the race.† To say this is not to deny the

† Birth Control. By Birth Control is now understood the prevention of conception after the marriage act, such prevention being procured either by the interruption of the act itself or by the use of external means mechanical or chemical. All such ' control ' is opposed to the moral law, as being a frustration of the primary end of marriage, the procreation of children, for which the sex instinct is given. It is thus opposed to the primary criterion of morality (p. 48) and falls under the same condemnation as private

existence of other and secondary ends. Among these the first place is held by the good of the contracting parties themselves. Love and fidelity to one another and all that this means in the sum of human happiness, the mutual conferring of the gifts, physical and psychical, which are the possession if not exclusive at least pre-eminent of either sex as complementary to the other, all the joy and peace which comes of happy family life and pure human affection are to be reckoned among the greatest, though secondary, natural ends of marriage.

It is from the natural end of marriage, the procreation and rearing of children, that its properties flow. The two chief of these are *unity* and *indissolubility*. To unity are opposed polyandry, or plurality of husbands, and polygamy, plurality of wives. Both of these are detrimental in the last degree to the good of the children. In either of them the children tend to be nobody's children, family affection is reduced to vanishing point, and education and training of the child is grievously imperilled. Polyandry is however more opposed to the natural law than polygamy, inasmuch as it thwarts not only the primary but the secondary ends of marriage, the good of the contracting parties themselves. The

sexual sin. The only form of control consistent with the moral law is that referred to by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians, 7. 5, i.e., voluntary self-control 'by consent, for a time.' On the social and medical aspects of the matter the student may consult with profit a paper read by Dr. K. M. L. Gamgee, reprinted in the *Catholic Medical Journal*, January 1926.

whole idea of family life is extinguished in such multiple unions.

In polygamy the rearing and education of children is less difficult perhaps than in polyandry, but experience shows that polygamous races have been more backward and less fruitful than monogamous. Moreover the practice is directly opposed to the secondary end of marriage, family affection and domestic peace and happiness. Under it also the wife instead of being the mistress of the household is degraded to the level of the husband's chattel and slave.

By the natural *indissolubility* of marriage is meant that the contract is of such a nature that once the marriage has been consummated it may not be dissolved except by the death of one of the parties. Such attempted dissolution is known as *Divorce*. Perfect Divorce, i.e. divorce from the *bond* of marriage, is to be distinguished from mere *legal separation* from bed and board. The latter is lawful in certain circumstances and need not be discussed. But Perfect Divorce, by which it is sought to dissolve the bond of marriage and to leave the parties free to contract fresh matrimonial unions, is opposed to the natural law and is never permissible. The reason for this assertion is to be found in what has already been said as to the primary and secondary ends of the natural institution of marriage.

If we remember that we are speaking of Perfect Divorce which leaves the parties as free as they were before marriage, it is at once obvious that whatever advantages may be claimed for it, those of the children are not

among them. The family is in fact dissolved, and those who are weakest are the first to suffer from the shock. They will suffer more should their legal custodian marry again. The whole design of nature as to their upbringing in the family and as members of the family has been laid in ruins. Instead of the love, control, and influence of both parents, each contributing to its development from the store of complementary gifts which is nature's endowment to parenthood, the child at the most plastic stage of its formation is left to the care of strangers. No more complete reversal of the natural end of marriage can be conceived than follows from such divorce. The proper upbringing of the child demands the mutual fidelity of its parents until such time as independence from parental control is reached, say at the age of about eighteen years. If then the primary end of the marriage contract be the good of the child, it is difficult to see how one can seriously maintain that it is secured in a divorce which disregards the contract, wrecks the family, and leaves the child to make its way as best it can, in the best circumstances permanently deprived of the love, control, and influence of one of its parents.

Moreover, one child is not in the design of nature the limit of family fertility. But a succession of children lengthens the period during which for the good of their offspring the parents must live together. And while it may readily be granted that such considerations are not of themselves absolutely conclusive against the lawfulness of Divorce, they are at least indicative of the desirability of

fidelity, and establish an a priori repugnance to Divorce from the standpoint of the natural end of the marriage contract.

Nor is the conclusion very different if we consider the good of the contracting parties themselves. Under the impulse of mutual affection they have solemnly pledged mutual fidelity to one another. Once it is recognized that this contract is repudiable by mutual consent, the way to dissension and disagreement is thrown open, the permanence of affection is jeopardised, and the unity of family life, nature's surest means for the propagation of the race, is at an end. Were such conduct to be adopted as a general rule of conduct, its effect on society could not but be disastrous in the extreme. Hence, according to the first of the Secondary Criteria of morality (p. 50), we cannot but conclude that such conduct is against nature and therefore immoral. There will still remain hard cases (and in this matter the cases can be particularly hard) but nature looks not to the particular case but to the good of the whole.

Looking then merely to the natural end of marriage, the case against Perfect Divorce is strong. For the hard cases there remains Imperfect Divorce or Legal Separation.

Questions for Revision.

1. How do you define a society? What is a perfect, what an imperfect, society?
2. Apply your definition to the family and show how it is a society.
3. Define marriage. What is its primary, what its secondary, end?

4. What are the chief properties of marriage? Explain.
5. State the argument in favour of the indissolubility of marriage.

CHAPTER II.

CIVIL SOCIETY—THE STATE.

1. Nature and Origin of the State.

Throughout this discussion we are speaking as political philosophers, not as politicians. Hence, when we speak of "the State," we do not mean the government in power, nor the cabinet, nor any form of party politics. Nor do we refer primarily to state-officials. The sense in which we use the term "State" is that of a perfect and self-sufficing community, consisting of many families, united under a common authority called the Sovereign, for the attainment of the complete welfare and life of the whole society.

Note that *the family* is a component part of the State. The State is said to be a 'perfect' society, inasmuch as it is not naturally dependent for its existence or authority on any other society. It is said to be self-sufficing, inasmuch as it contains within itself all the means necessary for compassing its end.

As the State originated before the dawn of history as we now understand the term, it

is clearly impossible to give a strictly historical account of its origin. We have to content ourselves with what we may call a logico-historical survey of the matter. That is, we have to take the data as we find them and reason back to what would seem to have been the origin of the State. The first datum in the problem is man himself.

His instinct for combination furnishes us with a starting point. Among the innumerable paradoxes about human nature is the fact that it is at once autocentric and heterocentric, independent and dependent. For the continuance of human life, and still more for its development and perfection, combination and co-operation are necessary. Expand the individual into the family, and the same characteristic appears. The family is no more self-sufficing than the individual. Families tend to combination for mutual convenience and protection. Develop this tendency, and you end in the State. Hence the State is in the strictest sense ' natural ' to man. It is the outcome of natural tendencies, not an artificial product, though there are many artificial elements in it.

The State then comes from nature, which implies that it comes from the Author of nature, God. And this not by any revelation or positive institution, but by the fact that God is the Creator of human nature and its tendencies, and that human nature imperatively demands some form of State.

It is natural to seek the origin of the higher and more evolved form of society in the lower. The most elementary form of society known to us is the family, in which blood-

relationship constitutes the bond of union. The family is the State in embryo. As the family grows, the end which it is capable of attaining grows also. Children beget other children and found new families, as cells split off from cells. From the union of several such families and their collaterals there arises in time the village community. Here we see the definite beginnings of the State. Differentiation of function soon becomes necessary. There arises also the need of protection, of economic organization, and of juridical organization to deal with cases in dispute. In the family all these matters might perhaps have been in the hands of the father, but they are now growing too vast and too complicated to be dealt with by one man, however competent and however highly respected. Once this differentiation has been effected and established, the village community is well on the way to that self-sufficiency which marks the fully developed State.

It might therefore seem that the State was rather the product of man's ingenuity, a contrivance of human reason to meet difficult conditions as they arose, an artificial product in fact, rather than a natural institution. There is truth in the objection, yet not to the extent required to make the State a purely artificial product. At each stage of its growth the State, as we are describing it, was the result of conscious human purpose. Yet it could not be said to have been consciously and formally aimed at from the beginning. The whole is not the result of a consciously formed plan, as though a number of men had come together and said " Now let us form a State."

It was a growth, to some extent blind, yet also directed. There is an element of blind groping in human affairs, though they are also directed by reason. The dilemma which would represent the State as either natural or artificial is unsound, since there is room for artificial elements in a natural institution.

The State is then natural in the sense that it is an integral part of the design of nature and not the product of mere chance or mere convention. It is natural inasmuch as it is the natural expansion of the family, which if it was to grow at all could not but grow into some form of State. And it is natural because it is the one means of successful human development. If man is not to remain confined and undeveloped in his activities, he must find development outside the limits of the family. In ultimate analysis this 'outside' is the State.†

2. What is the State for?

The State is the development of the family. Yet it is more than a mere aggregation of families. A new formality of some kind has entered with the combination. The family exists for the good of its individual members; the State does not exist for the good of the individual families which compose it, not at least as individual families, but for a mysterious something called the 'good of the whole.' Generally, but by no means always, this good of the whole will coincide with the good of

† The above is a general account of the natural line of development. In a particular case the State may arise in other ways, e.g. conquest, or mutual agreement.

individuals: but whether it does or does not, the State as such does not concern itself with the particular good but with that of the whole.

Further, the State arises from the inability of the family to provide for itself more than the necessaries of life. For the perfect life we need more than bare necessaries. Hence the State, whose business it will be to provide just those things which the family is incapable of providing. To the question then: What is the State for? the first answer will be that it exists to provide for the common good or the good of the social body as such.

Instances will make clear in what directions this good is to be looked for. It is obviously bad for the social body as such that its life should be passed in disputes as to mutual rights and wrongs, arising out of supposed observance or non-observance of the Natural Law. Such disputes are inevitable so long as the sole law of the people is the Natural Law. There is needed some authority to determine in detail natural rights and duties in regard to property, the fulfilment of contracts, and the like. Hence the common good demands that such a power be established. Further, there will always be those whose idea of right is that it is, in the main, might. Such men soon become disturbers of the public peace, because they do not confine their operations to one or two persons but strive to exercise them wherever there seems to be chance of their success. No merely moral considerations will suffice to restrain such unruly spirits. They can only be coerced. Some authority must therefore be set up which shall be able so to coerce them. The common

good demands this and the State empowers and authorizes its officers to deal in the matter.

It is also to the interest of all that there should be certain common services, that streets should be paved and lighted, sewage disposed of, that there should be some means of defence against a common enemy, that there should be harbours and docks, and water-supply and transport, and public offices of all kinds, not only for the useful arts but also for the educative and ornamental. All such things are elements in the common good. It is for the provision of all this variety of common goods, ranging from law-courts and judicial procedure, with all that they mean in the way of legislation and specialized training, to the provision of markets and scavengers, that the State exists.

Most important is the provision not merely of the useful, but of all that makes for the higher good of man, education and intellectual development, together with social development in its widest sense. For all these also the State exists, and for all it is able to draw on the common purse. It can multiply organization, and pool resources far more effectively than any individual or collection of individuals. Moreover it can act with authority.

3. Authority in the State.

Without authority, that is without the power to impose its will, it is clear that the State could not do a tenth part of its duty in regard to the common good. We are not now dealing with the origin of this authority but merely enquiring into its necessity. The

facts of the situation warrant us in saying that state authority is a natural necessity, since it is necessary for the existence and continuance of the State which itself is, as we have seen, a natural necessity. As a society the State needs to be directed to its end by some controlling authority, without which there would be anarchy and ultimately disruption. For while the end is one, the means which may be taken to secure it are multiple. Authority is required to determine which set of means shall in practice be adopted. Hence it is evident that authority of some kind is necessary for the making of laws and for their administration: and it is as necessary in a community of good and wise men as anywhere else. If fools can differ in their views of what is best to be done, much more can wise men. Hence political authority arises from the facts of the case: it is as natural as the State itself. And as the State is from God, all that is essential to its existence is also designed by God. This is what is meant by saying that state authority is God-given.

But state authority is not unlimited. The State governs free individuals, and their freedom must be respected. It may interfere in the free action of these in so far as the general or public interest requires. It may also interfere with human liberty in the interest of the individual wherever he cannot be reasonably supposed in matters of great importance to be able to look after his own interest. It will often happen that were individuals left free to act according to their own interests, they would interfere with the general good. Thus a landowner might neglect the cultivation of

forest because of the slow returns which afforestation brings. Timber being necessary for the common good, the State has the right to insist that a certain portion of land shall be under timber. It may interfere to prevent the too rapid depletion of fisheries, just as it may insist on a close time for the shooting of birds. Or it may interfere to protect the public, where it is too ignorant or indolent to protect itself. It may prohibit the quack doctor, forbid the sale of spurious articles, close insanitary premises, etc. It has however no right of interference in those rights which are fundamental to human nature, such as the right to live, to marry, to rear or found a family. Thus it has no right whatever to sterilize the unfit, nor to prevent children being born into an environment incompatible with their welfare either in the physical or spiritual order. To say that it may deprive the poor of their natural right to marry or to beget children is to forget that the State exists for the individual not the individual for the State, just as the doctor exists for the sick not the sick for the doctor. The same argument would entitle the doctor to do away with his sickly patients on the ground that the end of his art was health not sickness. Instead of any such right the State has a duty to remove disabling conditions of housing, slum areas, impure food and the rest. It must do all in its power to see that its citizens are healthy, but the best way to this is not that of mutilation or of choking the stream of life at its source. Rather it must improve conditions, secure more thrift, encourage industry, punish the exploiter, seek remedies for the evil of unemployment, inculcate

Christian morality, and be untiring in its efforts to safeguard the moral well-being of the young and uneducated. All such measures come within the legitimate scope of its activities. But it is guilty of sheer aggression if it attempts directly to interfere in the case of its less fortunate but innocent members with the right to and sanctity of family life.

4. The Origin of State Authority.

We have seen that state authority is natural, i.e. God-given, since whatever is of nature is to be ascribed to the Author of nature. We now pass from state authority in the abstract to the same authority in the concrete and enquire: Whence does a particular form of government derive its authority to govern?

Here there are two pitfalls to be avoided. The first is the error of the Divine Right of Kings which would exalt monarchy into the only form of legitimate government. The upholders of this theory transferred the attributes of state authority in general to the one form of monarchic government, insisting that monarchy was 'of God' antecedently to and irrespective of the popular will. This conclusion is unwarranted. All that can be deduced from the facts is that *some* form of government is of the essence of the State. This is dictated by nature, inasmuch as the State is a natural institution, and hence may be said to have been commanded by God. But what is commanded is government, not necessarily monarchic government.

The theory of the Sovereignty of the People is the opposite error. This asserts that the sovereign in every State is the will of the

majority of the citizens, and that hence sovereignty abides permanently with the people ruling by a majority of votes. But were this true, pure democracy would be the only legitimate form of government. We have therefore to find some *via media* between these two extremes.

Once the State exists, sovereignty exists, since sovereignty is one of its essential attributes. The State is the community as a moral entity, capable of relations with other such entities and with their constituent members. This is only another way of saying that state authority resides primarily in the community as a social whole. Hence the only natural possessor of this authority is not the individual or any number of individuals, but the entire people as one moral whole. How then does it pass from the body as a whole to the smaller body which in practice rules? What is the philosophical basis of sovereignty in the concrete?

Since the sixteenth century many widely different theories have been proposed on this very perplexing subject. It will be enough for our purpose to mention two. The first of these is that of Suarez† and Bellarmine‡ who continued the mediaeval teaching, the second that of later scholastic writers who, under the influence of later political conditions felt the Suarezian theory to be inadequate.

According to Suarez the philosophical basis of sovereignty in the concrete is the *consent*

† Francis Suarez, S.J. (1548—1617).

‡ Blessed Robert Francis Bellarmine, S.J., Archbishop and Cardinal (1542—1621).

of the governed, a sort of agreement between the commonwealth and the ruler, an implicit, or even explicit, contract which derives its binding force from the natural law. There is a tacit consent to the exercise of sovereign authority by some person or persons, a consent given by the community as it evolves from the imperfect stages of family and village life to the perfect State. There may be cases in which a fully developed political community elects a ruler and expressly transmits political authority to him. But in any case some pact, either formal or tacit, is always the basis of sovereignty.

Such a pact once made can only be changed by mutual consent, express or tacit, of both parties to it. The sanctity of the contract is protected by the natural law. This does not mean that if the sovereign abuses his power and becomes tyrannical, the community has no rights against him. It may always protect itself against tyranny, which indeed puts an end to the compact of sovereignty; for the contract is binding and inviolable on both sides. The sovereign must comply with the fundamental constitution of the country, as evidenced in written documents or in well-established custom.

The result of such a pact is that the sovereign holds *ordinary* jurisdiction. His power is not merely that of a delegate. Ordinary jurisdiction belongs primarily to the office rather than to the holder of the office, though in practice the office and its holder are indistinguishable. Once appointed to such office the holder possesses all the jurisdiction belonging to it, and possesses it as a personal

thing which he never loses except by resignation or deposition. Thus the sovereign is not a dependent power, the paid servant of the State, a mere executive officer. Rather he, or the governing body, is the sovereign power in the State with all the jurisdiction pertaining thereunto, even though for some reason, such as foreign travel or ill health, he does not exercise his office.

Delegated jurisdiction is quite different. The sovereign authority may depute some person or persons to act for it. Such delegates have real jurisdiction. But they cannot delegate it. They are the servants of him who appointed them and they have no jurisdiction outside their specifically official functions.

According to Suarez then, sovereignty in the State arises from the nature of the case. There must be sovereign power in a State: hence it is truly described as being from God. But that the sovereign power take this or that form is a matter of human devising and arrangement. Whether the constitution is to be monarchic, democratic, or republican is a question to be settled by the people, the community as a whole, or the greater and wiser part of the community. When this has been decided, officials are appointed. These receive their power not strictly from but *through* the people. The community is the legitimate channel for the transmission of such power, but the people does not create the power which it transmits. Hence the government, though appointed by the people, is not strictly speaking the servant of the people, rather it is the servant of the common good.

Such is the Suarezian theory. It rests on two

main ideas, first, the body politic as a permanent moral entity, enduring in normal circumstances in its identity from age to age and generation to generation; secondly, the idea that man does not live *for* the State, that he cannot be merely merged in the whole, and that the State is the servant of the common good and is subservient to higher law and purpose.

The theory has been criticized on the ground that it is unhistorical. Suarez himself would perhaps have been the first to admit this. But he might have added that in a matter such as this strict history is out of the question, and that one has to be contented with a method which, while not strictly historical, is at least logical and contains historical elements. Neither can it be urged that this theory consecrates democracy as the only original form of government. Negatively perhaps this is true, inasmuch as nature does not prescribe any particular form of government, but merely ordains that political authority shall exist somewhere; and since no individual subject is designated, it must reside in the general body of the community.

Contrasted with this contractual view of the matter as expounded by Suarez is the opinion of those who, under the pressure of later political events, have seen the origin of supreme political power in a certain fitness for government of a class or individual. One man for instance rises above his fellows as pre-eminent in organizing ability and in acuteness of discernment, so that others need his help and associate with him. This superiority of fact produces a superiority of right, and he

becomes the depositary of that authority which resides in every political society. Thus it may be said that what is left by natural law undetermined must be realized and made precise by positive fact. From out of the multitude, which in its totality cannot govern, there must emerge one or several persons in whom society respects the right to govern.

This theory has the advantage of being more in accord with the actual facts. Whatever our theory of the origin of state authority, we must admit that in practice men bow before the *de facto* ruler, provided that he has shown or seems likely to show himself capable of governing. They do not enquire too curiously into the process by which authority is handed over to him. His authority springs from the position which he occupies : it is not explicitly conferred on him by any person or persons.

Of the two theories Suarez' is the more coherent and reasoned. The chief difficulty against it is, as we have said, that it is negatively at least, unhistorical and that, as such, it seems less in accord with the facts than the view which we have just explained.

5. Functions and Rights of the State.

In practice the supreme authority of the State operates along a variety of lines. The chief of these are its (1) Legislative (2) Judicial (3) Executive functions. A word on each of these.

(1) *Legislative.* The State has full authority to make laws binding on all its subjects for the common good, as well as to devise and impose penalties for their non-observance. The method and machinery of legislation will

vary according to the constitution. But a just law constitutionally enacted binds all subjects to whom it applies. As modern laws however are for the most part—unless they are determinations of the natural law—"merely penal," the obligation is satisfied either by observance of the law or by acceptance of the penalty for non-observance.

(2) *Judicial.* The judicial functions of the State are a development of its legislative authority. They are divided between the civil and criminal courts. The civil courts deal with torts, the violation of legal rights, interpretation of contracts or agreements, and with the application of the civil law to disputed cases. The supreme judicial authority of the State has the power to give a final and binding decision in cases which fall within its competence. In regard to every law there may arise circumstances not foreseen by the legislator and which may press with great hardship on the individual citizen. Such cases have always been dealt with in civilized communities in courts of equity which by a generous interpretation of the law safeguard alike its rights and those of the individual.

The criminal courts are concerned at once with the defence of the innocent and the punishment of the guilty. Such punishment inflicted by state authority on those proved guilty of crime is a lawful and ordinary exercise of the jurisdiction inherent in the sovereign power, due proportion being observed between the offence and the punishment. The State, having the duty of protecting the community against the criminal, may adopt such punishments as are best calculated to

prevent the offender from repeating his offence and to deter others from following his example. It may thus not only fine or imprison, but inflict corporal punishment or even the death penalty for graver offences such as wilful murder. Such punishments, while in the main remedial or deterrent, are also, as we have seen (p. 111) retributive.

(3) *Executive.* Under this head we may group all those functions which are connected with the efficient administration of the State, such as finance, including direct and indirect taxation; the services, police, army and navy; sanitary regulations of all kinds, ranging from quarantine to housing; moral functions. These last are partly included under the heading ' police,' but in the modern State they include also the education of children. The education of the child is primarily the affair of the parent, at once his right and his duty. But as under modern conditions a large proportion of parents are either too ignorant or too occupied themselves to attend to their children's education, the function of elementary education has been taken over by the State. The problem of elementary education in this country dates from the suppression of the monastic and cathedral schools in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For over 200 years it remained practically untouched by the State. It was hedged about with what has come to be known as ' the religious difficulty ', the most serious attempt made to solve it being the establishment of the Education Board and its Board Schools in 1870. This solution proved to be no solution. The State was to provide secular education, the parent

or the denomination religious instruction and training. The State did however recognize the parent's right to provide such instruction, but refused to devote public money to the complete support of denominational schools. The long struggle for the existence of the denominational schools has gone on ever since. Its history does not here concern us. All that we need note is that the parent has, by the fact that he is a parent, the right and the duty to provide for the religious education of his children, and of this right the State has no authority to deprive him.

6. The Church and the State.

We have said that the State is a perfect society, containing within itself all that is necessary to compass its end. Another perfect society is the Church. The Church differs from the State in that it is a supernatural, whereas the State is a natural, society. The end of the Church is the salvation of souls. The means it employs to this end are in the main supernatural, such as prayer and the sacraments, though it also uses natural means such as training, education, teaching, right environment, etc. As the supernatural is higher than the natural, the supernatural society will of itself be higher than the natural association which we call the State. Hence it is quite erroneous to regard the Church as a function or department of the State, or as being subject to its control *in matters ecclesiastical*. The qualifying phrase is important. It does not mean that members of the Church are not also subjects of the State and bound

by its laws when these are just. It means that the State would be acting *ultra vires* if it attempted to interfere with either the dogmatic or moral teaching of the Church, especially as affecting the ordinary life and conduct of its members, or to hamper its freedom in administering the sacraments, ordaining its priests, choosing its bishops. Thus the State may not prohibit attendance at Sunday Mass, or interfere with the Church's marriage laws, or with the religious education of Catholic children

Owing to the unfortunate multiplicity nowadays of sects all claiming to be Christian most modern States adopt the policy of complete neutrality in regard to all religious denominations. In modern religious conditions such tolerance may be acquiesced in and accepted. Unless the government is professedly anti-Christian direct State interference with the Church is happily the exception rather than the rule. But there always remains the danger of indirect interference in matters that affect the general interest, such as for instance elementary education, where 'the religious difficulty' has been the bugbear of those who have advocated a uniform State education.

In a conflict between the Church and the State in matters falling within the Church's competence to decide, the right of the Church must prevail on the principle of obedience to God rather than to man. Such conflicts more easily occur where a false idea of the Church as a merely human institution has ousted the truth that she is a divinely instituted supernatural society parallel with but not subject to the State.

Questions for Revision.

1. Define the State. In what sense is the State 'natural'?
2. Trace the connexion between the family and the State. How far can the State be said to be conventional or artificial? How does its end differ from that of the family?
3. "State authority is from God"—explain.
4. How do you reconcile the statements that 'the State exists for individual, not the individual for the State', and 'the State looks not to the good of the individual but to the good of the whole'?
5. What is the duty of the State in regard to the physical well-being of its subjects?
6. Compare the theories of the Divine Right of Kings and of the Sovereignty of the People, and indicate where they are defective.
7. State the theory of Suarez as to the origin of sovereignty. What criticism may be made against it?
8. Is the sovereign the servant of the State? Give reasons for your answer.
9. What are the main functions of the State?
10. In what relation does the Church stand to the State?

1. Some useful text-books :—

M. Cronin, *The Science of Ethics.* Dublin, Gill, 2 vols. 17/6 each.

Joseph Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy.* Longmans, 6/6.

J. Elliot Ross, *Christian Ethics.* New York, The Devin Adair Company (and Herder, London), 16/-.

C. C. Miltner, *The Elements of Ethics.* Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 7/6.

T. Slater, *A Manual of Moral Theology.* Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 2 vols., 25/-.

Koch-Preuss, *A Handbook of Moral Theology*, Vol. V. : *Man's Duties to His Fellowmen.* Herder, 12/6.

2. For reference to special portions of the subject :—

H. Parkinson, *A Primer of Social Science.* Catholic Social Guild, 3/6.

H. Clay, *Economics for the General Reader.* Macmillan, 4/6.

A. D. Lindsay, *Karl Marx's Capital.* Oxford University Press, 2/6.

Fr. Cuthbert, O.S.F.C., *Catholic Ideals in Social Life*, 4/-, and *Socialism or Democracy*, 3/6. Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

J. Rickaby, *Political and Moral Essays.* New York, Benziger, and *The Lord my Light.* Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 9/-.

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INDEX.

Acts, human, 25, 39
  and capability, 15
  indirect voluntary, 27, 41, 139
  Voluntary, 26
Appetites, 33, 42
Aristotle, 11 (note), 17, 19-21, 22, 44, 69
Bentham, Jeremy, 111
Birth Control, 185 (note)
Calumny, 141
Circumstances, 38
Class War, 169
Conscience, 95, 97, 99, 104
Consequences, 40, 59.
Criteria, 46 f
  Primary, 48
  Secondary, 50
Desire, 29, 42
Determinants of Morality, 35
Detraction, 141
Divine Right of Kings, 198
Divorce, 187
Double Effect, Principle of, 41, 136, 140
Duty, 77 f
  Origin of, 79
  to God, 121
  to neighbour, 136
  to self, 130
End of the Act, 35
  The Final, 23, 82
Ethics, 11 f
Family, The, 154, 183 f
Fear, 30
Freedom, 84
Good, The, 32 f
  Final Good, 21
  Good and evil, 42
Habit, 66
Happiness, 14 f, 62
  Is it attainable, 20
Hedonism, 61, 63
Human Nature, 48
Ignorance, 27
James, William, 68 (note)
Justice, 136
Kant, Immanuel, 85
Killing, 139
Labour, 159
  Theory of value, 17
Law, 87 f
  Object of, 89
  Natural, 93-105
  Moral, 108-130
  Positive, 91
  Eternal, 81, 92, 114
  of General Utility, 50
  of General Injury, 50

Lying, 141 f
Marriage, 185 f
Marx, Karl, 165, 169, 172 f
Mean, The, 70, 71
Means, 37
Mental Reservation, 144
Mill, John Stuart, 56, 58, 60
Minimum Wage, 160
Morality, Determinants of, 35
Moral Philosophy, Method of, 4
Moral Virtue, 68, 72
Motive, 35
Passion, 29
Pleasure, 22, 60
Primary Moral Judgements, 101 f
  Development of, 103
  Immutability of, 105
Private Property, Right of, 150 f
  Responsibility of, 157
  Titles to, 158
Punishment, 110 f
Reason, 16, 69, 96
Rights, 147
Religion, 119
  Duty of, 121
  Acts of, 121
  Theories of Origin 123 (note)
St. Thomas Aquinas, 20, 25, 62, 64, 69, 107, 113, 140, 142, 156 (note)
Sanctions, 110
Sidgwick, Henry, 63
Socialism, 161 f
  and Ethics, 162
  and the Church, 178
Social Reform, 176
Society, 183
Sovereignty, 199
State, The, 190 f
  Reasons for, 193
  Authority in, 195 f
  and Church, 206
Suarez, Francis, 199
Suicide, 132
Superstition, 124
Utilitarianism, 55 f
Virtue, 68
Will, The, 130
Worship, 123

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